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Abstract 
Modern western understandings of citizenship are closely tied to the nation state. This is 
the political community where members are expected to exercise their freedoms and 
practice solidarity. When individuals claim rights across borders and move in and out of 
different polities the state-centric citizenship model is disturbed. Nowhere is this more 
pronounced than in the European Union where borders are transformed by transnational 
migration and internal mobility. This has led some scholars to welcome the emergence 
of a ‘postnational citizenship’ of human rights. Others argue for the need to protect a 
comprehensive state membership based on shared identity and active participation. The 
dichotomy of ‘thick and thin’ citizenship warrants critical attention, however. It risks 
romanticizing national or postnational membership, overlooking historical and 
contemporary power struggles and change.  
 
Agonistic democratic theory offers a particularly promising way of moving beyond the 
binary. It constructs a dynamic relationship between citizenship rights, participation and 
identification. Political conflicts over liberties and membership are seen as practices that 
re-constitute civic actors. By claiming and contesting rights migrants and citizens take 
part in the ongoing re-founding of polities and develop, reinforce or change their 
democratic subjectivity. But agonism like its intellectual counterpart deliberative 
democracy focuses exclusively on public ‘voice’. It neglects to explore the civic 
potential of exit, entry and re-entry so integral to migration and EU citizenship. In the 
thesis I address this problem and develop an agonistic conception of citizenship and 
cross-border movement. I do so through a heuristic empirical case study of transnational 
immigration and EU mobility in the Danish family unification dispute. In response to 
restrictive national policy many have used the freedom of movement in the EU to 
sidestep or contest domestic rules. Based on 30 narrative interviews with Danish-
international couples I draw out and conceptualize practices of contestatory 
transnational citizenship.  
 
 
  
4 
 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis could not have been written without the invaluable intellectual and 
emotional support of my husband, Mogens Hobolth. For his numerous insightful 
comments, our stimulating discussions, and for his patience, encouragement and love I 
am deeply grateful. Throughout the process, I have received excellent supervision from 
Anne Phillips and Jonathan White. I am profoundly thankful for their perceptive 
observations, help and inspiring conversations. Many thanks also to Chandran Kukathas 
who guided the project in its very early stages. Leigh Jenco, Sarah Hartley and Tendayi 
Bloom have read and offered detailed and lucid comments on selected, previous chapter 
drafts.  
 
A book-chapter drawing together some of the findings from chapter four, five and six of 
the thesis has been published in the Danish anthology Ægteskab og Migration: 
Konsekvenser af de danske familiesammenføringsregler 2002-2012 [Marriage and 
Migration: Consequences of the Danish Family Unification Rules 2002-2012] edited by 
Anika Liversage and Mikkel Rytter. Århus: Århus Universitetsforlag. An article version 
of chapter seven is forthcoming in the journal European Political Science Review. 
Earlier versions of chapter two, four, six, seven and appendix II have been presented at 
seminars, conferences and workshops in London, Oxford, and Bath, United Kingdom; 
Boston and San Francisco, USA; Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Turku, Finland; 
Sønderborg, Roskilde and Copenhagen, Denmark. The thesis has benefited greatly from 
comments in these forums. Special appreciation is due to Saskia Bonjour, Eleonor 
Kofman, Marlou Schrover, Anika Liversage, Mikkel Rytter, Garbi Schmidt, Tina 
Gudrun Jensen, Marlene Wind, Laura Block, Mireille Hebing, Aubrey Westfall, 
Christian List, Lea Ypi, Kai Spiekermann, Katrin Flikschuh, Mathew Coakley, 
Yonathan Reshef, Nimrod Kovner, Edward Hall, Pietro Maffetone, Helen Brown 
Coverdale, Luke Ulas, Elisa Piras, Diana Popescu, Molly Gerver and Marta 
Wojciechowska.  
 
Many thanks for very helpful conversations about migration, family unification, Europe 
and political theory to friends and colleagues; Clara Volintiru, Mona Morgan-Collins, 
Anne Staver, Saara Pellander, Kyriaki Nanou, Nadine El-Enany, Vicky Squire and Luis 
5 
 
Cabrera. I am also grateful to my family for their loving support and for interesting 
discussions of Danish family unification policy and practice. Thanks in particular to my 
sister for transcription assistance and to my mother for exploring the city of Malmö with 
me. The thesis is dedicated to the many couples, singles and families, who agreed to 
share their stories about transnational marriage and cross-border movement. I greatly 
value their trust and have endeavoured to do my best to listen to, interpret and re-present 
their actions, perspectives and voices.   
 
  
6 
 
Table of contents 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................... 3 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... 4 
List of tables and figures ............................................................................................... 8 
Preface ........................................................................................................................... 9 
Part one: Conceptualizing citizenship 
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 14 
Citizenship: transformation or decline? .................................................................. 16 
Theorizing citizenship and border crossing ............................................................ 21 
The case: marriage migration, border crossing and EU citizenship........................ 24 
Research questions .................................................................................................. 28 
Key concepts and methodology .............................................................................. 29 
Argument and structure of the thesis ...................................................................... 34 
CHAPTER TWO: DELIBERATIVE AND AGONISTIC CITIZENSHIP ................ 37 
Deliberative democracy and the dynamics of citizenship ....................................... 38 
Agonistic democracy and the dynamics of citizenship ........................................... 45 
Border crossing neglected ....................................................................................... 51 
Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 62 
CHAPTER THREE: STUDYING PRACTICES OF CITIZENSHIP ........................ 63 
Citizenship as practice............................................................................................. 63 
Narrative research ................................................................................................... 69 
Contextualizing the case ......................................................................................... 72 
Informants ............................................................................................................... 77 
Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 81 
 
7 
 
Part two: Stories of cross-border movement 
CHAPTER FOUR: EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP OF LAST RESORT ..................... 83 
European citizenship: a synthesis of thick and thin membership? .......................... 83 
Strategies of last resort: a corrective European citizenship? ................................... 87 
Transformations of belonging and national sovereignty ......................................... 95 
Limits to European citizenship of last resort ........................................................ 104 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 106 
CHAPTER FIVE: EXIT AND VOICE..................................................................... 108 
Border crossing and public deliberation ............................................................... 108 
Border crossing and organized activism ............................................................... 121 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 129 
CHAPTER SIX: PERFORMATIVE CITIZENSHIP ............................................... 131 
Exit as liberal anti-politics .................................................................................... 131 
Deliberative and agonistic democratic re-entry .................................................... 136 
Border crossing and democratic taking ................................................................. 141 
Pragmatic forum-shopping? .................................................................................. 146 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 149 
CHAPTER SEVEN: TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL DIS/OBEDIENCE .................... 150 
From shopping to dis/obedience ........................................................................... 151 
Transnational civil dis/obedience .......................................................................... 154 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 166 
CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION ........................................................................ 168 
Cross-border movement in the Danish family unification dispute ....................... 168 
Citizenship in Europe: beyond the thick and thin binary ...................................... 170 
Insights for agonistic and deliberative democracy ................................................ 172 
A dynamic conception of citizenship across border ............................................. 177 
8 
 
Appendices and bibliography 
APPENDIX I: ON METHODOLOGY ..................................................................... 182 
Fieldwork in a border region ................................................................................. 182 
A narrative research strategy ................................................................................. 189 
List of interviews................................................................................................... 198 
Interview guide...................................................................................................... 203 
APPENDIX II: ON NEWSPAPER DEBATE .......................................................... 205 
Debating the right to love ...................................................................................... 205 
Redrawing the boundaries of liberal democracy ................................................... 217 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................... 219 
 
List of tables and figures 
Figure 1: A generic dynamic model of citizenship ......................................................... 64 
Figure 2: An agonistic model of citizenship ................................................................... 65 
Figure 3: A deliberative model of citizenship ................................................................. 66 
Figure 4: An agonistic model of citizenship across borders ......................................... 178 
Figure 5: An overlapping agonistic model of citizenship across border ....................... 179 
Figure 6: The bridge of Øresund ................................................................................... 182 
Figure 7: Map of the Øresund region ............................................................................ 184 
Table 1: Interview participants...................................................................................... 199 
9 
 
Preface 
The right to private and family life is central to liberal ideals of citizenship and 
protected in many state constitutions and international conventions. The same principles 
are reflected and also increasingly contested in the family unification policies of 
European countries. These laws regulate to what extent spouses, children and dependent 
elderly parents can join settled immigrants and citizens in the EU. Family migration has 
long been one of the most important entry channels but during the past decade states in 
North-Western Europe have begun restricting access. In this trend, Denmark - my home 
country and the focus of this study - has been a noticeable ‘pioneer’. The development 
gives rise to a somewhat paradoxical situation which has animated the writing of this 
thesis. Avowing to guard the political community against real or imaginary costs of 
immigration democratic states are intervening, in some cases quite drastically, in the 
freedom of the citizens they claim to be protecting. To safeguard the polity against 
supposedly ‘unwanted’ outsiders, the rights of insiders are restricted. The result is a 
puzzling citizenship that does not entitle its holders to live in their own country with 
their closest family.  
 
While this reconfiguration of rights and membership warrants attention in itself, the 
often inventive tactics and strategies developed by many couples and families are 
perhaps even more intriguing. Danish citizens are moving to Sweden, Dutch nationals 
go to Belgium and British citizens are leaving for Ireland. This is not due to more liberal 
policies in the neighbouring countries, although in the case of Denmark and Sweden, 
which I study here, the differences in domestic regulation are indeed striking. Rather, 
what prompts this cross-border movement is a complex interplay between national and 
supranational rules. Freedom of movement in the European Union allows EU citizens to 
settle in another member state and to bring their partners if they can support them. It 
also enables European nationals to return again to their home country after a while with 
their spouse, regardless of domestic regulation. It is the practice, lived experiences and 
ethico-political significance of such undertakings that I explore in the thesis. Three short 
vignettes from my narrative interviews with Danish-international couples illustrate 
some of the key themes and questions discussed.  
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Let me begin with the story of Grace and Jonas. Grace is a young Filipina woman who 
came to Denmark to work as an au pair. Although her job in Manila was quite good, the 
comparatively modest stipend she could earn by leaving was worth more than twice her 
former salary. As it turned out, her au pair experience was not a very happy one. She 
felt exploited by her host family who pressed her to work far more than she was 
supposed to and treated her as a low-paid domestic servant. During her stay, however, 
she met Jonas, a Danish man in his early twenties, on an online dating site. They 
became very fond of each other and as their relationship developed the couple began 
considering how they could stay together after Grace’s visa had expired.  
 
Their immediate plan was to get married and apply for family unification. This proved 
to be rather difficult. For more than a decade, Denmark has had one of Europe’s most 
restrictive regulations of marriage migration with demanding requirements of age and 
national attachment as well as economic conditions. The best known of these is the 24-
years rule which stipulates that both spouses must be at least 24 years old before a 
residence permit can be granted. Jonas was only 23 at the time and the couple would 
therefore have to wait. They tried to buy time by applying for a work permit for Grace, 
but without success. Eventually she and Jonas therefore did what many Danish-
international couples have done and went to Sweden to use EU citizenship to realize the 
family life in Scandinavia they desired. In our conversation Jonas explained that he was 
‘just happy we’re in the European Union’ but then added that ‘it’s … a little bit scaring 
that you need to use some other rules than your own country’s. Just to be with …your 
own wife you need to leave your country…’ (Interview with Grace and Jonas, p.16) 
Most of my informants articulate similar views. They report feeling wronged by 
Denmark and are eager to express their critique. When I met them, Jonas and Grace had 
tried several times to contact the Danish media to tell their story, albeit without success, 
but many others have managed to participate in the from time to time vibrant and 
intense public debate over family unification.  
 
One who has done so is Cecilie. While travelling abroad after graduating high school 
Cecilie met an Argentinean architect. He went back to Argentine where she visited him 
twice for a period of three months. Then when she was about to begin her university 
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studies in Denmark they started exploring how he could join her in Copenhagen. Like 
Jonas, 21-years-old Cecilie was too young to apply for family unification under Danish 
national law. She and her partner considered whether he should come with her on a 
tourist visa, try to find a job and get a work permit. With his high level of education that 
might be possible. But the financial crisis had just begun, unemployment was growing 
and it seemed a very risky strategy. Instead, they decided to go to Sweden and then use 
EU-law to move from there to Denmark. While their preparations were on-going a 
heated debate began in the Danish press about national and EU rules for family 
unification. Journalists were eager to find transnational couples willing to tell their 
stories and Cecilie was one of the many who volunteered. ‘I want to sort of do 
something about it or at least have some focus on it’ she explained in our conversation 
(Interview with Cecilie 2011, p.7). During their exile the couple joined a network of 
Danish-International marriage migrants. Through the friends she met here Cecilie 
became involved in the civil society activism of an NGO working to help transnational 
couples and push for a more liberal family migration policy in Denmark.  
 
Helene also took part in the Danish media debate during her brief stay in Sweden. She is 
a Danish woman in her late forties who on a holiday met her Sudanese husband, Jasper. 
They decided that he should move to Denmark where she lives with her two teenage 
daughters from a previous marriage. The couple had no problem with the 24 years rule 
and with a successful dental practice Helene could easily fulfil the economic conditions. 
The challenge for them was that they had to prove that their relationship was ‘genuine’. 
This was due to the age difference of about ten years between Helene and Jasper which 
is generally interpreted by the Danish immigration authorities as an indication of a pro 
forma marriage. Helene was not so much worried that they would not pass as she was 
opposed to state practices of intimacy control as such. ‘[J]ust the fact you had to sit 
there and roll out your whole life … I said: “this is not a way.” It’s un-ethic in my 
opinion or the way I look at the world. So we started to look at the Swedish solution’. 
(Interview with Helene and Jasper 2011, p.3) Helene went to Stockholm, worked for 
three months and returned to Denmark where Jasper was given a residence permit as the 
spouse of a mobile EU citizen. She described their cross-border strategy as a 
‘philosophical’ decision, motivated by her opposition to any state interference in the 
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marital plans of self-supporting adults: Insisting that ‘I don’t want to participate in a 
system like this’, she narrated her practice of exit and re-entry as an act resembling 
conscientious objection (Interview with Helene and Jasper 2011, p.19).  
 
The strategies of cross-border movement, avoidance, resistance and civic activism 
recounted in these and other stories are worth exploring because they in different ways 
challenge how we think about rights and membership. Though democratic citizenship as 
a political concept emerged in the city-states of ancient Greece, its modern grammar is 
profoundly shaped by the development of the nation-state. It is within the boundaries of 
this juridical and political space that citizens are expected to exercise fundamental rights 
and contribute to the common good. Leaving one’s country is sometimes seen as an 
unpatriotic flight from duty, as in the case of tax evasion, and often entails giving up 
important social and occasionally political entitlements. Yet in the European Union it is 
precisely the crossing of borders that enables these couples to activate EU citizenship 
and effectively claim a right to family life.  
 
What does this tell us about the character and practices of membership emerging 
through processes of European integration and transnational migration? Is citizenship as 
a guiding ideal and lived experience losing value or being transformed? What 
theoretical tools do we need to make normative and political sense of citizenship in a 
context of migration and cross-border movement? These are questions that inform and 
motivate this study. With the aim of contributing to a re-conceptualization of citizenship 
I analyze how EU rules are mobilized when confronted with restrictive national 
immigration regulation. I investigate what this entails for the civic ethos and sense of 
belonging of affected couples and how and to what extent, if at all, these strategies of 
cross-border movement constitute acts of resistance or interplay with public protest and 
civil society activism. The thesis thus uses the contentious politics of marriage 
migration in the Danish-Swedish border region as a prism for exploring and engaging 
with important challenges to democratic membership in today’s Europe where the 
movement of persons and the diffusion of transnational law make the boundaries of 
polities profoundly porous and contested. 
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Part one: Conceptualizing citizenship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
14 
 
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
 
Contemporary politics is increasingly played out in a world of ‘porous borders’ 
(Benhabib, 2004, p.3, italics removed). Not only ideas and capital but also people cross 
frontiers transforming political communities. This is particularly striking in the 
European Union. Today’s Europe is marked by considerable mobility of persons across 
political boundaries. Migrants from all over the world arrive in search of refuge, jobs, 
adventure, or family life. Some obtain a right to work and access to health care and 
social services. Others live precarious lives at the margins of society while contributing 
to the economy or engaging in organized protest (Castles and Miller, 2009; Balibar, 
2004). Meanwhile, EU integration has made it easier for Europeans to settle anywhere 
in the union. EU citizenship protects the free movement between member states. 
Citizens are at liberty to seek employment, study, or enjoy their retirement in any EU 
country. They can bring their family members if they can provide for them. Mobile 
citizens may also vote in local and supranational elections, petition EU officials and 
take part in collective action at home or abroad (Citizenship Directive, 2004; Treaty of 
Lisbon, 2007, art. 17).  
 
This movement of persons who claim rights and participate in civil society challenges 
our predominant, nation-state centred understandings of political community (Soysal, 
1994; Benhabib, 2004, pp.178-179). Against the backdrop of the modern state 
citizenship has functioned as the normative ideal which ties together persons and 
political institutions within a given territory (Guild, 2009, p.35). Viewed from the 
perspectives of for example liberal nationalism, statist republicanism, or welfare state 
theories citizens are the subjects of rights bound together by bonds of loyalty and 
affiliation and constituting the self-governing people (Rousseau, 1968; Marshall, 1950; 
Rawls, 1993; Walzer, 1983). As an organizing principle of political life citizenship thus 
combines individual rights, political subjectivity and democratic community. But it does 
so by establishing a clear distinction between insiders and outsiders (Brubaker, 1992; 
p.21; Joppke, 2010a, pp.vi). As cross-border movement increases, what then happens to 
this model of politics? 
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In academic and public debate there have for several decades been heated discussions 
about international migration and intra-EU mobility and what this means for citizenship 
(for a good overview see Joppke, 2010a). Is citizenship an unjust ‘birthright privilege’ 
separating the global haves and have-nots (Sharchar and Hirschl, 2007; Carens, 1987)? 
Or is it the indispensable foundation of national political community (Walzer, 1983; 
Miller, 2008)? Is citizenship in decline (Jacobson, 1996; Spiro, 2008) or merely 
becoming ‘denationalized’ (Sassen, 2002)? Should we welcome a ‘transnational’ 
(Bauböck, 1994, 2007a), ‘postnational’ (Soysal, 1994) or ‘anational’ (Kostakopoulou, 
2009) form of membership? Or worry about a citizenship which is increasingly 
‘flexible’ (Ong, 1999) and instrumental (Bellamy, 2009)?  
 
Citizenship, as we shall see in the following, is both a legal status giving access to a set 
of rights and a lived experience of identification and participation. Moreover, it is an 
empirical phenomenon as well as an ethico-political ideal. While the concept thus refers 
to a state of affairs it is at the same time inherently evaluative. ‘[T]o describe a set of 
social practices in the language of citizenship serves to legitimize them and grant them 
recognition as politically consequential, while to refuse them the designation is to deny 
them that recognition.’ (Bosniak, 2000, p.453) It is therefore not surprising that this 
problematic of citizenship, migration and mobility has attracted the attention of legal 
scholars, sociologists, anthropologists and normative theorists alike. It is to this 
politically invested and profoundly interdisciplinary debate that I wish to contribute. I 
do so with a study of marriage migration, cross-border movement and European 
citizenship situated at the intersection between political theory and political sociology. 
Engaging with agonistic democracy and its deliberative critics I defend and develop 
further a dynamic conception of citizenship. It captures how rights are claimed or lost, 
civic identification transformed and political communities re-imagined through 
practices of cross-border movement. The model sets out how territorial mobility can 
generate and be facilitated by organized civic activism. It depicts how exit, entry and re-
entry can be acts of contestation that transgress political boundaries, construct 
transnational publics and reconstitute democratic subjects.  
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Citizenship: transformation or decline? 
One of the earliest and most influential as well as contested studies exploring the 
politics of migration and citizenship is Yasemin Soysal’s (1994) Limits of Citizenship: 
Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe. In this seminal work Soysal argued 
that civil, social and to some extent political rights, which were previously the 
prerogative of nationals, are now granted to different groups of immigrants in Europe. 
Especially permanent residents and non-nationals from other EU countries have been 
given extensive entitlements although they have not naturalized.
1
 We are therefore 
witnessing, she claimed, ‘a reconfiguration of citizenship from a more particularistic 
one based on nationhood to a more universalistic one based on personhood.’ (Soysal, 
1994, p.137) This allows, she contended, for a differentiated and more inclusionary 
political order where individual freedoms are universal but modes of belonging 
particular and multiple.  
 
The empirical plausibility of Soysal’s argument has been the subject of considerable 
debate. An important objection, in my view, is that supranational citizenship in the EU 
still presupposes full membership in one of the Union’s member countries, the 
allocation of which is a nation-state prerogative. Resident immigrants do not have the 
same freedoms and the external borders of Europe are tightly regulated (Bosniak, 2000; 
Maas, 2005; Balibar, 2004). In addition, much has changed in European migration and 
refugee policies in the two decades since Soysal first formulated her post-national 
thesis. Immigration has become a contentious political issue in most countries. Access 
to asylum - perhaps the best candidate for a human rights based, quasi-membership - 
has been severely restricted (Hatton, 2004). Moreover, as it has become more common 
for Western European countries to deport even permanent resident immigrants who are 
convicted of certain crimes, it is clear that citizenship status is still an important legal 
protection. None of this necessarily denies that significant transformations of 
                                                 
1
 Soysal clearly cherishes the fact that naturalization is not a precondition for rights, but at the time when 
she wrote her thesis the Turkish guest workers in Germany and their children - who are in many ways the 
central case of her study - had serious difficulties acquiring German citizenship even if they wanted to. 
This was due to Germany’s ethnicity based citizenship law (Brubaker 1992), which has subsequently 
been changed in a liberal direction. For a discussion of Germany’s politics of membership in the 1990, 
see Benhabib (2004). 
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membership are taking place in Europe, but it does caution us against an overly 
optimistic view of membership qua personhood (Bosniak, 2000; Benhabib, 2004).  
 
Though there are thus good reasons to be sceptical of the empirical accuracy of Soysal’s 
argument, these are not grounds for dismissing it. Rather, we should read it, as Linda 
Bosniak (2000, p.453) argues, ‘as an aspirational claim, a claim of desire rather than 
fact.’ What Soysal and others are doing is to challenge the implicit assumption that 
political membership must be national. They are making a normative intervention by 
opening up a different terrain for thinking about citizenship – not as it actually is, fully 
and incontrovertibly, but as it might become. Soysal’s work has thus inspired a new 
conversation about political community where different scholars aim to theorize 
belonging, rights and participation in new ways (see for example Benhabib, 2004; 
Kostakopoulou, 2009; McNevin, 2011). My thesis seeks to contribute to a re-
conceptualization of citizenship outside the confines of a nation-state model which 
currently has such a strong ‘hold upon our political imagination’ (Benhabib, 2004, 
p.178). But before we begin to explore how this is to be done, it is important first to 
introduce some key objections which have been raised against such an endeavour and 
which a convincing reinterpretation of citizenship must be able to meet.   
 
In the US, Peter H. Schuck (1989) and David Jacobson (1996) have both expressed 
concerns over the disentangling of freedoms and entitlements from citizenship status 
and identity. They argue that citizenship has been devalued by the distribution of rights 
to immigrants who can enjoy the benefits of membership without fully taking on the 
duties through naturalization. The risk is a general decrease in civic virtue and 
identification. Instead of a political community of compatriots united by their 
commitment to the common good, multiple communal and privatized modes of 
belonging are emerging (see also Jacobson, 2002
2
). Thus, while the boundaries 
distinguishing citizens from aliens may become more porous, we could end up with 
what Michael Walzer (1983) has termed ‘a thousand petty fortresses’ separating classes 
                                                 
2
 In Place and Belonging in America Jacobson (2002) analyzes the decreasing importance of territory for 
US membership and connects this to the rise of judicial politics and litigation supplanting republican 
participation. The public space is shrinking, he argues, while the private sphere (intimate, market-based 
and ethno-communal) is growing.    
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and ethnic groups. The cautionary tone of this republican argument is aptly captured by 
the title of Jacobson’s iconic Rights Across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of 
Citizenship.
3
 It is important to note, though, especially given a political environment of 
restrictive immigration policy where immigrants are often blamed for poor integration, 
that the ‘decline’ here is not causally attributed to immigration or immigrants as such 
but to a particular mode of incorporation. Immigration, which is permanent and 
involves a transfer of political loyalty in line with the US ‘melting pot’ tradition, need 
not be a problem. But strong transnational political ties and circular or chain migration 
are rather more difficult to accommodate within a framework of uniform membership.
4
   
 
In a European context Richard Bellamy (2008, 2009) has put forth similar arguments. 
His concern, however, is less with international migration
5
 than with EU mobility. What 
worries Bellamy is the expansive development of EU citizenship and in particular the 
free movement that is such a central part of it. He contends that the Union’s 
supranational membership status, with its focus on private rights and freedoms, is too 
‘thin’ (cf. Walzer, 1994) to serve as a genuine citizenship. Only within the nation state 
do we find the conditions necessary for democratic identification, solidarity and 
participation (see also Miller, 1995). Cross-border movement in the EU is valuable as a 
means of promoting peaceful relations and commerce among member states. But if 
rights are increasingly granted to mobile Europeans without correlative duties this 
creates an incentive to ‘shop around’ in search of the best deal (cf. Scharpf, 1999). Such 
an instrumental attitude is in itself at odds with the ethos of citizenship and could 
furthermore undermine the solidarity necessary for an egalitarian political community.   
 
If there are reasons to be sceptical of too optimistic accounts of postnational 
membership, then decline of citizenship arguments are no less contentious. Christian 
Joppke, for example, rightly criticizes the nostalgic longing of liberal nationalists and 
                                                 
3
 A more recent version of this ‘decline’-thesis has been articulated by Peter Spiro (2008) who argues that 
US citizenship as a legal status no longer adequately reflects people’s ties, identities and modes of 
participation. Though his analysis has less of a dystopic ring to it, the contention is still that citizenship is 
on its way out.  
4
 Much the same can be said about emigration as Rainer Bauböck points out (2003, p.719). 
5
 Bellamy (2008) argues that immigrants – by which he means non-EU nationals – reinterpret rather than 
undermine national identity and are thus not a problem provided that they take on the full duties of 
membership through naturalization.  
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statist republicans for an idealized model of political community. He points out that ‘the 
moment of such citizenship, in which rights were balanced by obligations but where, in 
turn, rights were more exclusive to the status of citizen than they are today, was shorter 
than commonly believed. Above all, it was tied up with a less commendable world of 
warfare and interstate violence.’ (Joppke, 2010b, p.30) In my view this is a crucial 
objection which deserves to be unpacked in some detail. To begin with, while political 
rights were gradually extended to the male population of Western Europe and the US in 
return for participation in war, women remained disenfranchised up until the early- and 
mid- 20
th
 century. Moreover, the emancipation of European working classes usually 
went hand in hand with the subjection of non-western populations to imperial rule (cf. 
Isin, 2002). In the US, it took the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s to end the policy 
of racial segregation in which African-Americans were treated as second class citizens. 
While the racist doctrines on which these regimes were built have now largely been 
delegitimized, they continue to cast long shadows in contemporary domestic and global 
politics. Joppke is therefore right that a citizenship resembling the thick, egalitarian-
republican ideal, to the extent it has ever existed, is a very recent phenomenon and not 
the longstanding model its supporters seem to imply when they point out the current 
threats it allegedly faces.  
 
However, while I fully endorse the critique of a romanticized conception of nation-state 
membership, I am not persuaded by Joppke’s broader analysis. He argues that 
citizenship in contemporary Europe and especially in the EU is bound to be a thin, 
postnational affair. Joppke is rather cautious in his enthusiasm for this ‘citizenship light’ 
as he terms it. In particular, he is concerned, like Bellamy, that the free movement of 
persons within the European Union could undermine social solidarity and thus threaten 
established welfare rights. Even so, he welcomes what he sees as the emergence of a 
rights-based, inclusive citizenship in the member states as well as at the EU level as an 
unavoidable and on the whole desirable trend.
6
 In developing his analysis of this 
‘inevitably lightening of citizenship’ Joppke (2010b, pp.14-15) discusses recent 
attempts by European governments to make political membership thicker and more 
                                                 
6
 The sociological analyses of for example Joppke and Jacobson are not explicitly normative in the same 
way the political theory arguments of Bellamy are. Even so, their interpretations of empirical trends often 
reflect implicit normative positions and judgments. See for example Joppke, 2010b, p.30. 
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selective by, for example, introducing citizenship tests. As part of the argument, he 
points out that when you look at the values these tests are meant to further, they are 
nearly all universalistic liberal ideals which are not specific to any particular country. It 
is thus hard to see how they could help foster a comprehensive and distinct national 
identity (Joppke, 2010b, p.18; for an intriguing discussion, see Joppke, 2008). This is a 
reasonable point, but advanced in this context it concedes rather too much to the 
republican ‘decline of citizenship’ argument Joppke criticizes. He seems to be saying - 
echoing sceptics like Jacobson - that for immigrants to become bearers of a thick, 
participatory citizenship, they would have to demonstrate their allegiance to a specific 
national political culture and set of institutions in accordance with state requirements. 
That in turn indirectly reaffirms the uniform model of citizenship where rights, 
identification and civic practice are all tied to a given political status. The postnational 
thesis, however, is precisely that this configuration is being disentangled (Soysal) or 
that it never quite was what it is supposed to have been (Joppke). The arguments of 
liberal nationalists or statist republicans are thus built on a binary distinction between a 
thick national and a thin postnational membership, which as we have seen already is 
questionable, but which is implicitly reproduced by Joppke in his account of a 
citizenship light.  
  
This dispute between ‘decline of citizenship’ scholars and some of their central critics 
thus leaves us with the impression that we must choose between a minimal legal status 
which can accommodate transnational migration and mobility but at the costs of 
communal bonds and democratic participation, and a deep national membership that 
seeks to reduce cross-border movement to preserve established polities. To see the 
potential limitations of this way of structuring the debate it is helpful to look to the 
growing body of research across a range of different disciplines that explores the civic 
agency of migrants. Sociological and anthropological studies show how migrants often 
develop multiple ties of belonging and engage in politics and civil society across 
political boundaries. Not all such transnational activism is democratic but some of it 
clearly is (Levitt, 2001; Smith and Bakker, 2005; Moghadam, 2009). Research within 
critical borders and migration studies analyzes the ‘contested politics of mobility’ 
(Squire, 2011). Asylum seekers and irregular migrants, it is argued, claim rights, 
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exercise freedom, and push for global democracy by crossing borders and organizing 
collectively (Mezzadra, 2004; Papadopoulos et al., 2008; Aradau and Huysmans, 2009; 
Aradau et al., 2010; Nyers and Rygiel, 2012).  
 
In political theory this new agenda has been taken up by liberals (Bauböck, 1995, 2003), 
post-marxists (Balibar, 2004) and post-structuralists (Ranciére, 2004) but has in 
particular been advanced by scholars working within the traditions of agonistic and 
deliberative democracy (Honig, 2001b; McNevin, 2011; Glover, 2011; Benhabib, 2004; 
Means, 2009). Developing dynamic understandings of political membership, these 
different scholars argue that what we are confronted with is a renegotiation and 
reinterpretation of civil liberties and identification and that this is itself a citizenship 
practice. It is to the theorization of citizenship and migration within these two radical 
democratic theories that I now turn. Agonist and deliberative theorists have already 
gone some way towards challenging the troubling binary between thick national and 
thin and postnational membership (see Benhabib, 2004; Honig, 2001b). While this is 
very helpful I argue that more attention to practices of cross-border movement is 
needed.  
 
Theorizing citizenship and border crossing 
Deliberative and agonistic theories have in the past couple of decades emerged as 
insightful and influential frames for thinking about contemporary democracy and 
political membership. Though questions of migration have not always been at the 
forefront in these bodies of literature, important theoretical and conceptual 
developments have been carried out through an engagement with the rights claims and 
actions of immigrants and refugees (see especially Honig, 2001b, and Benhabib, 2004).  
 
Deliberative democrat Jürgen Habermas (2001a) agrees with statist republicans that 
active participation and collective self-government are essential components of 
citizenship. But individual rights, he insists, are no less important. The two dimensions 
are equally fundamental. This is where he parts ways with someone like Bellamy 
(2008), who, while also in favour of civic rights, presents them as the outcome of and 
ultimately subordinate to democracy. The universality of rights, deliberative democrats 
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argue, obliges the people to consider the interests and perspectives not just of all their 
own members but of outsiders as well. Moreover, as the make-up of the citizenry 
changes through immigration, newcomers will take part in the reinterpretation of civic 
freedoms and the ethos of citizenship (Habermas, 1994). Even resident immigrants, who 
have not yet acquired the right to vote, can participate in these renegotiations by 
articulating their views and engaging in the exchange of reasoned arguments in the 
public sphere (Benhabib, 2004, 2011).  
 
This conceptualization has considerable merit in this context, as it allows us to see 
migrants as potential civic actors who reconstruct rather than undermine a thick 
citizenship. But the line of argument has important drawbacks as well. Habermasian 
deliberative democracy has a very demanding, idealized understanding of public claims 
making, emphasizing the exchange of reasoned argument (Habermas, 1996). This 
underestimates how difficult it can be for persons in marginal positions, including many 
groups of migrants and ethnic minorities, not just to get access to public forums for 
deliberation but, more importantly, to be heard as rational in dominant discourses 
(Butler, 1995; Young, 1990).   
 
Agonistic democracy has significant advantages in this respect. It offers a similarly 
dynamic understanding of citizenship which sees individual rights and political 
identification as objects of ongoing and open-ended political struggle where both 
insiders and outsiders can take part (Mouffe, 2000; Honig, 2001b). In contrast to 
deliberative democrats who place reason and understanding at the heart of civic action, 
agonists like Chantal Mouffe emphasise conflict and political mobilization. This allows 
for a broader understanding of citizenship practices which stresses passion, rhetoric and 
contentious claims making. It also draws attention to the importance of organized action 
as a way of challenging hegemonic constructions of membership that make particular 
claims and grievances inaudible (Honig, 2009b). In the context of migration, agonists 
point out how excluded groups such as irregular immigrants increasingly act in concert 
to challenge political boundaries which deny them basic freedoms (McNevin, 2011; 
Glover, 2011).    
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There are also limitations, however, to the way agonistic democrats have so far engaged 
with the politics of migration and citizenship. Like their deliberative democratic 
interlocutors, they focus on what Albert Hirschman (1970) famously termed ‘voice’.7 It 
is the various forms of public claims making - reasoned or passionate, individual or 
collective – by citizens and migrants that are analyzed. ‘Exit’ by contrast, where 
dissatisfaction or disagreement is expressed by leaving one polity and entering another, 
is largely ignored by both schools of thought due to its apparently silent and 
individualistic character. This means that despite the emphasis on immigration and 
‘porous borders’ (Benhabib 2004) the practice of crossing political boundaries so 
essential to migration is not given adequate consideration. Or rather its civic and 
political potential is underexplored (for a partial exception see Honig, 2001b). But in the 
EU the process of leaving and entering a member-state constitutes a person as a 
European citizen who can claim extensive rights (Bellamy, 2009; Wind, 2008-09; but 
see Kochenov, 2011). Here, voice, exit, entry and re-entry would seem to be intimately 
linked. This inattention to border crossing is not only empirically troubling as it 
prevents a more comprehensive analysis of contemporary practices of membership in 
Europe. It is also theoretically problematic because it weakens the attempts by agonists 
and deliberative democrats to counter the critique from liberal nationalists and statist 
republicans. What really concerns Bellamy, for example, is the seemingly thin, 
instrumental moving in and out of European countries facilitated by EU citizenship. If 
we can show that at least some forms of cross-border movement within the EU and 
transnationally can be a way of practicing participatory democratic membership, this 
greatly strengthens the arguments in favour of citizenship beyond the nation-state.  
 
In order to demonstrate more fully the analytical potential of dynamic re-
conceptualizations of citizenship it is therefore important to explore practices of border 
crossing. More attention needs to be given to analyzing the meaning of exit, entry and 
re-entry and how these strategies interplays with voice (cf. Hirschman, 1993) in 
struggles over citizenship and migration in Europe. A few thoughtful and innovative 
discussions of the civic character of cross-border movement have been offered by 
theorists working within liberal cosmopolitan and neo-Marxist frameworks (Cabrera, 
                                                 
7
 This bias is not exclusive to deliberative and agonistic democracy. As Mark Warren (2011) points out 
democratic theories have generally neglected to explore the critical potential of exit.  
24 
 
2010; Mezzadra, 2004, 2011). Approaching the problem from the perspectives of 
deliberative and agonistic democracy has advantages, however. Not only are both of 
these radical democratic theories strongly committed to citizenship as a mode of 
democratic participation and identifications.
8
 Their defenders also share with statist 
republican interlocutors a firm belief in the political necessity of boundaries and a 
profound scepticism of world-government schemes (Mouffe, 2000, 2009; Benhabib, 
2004). If a plausible argument can be made for reinterpreting modalities of cross-border 
movement as civic practices drawing on these theories, then it will present us with a 
stronger case against objections from ‘decline of citizenship’ sceptics.  
 
The thesis I advance is that agonistic democracy in particular presents a promising 
frame for re-conceptualizing thick and thin practices of citizenship across borders but 
that a proper understanding of exit and entry as potential civic strategies is lacking. This 
weakens the ability of the theory to allow us to go beyond the binary of thick 
participatory national citizenship and thin post-national rights-based membership. 
Through a theory-developing heuristic empirical case study of the Danish family 
unification dispute I thus expand and re-appropriate the dynamic agonistic conception 
of citizenship. I do so to incorporate modalities of cross-border movement as practices 
of claiming rights, participating in existing or emerging political communities and 
affirming and re-constructing democratic identification. 
 
The case: marriage migration, border crossing and EU citizenship 
The debate over thick and thin political membership is reflected in on-going migration 
politics. Joppke focuses, as we have seen, on changes in access to formal membership 
with the introduction of language and citizenship tests in several countries. I want to 
draw attention instead to another area, namely the contentious politics of marriage 
migration. Transnational marriages are interesting in this context because they challenge 
the distinction so central to state-centric conceptions of political community between 
insiders and outsiders, citizens and foreigners. When citizens marry spouses from 
another country, they demonstrate the inevitable porousness of the boundaries of 
membership. This is not merely because aliens, if they obtain family unification with a 
                                                 
8
 This is also central to Luis Cabrera’s liberal cosmopolitan theory which explore the ‘the practice of 
global citizenship’ 
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citizen spouse, gain access to the territory. Rather, the intimate union of spouses disturb 
the symbolic constitution of the ‘body politic’. Through bonds of marriage members 
and non-members are tied together, and immigrants thus become deeply implicated in 
the cultural and embodied reproduction of the political community.  
 
Spousal migration has been high on the political agenda in several European countries 
in recent years. When labour immigration from outside the Common Market was curbed 
in the early 1970s, family unification was one of the few legal forms of entry left. It 
continued to be a popular immigration route as the children of former labour migrants 
grew up and often entered into transnational marriages with spouses from their parents’ 
country of origin (Olwig, 2011; Charsley, 2007; Rytter 2010a). Other groups of citizens 
also marry across borders reflecting increasing internationalization in tourism, business 
relations and student life (Rytter and Liversage, 2014). Indeed, what Ulrich Beck (2011) 
has termed ‘the global chaos of love’ very nicely illustrates some of the complex 
economic and socio-cultural developments in the world today. It goes to the heart of the 
conceptual and political dilemma between the freedom of a self-governing people to 
determine its own boundaries and the rights of individuals and families. 
 
Across most of Western Europe access to family unification has been tightened in the 
past ten to fifteen years (Ruffer, 2011, p.936). In public discourse, concerns are 
expressed that rights to family life are being used instrumentally to obtain residence 
permits for relatives who do not have a genuine bond to the state or their spouses. 
Politicians critical of immigration argue that liberal family unification rules have led to 
mass migration. This is presented as a threat to political values, cultural cohesion and 
the welfare state. Thus, policies have been introduced in several countries to prevent 
marriages of convenience or simply reduce immigration altogether and in this way 
protect a thick national community (Kofman, 2004, pp.254-255; Ruffer, 2011).  
 
Denmark has been a front-runner in this development. For more than a decade 
successive governments have adopted very restrictive rules for family and marriage 
migration (Rytter, 2010b, pp.301-302).  In 2002 the newly elected centre-right 
government, with the support of the anti-immigration Danish People’s Party (Dansk 
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Folkeparti), carried through a comprehensive reform of the Aliens Act 
(Udlændingeloven). This included very significant restrictions on spousal migration. A 
24-years-rule was introduced stating that both partners must be at least 24 years old to 
obtain family unification. This was combined with a requirement that the couple’s joint 
attachment to Denmark must exceed their ties to any other country. Several economic 
conditions were also launched or tightened. The objectives of the law were to reduce the 
number of immigrants, promote self-sufficiency and prevent forced marriages (Ministry 
of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2002, pp.14, 36-39; Aliens Act, 2002). 
Especially the attachment requirement, distinguishing between different categories of 
citizens on the basis of their length of residency as well as linguistic, familial, education 
and labour market ties to Denmark, reflects an ethno-cultural understanding of 
membership (Rytter, 2010b). Citizenship is thus not merely a formal legal status. 
Rather, to gain access to the full freedoms that comes with it, individuals and families 
must demonstrate a thicker socio-cultural form of belonging.  
 
The strict family unification rules have made it very hard for citizens and immigrants to 
settle in Denmark with a partner from outside the European Union (Rytter, 2010a). In 
response, some have voiced their grievances or expressed their views in public debate. 
Many Danes have also made use of their status as EU-citizens and moved with their 
partner across the border to Sweden.
9
 To encourage free movement and thereby 
promote European integration EU citizens who live for a while in another member-state 
obtain a number of rights. This includes in particular extensive protection of family life. 
Crossing an internal border thus enables citizens to sidestep restrictive domestic family 
unification regulation. It also allows them to return again to their own country with their 
foreign spouse regardless of national immigration laws (Citizenship Directive, 2004; 
Rytter, 2007). While precise numbers are hard to come by, a recent study ‘suggests that 
an estimated 2,000-3,000 Danes have moved to Sweden since 2002 in order to obtain 
                                                 
9
 Denmark has an opt-out of EU cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs. This means that the 
country is not bound by the EU’s Family Unification Directive (2003) applicable to third country 
nationals residing in a member state who seek to bring in a spouse from outside the Union. Family 
unification for mobile EU citizens, however, is regulated by the Citizenship Directive and based on the 
right to free movement – a fundamental principle within the EU. Denmark is thus not exempted from this 
legislation (Manners et al., 2008, pp.296-297).  
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family unification’ (Rytter, 2010a, p.126; see also Schmidt et al., 2009).10 Similar cross-
border movement is found between for example the UK and Ireland, or Belgium and the 
Netherlands (Bonjour and de Hart, 2013; Staver, 2013) 
 
The EU route is not an option open to all. Only citizens and not resident immigrants can 
move freely across borders and bring their partners, and then only if they can provide 
for the spouse (Citizenship Directive, 2004). Still, compared with Danish national rules 
EU regulation is considerably less demanding. Some of the Danish exiles are settling 
permanently in Sweden with their families. Others are returning or plan to do so (Rytter, 
2007; author interviews). The options within EU law have been quite controversial in 
Denmark as in some other European countries.
11
 For several years Danish immigration 
officials interpreted EU law very narrowly and provided little public information about 
this set of rules (The Danish Parliamentary Ombudsman, 2008; Bøegh-Lervang and 
Madum, 2010). That in turn made it difficult for couples to use their supranational 
rights to return to Denmark after a period in Swedish exile. Later, as public debate arose 
about this administrative practice leading politicians criticized the EU and especially the 
European Court of Justice for encroaching upon Danish national sovereignty and 
interfering in Denmark’s immigration policy (see chapter four).  
 
The controversy in Denmark over family unification and EU mobility therefore aptly 
illustrates the political contention concerning post- or supranational rights and the 
boundaries of democratic community. National identity and popular sovereignty are 
often presented in this dispute as under siege from immigration and EU integration. As 
such the case is well suited to explore the tension between thick national and thin 
postnational citizenship and the limitations of this interpretive frame. From the 
perspectives of deliberative and agonistic democracy the Danish family unification 
dispute is also interesting to investigate. On the one hand, the public debate over the 
meaning and boundaries of citizenship places it firmly within the remit of these 
                                                 
10
 This estimate is a few years old. In 2010-2011 a new restrictive reform was introduced - see chapter 
three - which again intensified movement to Sweden. The estimate should be viewed with some caution 
due to limitations in the government statistics and the high political sensitivity of the topic.  
11
 In response to a green paper on family unification from the Europe Commission the Dutch government 
(2012) recommends restricting not just EU’s rules for third country national but also for mobile EU-
citizens. 
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theories. On the other hand, the novel strategies of exit, entry and re-entry challenge 
implicit assumptions in these perspectives about what forms practices of citizenship 
may take. This makes it useful for a heuristic case study with the purpose of conceptual 
development (cf. George & Bennett, 2005, p.75; Lijphart 1971, pp.64-65). Across 
Europe we find similar cases of contentious mobility and family migration. More 
broadly, migrants in other parts of the world cross borders to claim rights and challenge 
state policies that are experienced as illegitimate. The empirical patterns are likely to 
differ considerably, but a conceptual reinterpretation can open up new ways of 
analyzing and discussing cross-border movement with broad relevance, even if careful 
consideration should be given to changes in context, which will influence the character 
and conditions of such actions.  
 
The thesis thus presents a case study of the Danish family unification dispute. While 
Denmark’s Aliens’ Act naturally plays a major role in this controversy, the analysis is 
not an investigation of national immigration policy or comparative ‘citizenship models’ 
(Brubaker, 1992; Favell, 1998). With the complex and dynamic interrelation between 
Denmark’s immigration rules, EU integration, international law and Nordic cooperation 
the case underlines the importance of adopting what Rainer Bauböck (2010, p.302) has 
termed ‘a transnational constellation perspective’ on citizenship. To understand stakes, 
strategies and actions in the dispute attention must be given, as the analysis will show, 
to Danish and Swedish domestic rules as well as varying implementation of EU 
legislation, case law from the European Court of Justice, human rights conventions and 
even in some cases to the citizenship and migration policies of the foreign spouses’ 
home countries.  
 
Research questions 
In this thesis I examine struggles over migration and political membership in the Danish 
family unification dispute in a study combining political theory and political sociology. 
I ask what insights, if any, we can draw from the practices of contentious cross-border 
movement central to this controversy for the conceptual debate over thick and thin 
citizenship in general and for agonistic and deliberative democracy in particular.  
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To answer this question I look at how, if at all, citizenship is practiced in and through 
border crossing when transnational couples faced with the restrictive Danish marriage 
migration rules use EU law: I examine in what ways these couples claim rights across 
borders. What ideals of political community are mobilized and contested? How, if at all, 
are their self-understandings and modes of identification re-constructed? In what ways, 
if at all, do their actions of exit, entry and re-entry interplay with public voice and 
collective action?  
 
On this basis, I explore whether citizenship is lost, rediscovered or transformed through 
modalities of border crossing. If I do find that political membership is enacted rather 
than abandoned, to what extent can these practices be captured by the framework of 
thick and thin citizenship? How, if at all, can exit, entry and re-entry support or 
constitute acts of political contestation enabling us to extend agonistic theories of 
democracy? How, if at all, can cross-border movement meet the requirements of 
reasoned debate allowing it to be incorporated within deliberative democracy? 
 
Key concepts and methodology 
To answer this set of questions I conduct an in-depth study of family unification and 
cross-border movement exploring practices of thick and thin citizenship. The Danish 
family unification dispute is analyzed from the perspectives of agonistic and 
deliberative democracy, but these conceptual frames are also critically assessed and 
reinterpreted in light of the case.  
 
Style of reasoning 
A study of citizenship practices invites a close conversation between a political theory 
offering critical and normative conceptions of political community and a political 
sociology analyzing actual performances and lived experiences of membership across 
borders. While sociologists and anthropologists have long been investigating migration, 
political philosophers have generally not shown the same interest. When John Rawls 
revived the discipline in 1971 with the publication of A Theory of Justice he focused on 
a society perceived as ‘a closed system isolated from other societies’, thus effectively 
bracketing questions of emigration and immigration (Rawls, 1971, p.8). A few critics 
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pointed out that this left aside the important issue of political boundaries and their 
legitimacy (Walzer, 1983; Carens, 1987). As Walzer argued, before we discuss what 
rights and obligations to distribute among members, we need to confront the distribution 
of membership itself. Even so, migration remained a largely marginalized issue in 
political theory. With a few important exceptions (Arendt, 1958b; Walzer, 1983; 
Carens, 1987; Barry and Goodin, 1992; Bauböck, 1994), it was mostly addressed 
somewhat indirectly as part of the debate over multiculturalism (see for example 
Kymlicka, 1995; Barry, 2001; Phillips, 2007). Recently, however, this has changed with 
theorists increasingly concerned with political boundaries. Migratory movement is now 
analyzed by a wide field of scholars and from a variety of theoretical perspectives 
(Abizadeah, 2008; Miller, 2008; Anker, 2010; Ypi, 2012). Various meta-theoretical 
approaches are employed in these studies of membership and foreigners, ranging from 
analytical philosophy and applied ethics to critical theory and deconstructive methods 
(see for example Valadez, 2012; Kukathas, 2005; Benhabib, 2004; Doty, 2006).  
 
The present study, following deliberative and agonistic perspectives, is situated within a 
broad tradition of immanent critique. These theorists engage with actual struggles, 
actions, discursive constructions and forms of resistance by contemporary migrants and 
citizens. The aim is to criticize embedded power relations while drawing out the 
transformative agency displayed by some persons and groups. That in turn spurs a close 
interaction with empirical political sociology analyzing how citizenship is lived and 
contested on the ground (see especially Benhabib, 2004; McNevin, 2011; Glover, 
2011).  
 
This approach has, in my view, several merits. The problem with Rawls’ bracketing of 
cross-border human mobility was not merely that the rights of immigrants and 
emigrants were not attended to, but that their ability to act and take part in political 
communities disappeared from view. It reflected how our contemporary conceptions of 
democracy and citizenship have developed in conjunction with the nation-state thus 
generating a built-in bias (cf. Bosniak, 2000). Exploring how migrants and citizens 
themselves contest and dispute political boundaries can help us challenge the 
unreflective nationalism of our political grammar (McNevin, 2013). But this is not the 
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only virtue of such a mode of inquiry. A growing number of scholars in the analytical 
tradition, for example, are also reinterpreting key concepts of political theory for a post-
national context. Without carefully studying actual practices, however, we risk 
misrepresenting the stakes in disputes over migration and membership. Moreover, 
engaging with the claims and actions of immigrants and emigrants reflects an egalitarian 
respect for and brings attention to actors whose agency and subjectivity has been 
overlooked and denied (cf. Tully, 2008).  
 
This cross-disciplinary conversation between empirical political sociology and political 
theory follows an interpretivist epistemology which does not operate with the hard and 
fast distinction between ‘facts and norms’ (Habermas, 1996) so central to analytical 
philosophy and positivist social science. The reason for this is quite simple. The 
conceptual lenses we use are often themselves normative in character. Thus, when we 
describe a particular set of practices as civic or democratic we are implicitly saying that 
these are good in some ways. This form of categorizing, necessary to any empirical 
study of citizenship and migration, is therefore invariably and unavoidably an act of 
judgment (Bosniak, 2000). There are, however, different ways of reconstructing the 
relationship between empirics and ethics within the tradition of immanent critique. 
Habermas (1996), for example, argues that when we engage in communicative practices 
we implicitly assume rules about reason-giving from which normative principles of 
justification can be derived. This argument does not reduce moral codes to actually 
existing customs, but it contends that universal norms, which transcend any given 
societal ethics, are built into the socio-linguistic practices of the life world. His political 
theory develops a normative account of liberal democracy based on an idealized 
reconstruction of such practices, which in turn can be used as a regulative ideal for 
judging actual deliberation.  
 
The problem with this argument is its reductive view of speech and action particularly 
in politics. While Habermas recognizes that language has expressive and instrumental 
aspects as well, he presents these as subordinate to the ‘telos’ of understanding. Yet 
political communication, as agonists are apt to point out, is as much about mobilizing 
support through passionate rhetoric, creating collective identities and negotiating who 
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gets what (Mouffe, 2000). If we take the example of the mass protests in Europe and the 
US by irregular migrants, these actions undoubtedly demonstrate a wish to have specific 
grievances, interests and perspectives heard and taken into account, but they are also 
enactments of dissent through which migrants refuse to be defined as ‘illegal’, 
‘paperless’ non-members (cf. McNevin, 2011). They constitute new actors and new 
‘forms of being political’ (Isin, 2008, p.37; 2009). It is hard to see why the expressive 
and constitutive aspects of these actions should be any less important, politically or 
ontologically, than their communicative side. If anything, the constitution of actors 
would seem to be logically - though not temporally - prior to the exchange of 
arguments. The agonistic approach I follow therefore does not seek the transcendence of 
the Habermasian discourse ethics. It offers instead a situated critique which must always 
question its own ground, including what constitutes practices of citizenship (cf. 
Foucault, 1997; Honig 2009b, pp.112-138). Indeed, the object of the thesis is precisely 
to inquire critically into core assumptions about membership and political action not 
just within nationalist or deliberative accounts but in agonistic democracy itself. It does 
so through an iterative engagement with theory and practice where practices are studied 
and interpreted through normatively laden conceptual lenses but where these theoretical 
frames are also critically interrogated in light of the empirical findings (Tully, 2008). 
This in turn raises methodological questions about how best to study performances of 
cross-border movement and citizenship.  
 
A narrative methodology 
Some political theorists have begun exploring the potential of ethnographic and 
interview based methods for conceptual work on migration and citizenship (Doty, 2006; 
Cabrera, 2010; McNevin, 2011; Aradau et al., 2010). I adopt a narrative interview 
approach which analyzes how meaning is constructed in and through story-telling 
(Riessman, 2008; Chase, 1995). There are several reasons for this choice. Firstly, it is a 
fairly unstructured form of interviewing, which while organized around the themes of 
the research - in this case family migration, cross-border movement and citizenship - 
gives ample room for informants to shape the conversation and recount their 
experiences in their own terms and manner. This is important since the point about 
using interviews for political theory is precisely to pay heed to the voices and 
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perspectives of cross-border agents themselves. Secondly, it is a form of interviewing 
attentive to articulations of identification, a central concern for my thesis. The 
underlying theoretical assumption is that identity is narrative (see for example 
Benhabib, 2002; Arendt, 1958a). That is to say, we interpret our lives by weaving 
together occurrences, emotions, bodily experiences and interactions into storylines with 
actors and plots. In the process we construct who we are. Thirdly, marriage migration 
and exile, as we shall see, exhibit many features which make them well-suited events 
for storied accounts (see appendix I). Exploring their narration is thus a very useful way 
of analyzing how practices of cross-border movement are given meaning as lived 
experiences.  
 
Narrative interviews have become widely used in sociological and anthropological 
studies exploring lives of migrants and refugees (see for example Schuman and 
Bohmer, 2004; De Fina, 2004; Hebing, 2009; Eggebö, 2013). There are several types 
which differ somewhat with regard to interview technique, style of analysis and meta-
theoretical assumptions (Bruner, 1991; Holstein and Gubrium, 1997; Jovchelovitch and 
Bauer, 2000; for an overview see Chase, 2005). All, however, focus on inviting and 
analyzing stories rather than discrete answers. Catherine Riessman (2008, p. 24) notes 
that, ‘[e]specially when there has been a major disruption in a life – in the normal social 
biography - ... individuals often want to develop long accounts’. Confronted with events 
which challenge our routines and expectations narrating our experiences to ourselves 
and others can be a way of handling the situation by making sense of what has taken 
place. Typically, these are occasions where we reflectively reassess our assumptions 
and ideals. We may also come to narratively re-construct our self-understanding. 
Migration is clearly often such a life-changing event. Individuals who move across 
borders will usually have to acquaint themselves with customs, climate, language, and 
institutions which differ from what they are used to. For many, new opportunities 
emerge, while others experience loss of status and security or suffer in the absence of 
friends and family members left behind.  
 
I thus use narrative and semi-structured interviews (Riessman, 2008; Holstein and 
Gubrium, 1997; Kvale, 2007) to examine practices of cross-border movement and 
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migrant activism among Danish-international family migrants in order to facilitate 
conceptual development that is attentive to the agency and lived experiences of migrants 
and citizens. The study is based on 30 interviews with Danish citizens and/or their 
foreign spouses carried out in 2011-2012. Most of these informants have used their EU-
citizenship to move to Sweden and obtain family unification. A description and 
discussion of the selection of informants and an overview of the interview sample is 
provided in chapter three and appendix I. A narrative approach is also used to analyze 
the interviews (Chase, 2005; Riessman, 2008). A central concern here is to maintain the 
integrity of each story instead of reorganizing the data according to a number of codes. 
This means re-presenting a number of individual stories throughout the analysis and 
comparing and contrasting them with the wider data corpus. Appendix I gives an in-
depth discussion of how the interviews were analyzed and re-constructed.  
 
Argument and structure of the thesis 
The remainder of the thesis proceeds as follows. In chapter two I analyze how a 
dynamic conception of citizenship and migration is articulated by deliberative and 
agonistic theorists, drawing out and discussing the main points of disagreement. I argue 
that especially agonistic democracy offers promising tools for challenging the troubling 
dichotomy of thick and thin post/national membership but that an engagement with 
cross-border movement as a civic practice is missing. Chapter three then sets out an 
analytical strategy for developing a dynamic conception of citizenship that can 
incorporate strategies of exit, entry and re-entry. The subsequent chapters analyze the 
empirical material.  
 
Chapter four returns again to the debate about thick and thin citizenship. It engages with 
an influential and elegant synthesis wherein a thick and deeply rooted national identity 
is kept in check by a thin rights-based supranational citizenship. Through an analysis of 
my informants’ stories of border crossing I show that this model has some appeal but 
also important limitations. I argue that a ‘European citizenship of last resort’ is enacted 
which both affirms and challenges the primacy of national citizenship on which this 
synthetic model is based. Borders are crossed to activate EU citizenship where core 
civic freedoms are at stake and options within national law are not available. But 
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through these practices of exit and re-entry national belonging is often undermined, 
civic identification profoundly transformed and national sovereignty deeply disturbed. 
This, I argue, demonstrates the need for the more radical rethinking of the thick-thin 
binary found in deliberative and agonistic theories of democracy when conceptualizing 
citizenship and cross-border movement.    
 
Chapter five provides an analysis of how cross-border movement spurs and facilitates 
deliberation and organized activism in the family unification dispute. I show that 
transnational publics emerge through the interplay between voice and exit/entry in the 
case. In chapter six I investigate exit to Sweden and return to Denmark as performative 
acts of dissent and protest. I outline four different storylines of, respectively, liberal 
anti-politics, civic protest, democratic taking and forum shopping. This is followed up 
in chapter seven with a narrative analysis that develops a concept of ‘transnational civil 
dis/obedience’. It captures how couples can act simultaneously as ideal Europeans and 
non-compliant national citizens. In making this argument I draw on agonistic, 
deliberative and cosmopolitan approaches to civil disobedience to construct an analytics 
of conscientious and contentious border crossing within a complex legal order like the 
European Union. 
 
In the concluding chapter eight I draw the threads together to argue that specific 
practices of border crossing in the European Union can be meaningfully re-interpreted 
as civic acts through a re-appropriation of agonistic and deliberative theories of 
democracy. That in turn prompts us to critically re-consider key assumptions about 
democratic agency in these theories. Deliberative democracy - with all its commitment 
to the potential of discursive practices to transcend specific cultural and political 
contexts – needs to pay more attention to the generative and constitutive role of 
migratory movement. The study illustrate how transnational publics can emerge in and 
through border crossing in Europe, in particular when these strategies of mobility form 
part of a public political dispute over how to interpret the rights and bonds of 
citizenship. Agonistic democracy ought to interrogate critically its preference for and 
understanding of collective action. Individualized practices of border crossing can be 
facilitated by and generate organized activism through which relations of solidarity and 
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practices of contestation develop. Furthermore, border crossing can be undertaken as an 
act of protest and civil dis/obedience wherein ideals of liberty and equality are re-
imagined.  
 
The thesis illustrates the merits of challenging the binary of thick and thin citizenship 
through a dynamic re-construction of the relationship between rights, subjectivity and 
civic practice. We see that civil rights are indeed re-claimed through cross-border 
movement and in the process citizens’ identification with Denmark often do suffer. 
While this in some instances leads to a thin or even instrumental approach to citizenship 
the story is far more complex. Rights are sometimes claimed and reinterpreted as part of 
an act of political protest. In other cases the protection offered by supranational 
citizenship in the face of national restrictions enables citizens and migrants to engage in 
civic practices of public deliberation and collective action. Sometimes exit and entry 
leads to identification with a Swedish society perceived as liberal and welcoming, or 
stronger appreciation of the European Union is gained. Other informants experience 
how their civic solidarity is enlarged through the process of involuntary exile and 
practices of engagement and they cultivate a cosmopolitan ethos. Finally, the thesis 
shows how citizenship can be at the same time instrumental and affective. Deprived of 
the ability to realize the family life they desire within Denmark citizens often come to 
appreciate the importance of a legal status that offers an effective protection of liberal 
rights. This is something many had hitherto taken for granted without giving it much 
thought. Many couples indeed apply for a Swedish citizenship for the non-EU spouse 
precisely because of the freedom and security it provides. But this pragmatic acquisition 
often goes hand in hand with a commitment to active and critical participation in the 
common life of citizens within and across borders.  
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CHAPTER TWO: DELIBERATIVE AND AGONISTIC CITIZENSHIP 
 
This chapter explores how deliberative and agonistic theories of democracy contribute 
to the debate over citizenship and migration. I contrast and assess how scholars working 
within the two approaches develop dynamic conceptions of membership particularly 
when engaging with the politics of immigration. Rather than seeing citizenship merely 
as a legal status or a stable political identity, a critical practice is explored: Members 
and would-be members claim and reinterpret rights and through their participation come 
to affirm or reinvent a civic ethos. There are, however, significant differences in how 
this civic practice is conceptualized within the two theories. These in turn are crucial to 
the insights the perspectives can offer on the dispute over thick national and thin 
postnational citizenship. I argue that while deliberative democracy goes some way 
towards challenging this problematic binary, key theoretical commitments prevent it 
from developing a more persuasive re-conceptualization. Agonistic democracy, by 
contrast, has the potential for creating a more profound restructuring of the terms of the 
debate. But a problem remains, which is the insufficient attention to cross-border 
movement and its civic potential. 
 
In the chapter and the rest of the thesis I follow a classical approach in agonistic 
scholarship of constructing the argument through a critical engagement with 
deliberative democracy (see Mouffe, 2000; Honig 2001a; Schaap, 2006; McNevin, 
2011; Glover, 2011). These two approaches share important concerns with democratic 
participation, porous boundaries and transnational politics but also differ markedly in 
their understanding of the character of ‘the political’ (Mouffe, 2005). Intervening in this 
on-going dispute and taking seriously the merits and shortcomings of both perspectives 
is a helpful strategy for drawing out what agonism has to offer a reinterpretation of 
citizenship across border and for developing the theory further (cf. Tully, 2008). The 
chapter begins by setting out and discussing deliberative democracy before moving on 
to agonistic accounts of citizenship and migration. The last part of the chapter then 
identifies and discusses the neglect of border crossing. 
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Deliberative democracy and the dynamics of citizenship 
Deliberative democracy is a very broad and varied school of thought (Fishkin, 1991; 
Chambers, 1996; Dryzek, 2000). I focus here on the work of Jürgen Habermas and 
Seyla Benhabib. The latter has in her appropriation of Habermas’ work developed it in a 
more context sensitive direction and given special attention to questions of migration 
and citizenship (Benhabib, 1992, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2011).  
 
Habermas: a synthesis of thick and thin citizenship? 
To understand how citizenship is constructed in Habermas’ deliberative theory we need 
to look at his account of constitutional democracy. Habermas argues for a conception of 
modern democratic polities which is committed to both the individual rights of citizens 
who are equal under law and to the popular sovereignty of those citizens as a collective 
body. He criticises liberal constitutionalists who want to privilege the law at the expense 
of democratic will formation and civic republicans and radical democrats for whom the 
self-government of the people comes first. Contrary to such approaches Habermas 
argues that ‘[p]rivate and public autonomy require each other. The two concepts are 
interdependent.’ (Habermas 2001a, p.767) Without a constitution that secures the 
personal freedom of all citizens, a majority can suppress a minority. But without a 
democratically engaged citizenry who legislate for themselves, the law becomes an 
alien force bereft of legitimacy. A vibrant democracy, he insists, needs both human 
rights and popular sovereignty, private and political rights. The relation is one of ‘co-
originality’, not of conflict (p.767). Habermas thus presents his conception of 
citizenship as one which is neither simply thin and rights-based nor thick and 
republican, but rather in dialectical fashion unites and transcends these two extremes.  
 
This is an alluring thesis but not without complications. Even if we grant that the ‘co-
originality’ argument holds in theory, in practice there is always the risk that a 
democratic majority may decide to suspend the rights of select minorities. It is therefore 
important that citizens ‘make appropriate use of their public autonomy’ (p.767, original 
emphasis) and this requires public deliberation of a particular character. All participants 
should be willing to take into account the perspectives of others and change preferences 
if persuaded by the ‘forceless force of the better argument’ (Habermas, 1999, p.332). 
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This view underlies the discourse principle, according to which ‘[j]ust those action 
norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in 
rational discourse’ (Habermas, 1996, p.107). When it comes to deciding on legally 
binding norms Habermas rephrases this moral precept as the democratic principle. It 
‘states that only those statutes may claim legitimacy which can meet with the assent 
(Zustimmung) of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been 
legally constituted’ (p.110). This regulative ideal aims precisely to secure the protection 
of individual rights in and through public deliberation, while ensuring that these 
constitutional freedoms are also the product of the will of the people.  
 
This does not solve the dilemma, though. After all, who decides what use of public 
autonomy is ‘appropriate’? What to do if citizens will not listen to each other (Honig, 
2001a)? If the popular sovereignty of the people is to be respected then there is no room 
for experts – whether judges or philosophers – whose arbitration is final and 
incontestable. It is in his response to this problem that the dynamic character of 
Habermas’ citizenship conception comes out. Drawing on the work of Frank 
Michelman, Habermas ‘argue[s] that the allegedly paradoxical relation between 
democracy and the rule of law resolves itself in the dimension of historical time, 
provided one conceives the constitution as a project that makes the founding act into an 
ongoing process of constitution-making that continues across generations.’ (Habermas, 
2001a p.768) ‘Past mistakes’ - such as racial segregation or the exclusion of women 
from public life - will hopefully over time be overcome through the ‘self-correcting 
learning processes’ of ongoing deliberation (Habermas, 2001a, pp.774-775). There can 
of course be setbacks where liberalizing reforms are opposed and overturned. But the 
constitution itself provides us with the resources for critiquing such legislation:   
 
…each citizen of a democratic polity can at any time refer to the texts and 
decisions of the founders and their descendants in a critical fashion, just as 
one can, conversely, adopt the perspective of the founders and take a critical 
view of the present to test whether the existing institutions, practices, and 
procedures of democratic opinion- and will-formation satisfy the necessary 
conditions for a process that engenders legitimacy. (Habermas, 2001a, 
p.775, original emphasis) 
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If and when we do so we are on a journey towards greater liberty and equality. With this 
temporal argument Habermas presents us with a critical, practice-oriented 
understanding of citizenship as individual rights and collective self-determination. It is 
dynamic in a dual sense. First, the meaning of individual freedoms is not given once and 
for all but requires a continuing interpretive engagement. As he puts it, ‘[a]ll the later 
generations have the task of actualizing the still-untapped normative substance of the 
system of rights laid down in the original document of the constitution’ (p.774). Second, 
though this interpretive process is self-referential it is not insular. The universalism of 
human rights as reflected in the discourse principle obliges citizens to take into account 
the perspectives of affected outsiders or those not yet fully included in the polity. Thus 
in the essay ‘Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State’, 
Habermas engages with questions about migration and the ethno-cultural pluralisation 
of European societies. He argues that Germany and other rich countries of Western 
Europe ought to pursue a liberal immigration policy which considers not just the wishes 
of their own citizens but also the needs of persons from poor third world countries 
hoping to improve their life chances (Habermas, 1994, pp.135-148).  
 
While this approach to citizenship is both novel and attractive, it has been the subject of 
considerable criticism especially from agonistic democrats who question the tenability 
of the co-originality argument. They point out the teleological understanding of history 
reflected in the argument about ‘self-correcting learning processes’ (Honig, 2001a 
p.795). Agency is no longer located in the people. It is either transferred, in the fashion 
of enlightenment progress narratives, to a quasi-transcendental History that seeks to 
realize a built-in objective. Or it is invested in the founders as the ultimate source of 
law. The metaphor of ‘tapping’ the constitution for its unrealized surplus value suggests 
that radical reinterpretations such as extending the rights of citizenship to women were 
already laid down, however inchoately, in the original document. It reduces the civic 
agency of the activists who struggled to bring about such changes and ignores the 
inherent open-endedness of democratic politics. This makes us less well prepared for 
political contestation and deprives the people of genuine sovereignty by casting 
conservative and exclusionary policies as inappropriate choices that will eventually be 
corrected (Honig, 2001a; Mouffe, 2005; Butler, 1995). 
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This problem has important implications for the contention over thick and thin 
citizenship with which I am engaging. The more the proper interpretation of universal 
rights must be theoretically safeguarded - either through historical narrative or the 
communicative ‘telos’ of language games - the less room there is for actual democratic 
politics. If the form and outcome of civic participation is somehow already given in 
advance then it begins to resemble a staged show rather than a dynamic political 
practice. Habermas’ postnational conception of citizenship, though initially promising, 
thus ends up looking rather too democratically thin to really challenge the troubling 
binary in the debate over migration and membership.
12
   
 
Benhabib and democratic iterations 
Benhabib is one of the friendly critics of Habermas who has long tried to grapple with 
challenges such as these to deliberative democracy (see Benhabib, 1992, 2002, 2004, 
2011). In The Rights of Others she approaches democratic citizenship from the 
perspective of migrants as the epitomic outsiders whose presence prompts us to 
reconsider the ways we think about rights and political communities. Drawing on 
Jacques Derrida’s concept of ‘iterability’ Benhabib (2004, p.179) coins the term 
‘democratic iterations’. The point about the concept of iteration, as she explains it, is 
that:  
 
In the process of repeating a term or a concept we never simply reproduce a 
replica of the first original usage and its intended meaning; rather every 
repetition is a form of variation. Every repetition transforms meaning, adds 
to it, enriches it in ever-so-subtle ways. In fact, there really is no ‘originary’ 
source of meaning, or an original to which all subsequent forms must refer. 
(p.179)    
 
The implication of this appears to be that when we deliberate in the public sphere about 
the core ideals and constitutional principles of liberal democracy we are therefore not 
                                                 
12
 Habermas’ conception of citizenship with its emphasis on public identification with constitutional 
rights and principles (‘constitutional patriotism’) rather than language and shared history is often chided 
by republicans and liberal nationalists for being too thin. Common political ideals are important to be 
sure, but not enough, they argue. A sense of shared identity provided by the nation as an imagined 
community is necessary to bind a people together and ensure their mutual trust and solidarity (see for 
example Bellamy, 2008; Miller, 1995). Note that this is not the critique developed here where focus is on 
democratic contestation and mobilization rather than national belonging.   
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just repeating the acts of our forefathers. This seems do away with the idea of ‘tapping’ 
the normative substance as there is no longer a stable original to tap (but see 
Thomassen, 2011). Rather, as Benhabib puts it, ‘[i]teration is the reappropriation of the 
original’ (Benhabib, 2004, p.180). In our debates we bring our different contextual 
understandings and particular experiences and perspectives into play and in doing so we 
give new meaning to ideals of rights, belonging and citizenship.  
 
Benhabib also acknowledges that while liberal democracy entails a dual commitment to 
universalist human rights and the popular sovereignty of a particular ‘demos’ there is an 
irreducible tension between these two constitutive dimensions. She argues that ‘this 
paradox of democratic legitimacy has a corollary ..: every act of self-legislation is also 
an act of self-constitution. “We, The people” who agree to bind ourselves to these laws, 
are also defining our-selves as a “we” in the very act of self-legislation’ (2004, p.45) 
This means defining who does not count as citizens of a given polity – for example the 
mentally ill, criminals, foreigners. That in turn brings us to the challenge of immigrants 
as individuals who are subjected to the law but are not its authors (cf. Walzer, 1983). 
Benhabib argues that: 
 
[w]hile the paradox that those who are not members of the demos will 
remain affected by its decisions of inclusion and exclusion can never be 
completely eliminated, its effects can be mitigated through reflective acts of 
democratic iterations by the people who critically examines and alters its 
own practices of exclusion. (p.21)  
 
She contends that boundaries are necessary for democratic will formation and 
representation but that norms which transcend our particular polities are written into the 
grammar of individual rights obliging us to pay attention to the perspectives and 
interests of outsiders. The territorial and political borders of a polity must thus be 
‘porous’ (p. 3) and open to revision through democratic iterations. These she defines as: 
 
… complex processes of public argument, deliberation, and exchange through 
which universalist rights claims and principles are contested and 
contextualized, invoked and revoked, posited and positioned, throughout legal 
and political institutions, as well as in civil society. (Benhabib 2004, p.179) 
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It is through participation in such deliberative processes that we negotiate what 
citizenship means, the rights and collective identities that come with it and how it is 
distributed. With the concept of democratic iterations Benhabib thus engages in critical 
dialogue with those civic republicans who worry that contemporary migration threatens 
civic participation and political community. Far from undermining citizenship, she 
contends that immigrants can contribute actively to the reinterpretation of membership.  
 
To illustrate her point Benhabib analyzes contemporary debates particularly in France 
over the access to citizenship and the right of Muslim girls and women to wear 
headscarves in public schools and the work place. Benhabib argues that some girls and 
women are beginning to reinterpret not just what it means to be Muslim but also what it 
means to be a French citizen. That is, they are engaging in democratic iterations. In her 
discussion it is clear how, despite the incorporation of Derridean insights, hers is still a 
deliberative democratic argument. She stresses that ‘learning processes’ should ensue 
where participants in this debate make their voices heard and listen to each other 
(p.192): ‘While the larger French society would have to learn not to stigmatize and 
stereotype as “backward and oppressed creatures” all those who accept the wearing of 
what at first appears as a religiously mandated piece of clothing, the girls themselves 
and their supporters would have to learn to give a justification of their actions with 
“good reasons in the public sphere”.’(p.192) This illustrates how Benhabib retains a 
commitment to moral progress through deliberation. Both immigrants and those critical 
of migration are positioned as somewhat immature and in need of civic education in so 
far as their public engagement falls short of the standards of discourse ethics.
13
  
 
Though her concept of ‘democratic iterations’ thus appears to offer more room for 
democratic contestation it ends up being rather too narrow. Its strong apparent attraction 
derives from its promise of a universalistic normative political theory along the lines of 
Habermas’ deliberative democracy but without its shortcomings. But her text is rife 
with tensions and ambiguities which point either towards a classical deliberative 
                                                 
13
 As Lasse Thomassen (2011) argues, the two groups – French mainstream society and young Muslim 
women – are not on a par in Benhabib’s narrative. The former are assumed to already know the language 
game of democratic deliberation but must learn to include in it also these new prospective participants, 
thus countering their own prejudices. The latter are implicitly presented as new to this discursive practice 
of public justification – whether because they are young, Muslim or immigrants.  
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democratic account or towards something more akin to agonistic democratic theory 
(Thomassen, 2011; see also Honig, 2009b, pp.112-137). In subsequent books, Another 
Cosmopolitanism and Dignity in Adversity: Human Rights in Troubled Times, Benhabib 
engages with her critics and clarifies key issues somewhat. For example, she concedes 
that while democratic iterations can foster greater inclusion they may also in some cases 
prompt hostility against immigrants, a point which while admitted in her earlier analysis 
had not been given much attention (Benhabib, 2011, p.152; 2004, p.198). This is an 
important recognition of the open-endedness of democratic politics – a predicament 
which, as we shall see below, is central to agonistic theorists. This further distances her 
concept from Habermas’ teleological narrative. The idea of moral learning, however, 
remains central (Benhabib, 2006; Thomassen, 2011) and with it the somewhat 
restrictive procedural notion of what constitutes good citizenship.  
 
Taken together, Habermas and Benhabib offer dynamic understandings of citizenship 
which insist on the democratic necessity of boundaries while emphasising their fluidity 
and the context-transcending character of civic rights. This re-conceptualization goes 
some way in challenging the dichotomy of thick and thin membership. We are not 
presented with a postnational account wherein citizenship is based primarily on 
individual rights which erases political differences between insiders and outsider 
(Soysal, 1994). But neither are we faced with a more exclusive national or republican 
membership where migrants are perceived as potential threats to cultural and political 
identity (Jacobson, 1996). Rather, citizenship is a critical practice wherein a people 
exercise sovereignty by reinterpreting the rights, civic identity and political boundaries 
of membership through deliberation in the public spheres. Even so, the strong 
commitment to moral progress in both Habermas and Benhabib’s work leaves too little 
room for democratic politics to provide an effective critique of the thick/thin binary. 
The political sovereignty of the self-constituting ‘demos’ remains too constricted which 
makes it easy for republican critics to dismiss this account as yet another thin 
universalist post-nationalism in disguise.    
 
In the following I set out agonistic conceptions and explore how they can help us 
engage better with this problematic. 
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Agonistic democracy and the dynamics of citizenship 
Agonistic democratic theory is a rapidly growing body of research which like 
deliberative democracy includes varying strands and significant differences (for a 
critical comparison of key agonistic thinkers see Glover, 2012). I focus here on two of 
the main theorists who have developed this approach, Chantal Mouffe and Bonnie 
Honig. The latter in particular has explored the relations between democracy, 
citizenship and migration.  
 
Mouffe and the problem of moralistic politics 
Mouffe constructs her theory of agonistic democracy partly through a critique of 
Habermas and Benhabib’s deliberative democracy. She argues that their work provides 
us with a flawed understanding of politics and citizenship. Instead, she presents us with 
a different conceptualization emphasizing contestation rather than reason and consensus 
(Mouffe, 2000). Following Carl Schmitt, Mouffe sees the creation of friend-enemy 
distinctions as the essence of ‘the political’. Democracy needs a ‘demos’, and partisan 
politics needs partisans. We create these collective selves by drawing boundaries and 
mobilizing passion through evocative and rhetorical discourse. Conflict is therefore an 
ineradicable part of politics. Instead of seeking to overcome it through deliberation and 
a search for rational consensus, we should aim to transform it in democratic ways. We 
do this by treating the other not as ‘an enemy to be destroyed, but as an “adversary”: i.e. 
as somebody whose ideas we combat but whose right to defend these ideas we do not 
call into question’ (p.102).  
 
This view of conflict makes Mouffe critical of Habermas’ claim to have solved the 
tension between human rights and popular sovereignty. She shares his commitment to 
both democratic engagement and individual freedom, but insists that ‘[t]here is no 
necessary relation between the two distinct traditions but only a contingent historical 
articulation’ (p.3). Our rights as citizens are always at risk of being curtailed through the 
collective decisions we partake in as members of the civic body, just as our self-
determination as a people can be invaded by the rule of law. 
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For Mouffe the ‘constitutive paradox’ of liberal democracy is precisely that the tension 
between liberty and populism cannot ultimately be overcome (p.11). All we can do as 
democratic citizens, according to Mouffe, is to engage in an ongoing political struggle 
over how to interpret their relationship, while acknowledging that any articulation is 
partisan and contestable. This, however, is no cause for despair, she claims. On the 
contrary, it provides us with a more genuinely dynamic and pluralistic understanding of 
citizenship. Hence she argues that: 
 
By constantly challenging the relations of inclusion-exclusion implied by 
the political constitution of ‘the people’ … the liberal discourse of human 
rights plays an important role in maintaining the democratic contestation 
alive. On the other side, it is only through the democratic logics of 
equivalence that frontiers can be established without which no real exercise 
of rights could be possible. (p.10) 
 
The constitutive paradox of liberal democracy is thus productive. It enables us to create 
a community of citizens with equal rights, while keeping open the interpretation of 
these freedoms and allowing for a re-drawing of the boundaries of the civic body.  
 
Critics wonder, however, why contestation should necessarily be so desirable (cf. 
Dryzek 2005). Migration is a topic which has in the past two decades become highly 
contested in European politics yet this does not appear to have served immigrants 
particularly well. On the contrary, restrictive policies on family unification, asylum and 
border control have been introduced in several countries and in the EU. This has made it 
increasingly difficult for refugees and transnational couples to find sanctuary or realize 
the family life they wish for (Ruffer, 2011; Hatton, 2004; Collinson, 1996). Moreover, 
the negotiation of sensible and pragmatic solutions to the micro-politics of migration 
and multiculturalism can easily be obstructed by confrontational discourse (cf. Dryzek, 
2005). Contemporary disputes over the display of religious attire in public institutions 
or the social exclusion experienced by many young citizens and migrant residents in 
impoverished areas are heated enough already. What is needed, surely, is not more 
contestation but the prevailing of cooler heads willing to listen to arguments on all 
sides. 
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Mouffe’s argument turns this critique on its head: It is because of the lack of agonistic 
social and economic politics in the 1990s and early 2000s that immigration came to 
dominate the agenda in this troubling way (Mouffe 2005). She argues that in this period 
politics in Europe and the US was marked by an absence of adversarial contestation. 
Left-right opposition was deemed outmoded by ‘third way’ advocates like Tony Blair, 
Bill Clinton and Anthony Giddens. Instead, Mouffe argues, politics became technocratic 
or was played out ‘in the register of morality’ with opponents presented as backwards, 
irrational or outright evil (p.72). This lack of clearly marked political and ideological 
differences within mainstream politics left the field open to right wing populist parties. 
They present alternative storylines and offer powerful constructions of collective 
identity which define ‘the people’ through opposition to foreigners, immigrants and the 
‘establishment’. Mouffe cautions us that a moralistic response to such parties which 
presents them as quasi-fascist and beyond the pale is not only un-democratic but will 
also strengthen their popularity. Instead, social-democrats need to rediscover and 
rearticulate their ideological project so as to provide alternatives to the neoliberal 
hegemony thus ensuring that there are conflicting political visions of democratic society 
with which citizens can engage and identify (Mouffe 2000, pp. 121-127). The idea is 
that if we are not offered partisan democratic projects which can mobilize our passions 
and channel them in peaceful political directions then it is only too likely that they will 
find other outlets for example in religious fanaticism or xenophobic movements.  
 
In this way Mouffe presents a dynamic conception of citizenship which in many ways 
resembles Benhabib’s analysis but gives more space to democratic contestation and 
passionate identification. Her analysis draws attention to the dangers of a citizenship in 
which legal and moral rights take precedence because this dislocation of politics may 
engender both passivity and antidemocratic movements. With its emphasis on active 
engagement and visceral attachments this is an account of porous boundaries better 
suited to meet the concerns of republican critics.   
 
Honig’s democratic taking 
Mouffe analyzes one important, if for leftists and cosmopolitans disturbing, role the 
invocation of migration can play in democratic politics. Immigrants as the outsiders 
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inside are easily cast as threats to the welfare, unity, and sovereignty of the people and 
this in turn can serve as an effective rallying call for popular mobilization. While this is 
clearly crucial, other more ambiguous stories of migrants form part of the democratic 
imaginary, as we shall see in the work of Bonnie Honig, which gives more attention to 
the civic agency of migrants. Where immigration for Mouffe is an area of political 
contention (and potentially an undesirable one symptomatic of too little socioeconomic 
adversarial politics), immigrants themselves are vital civic actors in Honig’s analysis.  
 
To appreciate Honig’s insights into the politics of migration and citizenship it is 
necessary to set out briefly her version of agonism, which is somewhat different from 
Mouffe’s Marxist and Schmittian approach (see Glover, 2012). Like Mouffe, Honig 
(1993, 2001a) is sceptical of the overemphasis on reason and consensus in liberal and 
deliberative conceptions of citizenship. Drawing on Arendt, Nietzsche and Derrida she 
emphasizes the creative and disruptive qualities of political action. Politics is about 
collective willing. We come together to make something anew and in doing so 
constitute ourselves as a people (Honig 1991, p. 99). But this is not simply a moment of 
harmony and rational agreement. It entails, by necessity, exclusion and transgression. A 
group of persons invoke - not just any political order - but a specific constitutional 
regime which facilitates certain forms of subjectivity and suppresses other (Honig 1993, 
pp. 3-6). And the founders do so in the name of a people ‘that does not exist before this 
declaration’ or inauguration (Derrida quoted in Honig 1991, p.104, italics in original). 
This demos in whose name the constitution is enacted therefore cannot serve as the 
basis of legitimacy for the points of inclusion and exclusion this political act establishes.  
Consequently, Honig claims, ‘every politics has its remainder, […] resistances are 
engendered by every settlement even by those that are relatively enabling and 
empowering.’ (Honig 1993, p.3) We should thus ‘seek to secure the perpetuity of 
political contest’ in order to challenge the relations of power prevailing in a given 
regime (p.3).  
 
In Democracy and the Foreigner (2001b) Honig intervenes in today’s public and 
politico-theoretical dispute over migration and citizenship. Instead of asking ‘[h]ow 
[we] should … solve the problem of foreignness?’ she suggests that we enquire into 
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‘what problems foreignness … solves for us’ (Honig 2001b, p.4, italics in original). By 
this she means what positions foreigners occupy in the narratives about liberal 
democracy ‘we’ tell ourselves in the ‘West’. Through careful readings of a selection of 
religious, literary, and philosophical texts as well as popular culture she draws out an 
ambiguous figure of the foreigner. Immigrants are cast as redeemers and ‘re-founders’ 
who bring new life to decaying political communities, but also as troublemakers who 
pollute the civic body and undermine the bonds of trust and fellowship. Rather than 
lamenting the ways the myth of the foreigner is employed in the construction of the 
citizenry Honig reinterprets this ambivalent narrative for her own agonistic democratic 
purposes. Building on the work of Jacques Rancière she presents us with a view of an 
immigrant as a ‘democratic taker’ who grasps the civic rights she does not yet possess 
(Honig 2001b, p.101 italics in original; Rancière 2004). Instead of waiting politely to be 
granted the status of citizenship with liberties and access to participation, ‘such 
immigrants have banded together to take or redistribute power.’ (Honig, 2001b, p.101) 
In doing so they demonstrate the dynamic nature of citizenship, the productive and 
disruptive effects of democratic political engagement and the ‘porousness’, as Benhabib 
terms it, of political boundaries.  
 
The concept of democratic taking provides Honig with an inroad into the debate over 
thick and thin citizenship in the context of migration. In xenophobic discourse, 
immigrants are often charged with taking something from ‘us’ that is rightfully ‘ours’ - 
jobs, welfare or even sovereignty. Here taking is a form a stealing with connotations of 
selfishness, unlawfulness and illegitimacy. But there are other forms of taking - as in 
taking action or taking a stand - which imply solidarity, engagement and a conscientious 
attitude. Honig’s re-signification of the term helps her to show that a democratically 
thick citizenship actually needs such unauthorized collective actions. They challenge the 
inevitable exclusions of membership and keep contestation alive. She thus agrees with 
liberal nationalists and statist republicans that democracy requires active participation 
but reminds us that this often involves performative acts of taking which from the 
perspective of the existing order are likely to appear illicit and instrumental. As the 
powerful seldom concede their privileges without a struggle, it may be necessary for the 
disenfranchised to claim rights in political acts which they do not yet have in law. Even 
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well-established freedoms need to be appropriated and defended if they are not to be 
devoid of content (Honig 2001a). This is reflected, for example, in occupy movements 
where citizens re-claim public spaces that have been privatized by consumerism or 
securitized by governments. 
 
This conceptual prism is appealing but it runs the risk of glorifying migrants and 
portraying them again simplistically as ‘heroes’, while downplaying the challenges they 
face and represent to society. That is a problem often generated by pro-migrant activist 
scholarship (Ong, 1999; McNevin, 2011; see for example Hardt and Negri, 2000). To 
counter such interpretations Honig suggests that we read migrant activism and 
contemporary citizenship not as a love story with a happy ending - the good immigrant 
was enfranchised and the polity became a better, more inclusive community - but as a 
‘gothic romance’. In gothic romance the heroism of the protagonist is checked by her 
own ambivalence and her dark and uncertain surroundings (Honig 2001b, pp.107-112). 
The civic engagement of migrants, as of all actors, can be cosmopolitan and 
conservative, solidaristic and self-serving, and immigrants often find themselves in a 
hostile political environment where claiming rights is difficult and risky and outcomes 
hard to predict.  
 
Gothic romance is also helpful for rethinking our relationship to states and international 
or supranational regimes. As migrants or citizens we seek recognition and rights from 
political communities in which we in different ways take part. The polity is thus a 
potential source of protection as well as social and political membership. But it is also a 
possible and often very real threat which may debar our inclusion or control our 
intimate lives. Against a romanticized ideal of states or institutions like the EU in 
nationalist and postnational accounts Honig (2001b, 2009b) stresses the dangers as well 
as promises of organized power. She calls for ‘a politics that acknowledges our 
passionate ambivalences and engages them by pluralizing our attachments so that the 
nation-state is just one of several sites of always ambivalent attachment rather than the 
sole and single site of romantic love’ (Honig, 2001b, pp.121-122). She thus counters the 
thick/thin binary by drawing attention to the multiple arenas for democratic engagement 
while at the same time reinterpreting the civic ethos.  
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Summing up, agonistic democracy in the work of Honig and Mouffe provides 
conceptions of citizenship which, like the deliberative versions, are dynamic and 
combine civil rights, identification and democratic participation. But in this approach 
emphasis is on conflict and collective action rather than deliberation and consensus. 
Citizens and migrants participate not in a sober exchange of reasons over how best to 
interpret our basic freedoms, but in an open-ended, passionate and creative struggle over 
how to re-imagine these liberties and establish a new hegemonic understanding. The 
ideals of freedom and equality are shared by partakers, but these are understood 
differently by adversarial contesters ‘so consensus is bound to be a conflictual-
consensus’ (Mouffe 2000, p.103). This perspective is more promising than the 
deliberative account for a restructuring of the debate over migration and membership 
that takes us beyond the binary of thick national and thin postnational citizenship. 
Populist critics of immigration are treated as political adversaries whose ideas should be 
challenged rather than deemed immoral or immature. Migrants themselves are taken 
seriously as actual and potential civic actors without first subjecting them to a process 
of civic education. In this way, a space is opened up for a more radically participatory 
politics of transnational membership the outcome of which is never given in advance.  
 
Border crossing neglected 
Though agonistic democracy presents a conception of citizenship better suited to 
challenge the binary of thick and thin, it shares with deliberative democracy a troubling 
neglect of exit-entry as a potential civic practice. Little attention is given to the 
strategies and lived experiences of cross-border movement which give rise to and are 
often a focal point for these political disputes. Honig (2001b), for example, indirectly 
explores the role of migratory entry in an analysis of the biblical figure Ruth who left 
her home state for Israel. But though she gives a critical re-appraisal of Ruth’s 
transformative agency, the civic potential of such cross-border movement is not in the 
end appreciated. Benhabib (2011) in a recent analysis of international law welcomes 
feminist transnational collaboration where migrant activists support local mobilization, 
but she does not adequately explore the role cross-border movement plays in the making 
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of such public debates.
14
 This omission is a problem because it weakens the reply 
agonists and deliberative democrats can offer to their liberal nationalists and statist 
republican interlocutors. The practices that are deemed most problematic by these critics 
- ongoing cross-border movement - are insufficiently addressed while the potential of 
these actions for contributing to democratic life is not properly elucidated. 
 
In public discourse porous borders are often presented as dangerous, representing both a 
security risk and a threat to popular sovereignty:
15
 When access to the territorial and 
symbolic space of the polity is not tightly regulated ‘we’ as insiders may be invaded by 
transnational criminal networks, terrorists and unwanted immigrants all of whom are in 
different ways seen to endanger the community of citizens. A critical moment in 
especially agonistic interventions in the politics of migration and membership is to 
dispute this narrative by showing how the collective mobilizations of irregular 
immigrants can reinvigorate and transform democratic life (Honig, 2001b; McNevin, 
2011; Glover, 2011). Though these residents are not lawfully present let alone passport-
holding members their public claims and organized protests can be acts of citizenship. 
This re-orientation of the debate would carry more weight, though, if agonists could 
also show how clandestine border crossing in itself might form part of or constitute 
civic action.  
 
A similar point can be made with regards to academic and public debate over EU 
citizenship. Some EU skeptical republicans, for example, welcome international 
immigrants who will settle and go through the process of becoming fully included 
citizens. What worries them is the free movement of EU citizens: They claim 
supranational rights but do not trouble to take on the obligations of a comprehensive 
                                                 
14
 Anne McNevin does engage critically with arguments in the so called ‘autonomy of migration 
literature’ - an activist, neo-Marxists strand of critical borders and migration studies - that clandestine 
cross-border movement is itself a radical transformative practice (see for example Papadopoulou et al., 
2008; Hardt and Negri, 2000). She quite rightly criticizes some of these authors for a wildly romantized 
conception of migration and for failing to account for what might make such actions political (McNevin, 
2011, pp.96-98). While I certainly agree that it would be disingenuous to describe all illicit border 
crossing as civic, including for example human trafficking, particular modalities of exit-entry might well 
warrant such an interpretation (for an excellent discussion see Cabrera, 2010). In a recent article McNevin 
(2013) is more open to exploring the transformative potential of mobility proposing an analytics of 
‘ambivalence’ resonating well with Honig’s gothic approach.    
15
 For examples from the Danish family unification dispute, see chapter five and appendix II and Rytter, 
2010a. 
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national membership in their new home state. Again, the case for a dynamic re-
conceptualization of citizenship would be strengthened if a credible argument could be 
made for the civic character and import of the cross-border movement that is so central 
to citizenship in the European Union. 
 
Explaining the gap 
This one-sided focus on civic voice at the expense of exit is perhaps to be expected 
given the theoretical presumptions of deliberative and agonistic democracy. For 
deliberative democracy public speech is essential.  The ‘forceless force of the better 
argument’ can only prevail if an argument is articulated (Habermas, 1999, p.332; 
Benhabib, 2002). The citizen who leaves her country out of discontent does not, it 
would appear, attempt to convince her fellow citizens through reasoned deliberation. 
She does not engage in public argument over how to improve the political or economic 
circumstances for all. Nor would she seem to listen to the views of those who disagree 
with her assessment of the situation. No debate, therefore, takes place through which the 
boundaries of civic community can be rationally reinterpreted (cf. Benhabib, 2004). 
Hence, at the face of it at least, the silence of exit challenges the deliberative democratic 
understanding of civic action.  
 
Agonistic democracy also stresses the importance of voice, albeit for different reasons 
(Glover, 2011). In order to counter dominant constructions of the people alternative 
understandings need to be publicly expressed. If new forms of solidarity are to be 
forged articulations must be made which link together the interests, hopes and 
grievances of diverse societal groupings through opposition to a common adversary 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). But agonistic democracy has a different and rather more 
permissive understanding of civic articulations. Political speech acts are not rational 
arguments but evocative narratives and statements (Mouffe 2000, pp.80-107, Norval 
2007, pp.58-59). This could allow better for symbolic manifestations such as sit-ins. 
There is, however, a strong commitment to collective action in agonistic democracy, as 
we have seen. It is by joining together that separate individuals constitute themselves as 
a democratic political force (Honig, 1993; Mouffe 2000). In cases of mass movement 
due to for example war or persecution of certain societal groupings exit can, in some 
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sense, be an organised activity. But the act of leaving is in most cases undertaken by 
individuals and families as part of their private attempts to improve their lives. From the 
perspective of agonistic democracy then, what is troublesome about exit is less its 
silence than its apparently individualistic character.  
 
It is therefore not surprising that border crossing as a civic political strategy has largely 
been ignored in deliberative and agonistic democracy, despite the considerable interest 
in migration displayed within this literature. Indeed, it might be argued that this is a 
desirable consequence of a concern with public action and debate as a defining feature 
of democracy. If the two theories integrated practices of exit and entry within their 
understandings of civic action they would, on this reading, compromise essential 
commitments, weakening thus their overall frameworks. Instead of political theories 
which seek to cultivate an engaged citizenry who care about the general welfare we 
would have conceptualized a marked-based, libertarian society where individuals opt in 
and out of polities according to their private interests.
16
 There is, however, a 
considerable and growing body of sociological literature that finds evidence of a fruitful 
interplay between exit and voice. This suggests that by overlooking practices of exit, 
entry and re-entry deliberative and agonistic theories risk giving a distorted account of 
how the porous boundaries of membership are actually negotiated and may fail to grasp 
the conditions and character of transnational voice.  
 
Exit and voice 
To see why this is the case, let us look first at the example of refugees whose moral and 
legal claim to sanctuary is a central to concern for especially Habermas (1994) and 
Benhabib (2004). International human rights conventions inaugurate the basic rights of 
all persons to for example religious freedom. In most parts of the world, though, 
implementation is left almost entirely to states. The norm of state sovereignty in 
domestic affairs is strong and rights violations must be on a massive scale to - maybe - 
sanction intervention from outside. If, however, persecuted persons leave their home 
country and enter into the territory of another state then they can claim protection. The 
speech act is crucial. The individuals in question must in the presence of an official 
                                                 
16
 According to Richard Bellamy (2009), this ‘liberty of the post-moderns’, of which he is highly critical, 
is already implicated in Benhabib’s work.  
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person say the word asylum. But it is the actual crossing of borders that legally enables 
them to do so. The act of moving between states constitutes refugees as subjects who 
may claim a right to protection they did not previously possess (Guild 2009, p.81). 
Asylum seekers can thus be seen as performing a (minimal) cosmopolitan citizenship 
that demonstrates the porousness of political boundaries (Benhabib, 2004), but to 
properly understand this civic action attention must be given to the conjoined practices 
of exit, entry and voice (cf. Aradau and Huysmans, 2009) 
 
It is not only forced migrants who claim and reinterpret rights of membership by 
crossing borders. In the EU, European nationals and their families enact a supranational 
citizenship by moving between member states, as we have seen. As long as a citizen 
remains within her own home state her national citizenship is meant to protect her. 
Crossing the borders gives her access to another set of entitlements and fundamental 
freedoms. The mobile citizen must claim her rights to the authorities of her host 
country. EU law can be unclear, and member states often differ in their implementation 
(Falkner et al., 2006). Hence, it is sometimes necessary to take legal action and present 
the case in court (Kostakopoulou, 2007). Again, it is practices of exit and entry that 
reconfigure this Union citizen who voices her rights claims and performatively contests 
the norm of state sovereignty.  
 
In these important cases, cross-border movement is thus constitutive of voice and the 
one cannot therefore be meaningfully understood without the other. Indeed, when 
appeals for sanctuary or free movement are articulated it is the crossing of borders that 
makes these articulations audible within a juridical sphere as the voices of international 
refugees and European citizens. The transnational nature of such acts is thus intimately 
bound up with practices of exit and entry. Not all cross-border movement entails a 
juridical reconstitution. Existing empirical research nonetheless identifies an intricate 
and often productive interplay between exit, entry, re-entry and voice which I find is 
important for a dynamic conception of citizenship.  
 
This role of border crossing may appear contra-intuitive. As described earlier, exit looks 
more like a way of giving up on public debate. In his initial work, Voice, exit and 
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loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, Hirschman (1970) 
argued that easy access to emigration could undermine democratic debate. The reason 
was that the discontented would leave rather than voice their concerns. In a later article, 
however, he revised his views somewhat. Analyzing the case of the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) and the fall of the Berlin wall Hirschman (1993, p.177) found that ‘exit 
(outmigration) and voice (protest demonstrations against the regime) worked in tandem 
and reinforced each other, achieving jointly the collapse of the regime’. In reaction to 
the large number of persons who left or wanted out others mobilized around staying. 
Their slogan ‘”Wir bleiben hier”’ (quoted in Hirschman, 1993, p.189) was a demand for 
change directed at the regime. Hirschman points out that though at first ‘the Ausreiser, 
the partisans of exit, and the Bleiber, the partisans of voice, form[ed] separate, even 
somewhat antagonistic, groups [they] [e]ventually … merge[d] under the slogan "Wir 
sind das Volk" (we are the people)’ (p.190). In the case, mass exit prompted organized 
protest and was an essential part in the peaceful democratic revolution.  
   
Hirschman’s 1993 article has generated a substantial body of research exploring the 
potentially constructive interplay between emigration and public dissent in the GDR and 
elsewhere. This literature examines the complex relation between voice, exit, entry and 
re-entry and probes the conditions for cross-border movement to generate or facilitate 
public protest (Lohmann, 1994; Joppke, 1995; Torpey, 1995; Pfaff and Kim, 2003; 
Gammage, 2004; Hoffmann, 2004, 2010; Hughes, 2005). Here I discuss what I take to 
be the most important of these – the magnitude of exit.17  
 
Throughout the history of the German Democratic Republic emigration rates were 
considerable, never falling below 10,000 per year. The building of the Berlin Wall 
significantly reduced numbers for a while, but an outflow of people continued. As 
Hirschman and others point out, this served to dampen rather than generate voice, as 
potential critics left of their own accord while troubling dissidents were expelled. 
During the summer of 1989, however, Hungary opened its borders to Austria thus 
providing discontented East Germans with an easy exit route to Western Europe and a 
veritable exodus took place. It was this mass emigration that prompted reformists and 
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 Other conditions discussed in the literature include state policies, constructions of collective identity 
and societal cleavages (see Torpey, 1995; Hoffman, 2004; Hughes, 2005).  
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prospective emigrants to voice. It demonstrated to both insiders and outsiders that the 
regime had lost control and legitimacy (Hirschman, 1993; Joppke, 1993; Pfaff and Kim, 
2003). This suggests that the size of exit greatly matters for its ability to generate public 
protest and transform a regime.  
 
Steven Pfaff and Hyojoung Kim have examined the importance of the scale of 
outmigration in the GDR. Based on a county-level statistical analysis of emigration and 
demonstrations in East Germany in 1989 they argue that ‘the level of exit has an 
inverted-U-curve relationship with the frequency and magnitude of protest events.’ 
(Pfaff and Kim, 2003, p.414, italics in original) For emigration to play a political role it 
must ‘take on the social character of a ‘crisis’ and spread [...] an unmistakable signal 
of generalized discontent. Tens of emigrants do not make a regime crisis, but thousands 
do.’ (p.409, italics in original) According to Pfaff and Kim, a critical mass of exit is thus 
needed to facilitate voice. But they also argue that if too many people leave this will 
undermine the social networks necessary for organized voice, thus producing the 
reverse effect.  
 
That size matters is intuitively plausible but how many is many? Hundreds of thousands 
left the GDR in 1989 but then that lead to revolution, regime change and the 
dismantling of the East German state. Civic action in democracies typically has more 
modest objectives. In a society with independent media and freedom of speech, 
migration on a smaller scale could well be sufficient to draw public attention to socio-
political problems and trigger public voice. In the Danish family unification dispute, 2-
3000 citizens have left for Sweden and this has indeed spurred intense debate about the 
effects of the policy, as we shall see in chapter five. Moreover, when border crossing 
prompts and enables migrants to articulate their concerns in courts the significance of 
just a few cases can be considerable. 
 
The second part of the u-curve argument also merits close attention. At the face of it at 
least, the claim that at some point large-scale emigration will undermine the social 
networks needed for public protest would seem credible. But this contention reflects a 
conceptual problem of ‘methodological nationalism’ in Hirschman’s (classical and 
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revised) framework (Hoffman, 2010; cf. Bartolini, 2005, p.5). It is based on the 
assumption that once you have left you cannot exercise voice. In the GDR case, this was 
arguably a reasonable expectation since maintaining social networks across state 
boundaries was very difficult because of the regime’s strict border control and massive 
surveillance. But even there, emigrants from the Eastern Bloc countries could and often 
did voice their critique in the West. If we move beyond the example of East Germany to 
contemporary transnational migration, this territorialist framing becomes more 
troubling, as Bert Hoffman has pointed out. Emigration can not only trigger domestic 
voice in the country left behind. It can also facilitate individual claims-making and 
collective action from abroad.
18
 
 
To illustrate the argument, let us return again to the refugee-example. A person whose 
life and freedom is in danger in her home country is in a very difficult position for 
critiquing the government and engaging in democratic protest. But fleeing to another 
state she could find the personal security which would enable her to do so (Hoffman, 
2010; cf. Dowding et al., 2000, p.491). Other groups of migrants can also take part in 
public debate in their host state or country of origin. They could organize themselves in 
cross-border advocacy networks seeking to raise issues locally and internationally and 
back domestic opposition groups. Case studies from Central America, the Caribbean, 
North Africa and the Middle-East finds support for such transnational relations between 
exit and voice (Hoffmann, 2010; Moghadam, 2009; Smith and Bakker, 2005; 
Gammage, 2004). Valentine Moghadam, for example, shows how in a struggle for 
greater freedom for women in Iran, Iranian women’s rights activists were supported by 
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 The argument that high levels of exit undermine social networks in the sending state finds some support 
in a study of Mexico. Based on survey data and data from the 2000 presidential election, Gary Goodman 
and Jonathan Hiskey (2008) find that emigration-intensive municipalities have lower voter turn-out and 
less participation in non-electoral political activism. Membership of other forms of civic organizations, 
including transnational neighbourhood groups, increases however. On this basis they argue that though 
migration creates cross-border communities these at the same time undermine national democracy as 
citizens turn away from the political system of the state. This finding is challenged, though, by two other 
quantitative studies. Clarisa Péres-Armendáriz and David Crow (2010) find, contrary to Goodman and 
Hiskey, that non-electoral participation – political and otherwise – increases for citizens with friends and 
relatives who have migrated or who belong to migration-intensive social networks. Thomas Pfutze (2012) 
looks at local elections in 2000-2002 and shows that residents in high migration areas were more likely to 
vote against the ruling party which had dominated Mexican politics for a century thus contributing to a 
democratic transformation.  
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‘expatriate feminists’ and transnational women’s rights groups, ‘in partnership with 
international human rights organizations’ (Moghadam, 2009, p. 266).19  
 
Moreover, emigrants sometimes return to their country of origin to take part in public 
affairs. Or they do, occasionally, engage in politics in their state of birth while 
remaining fully or partly in their new country (Hoffman, 2010; Smith and Bakker, 
2005). In Citizenship across border: the Political Transnationalism of El Migrante 
Michael Peters Smith and Matt Bakker provide a series of interconnected ethnographic 
case studies of migrant activism in Mexico and the USA. They map the emergence of a 
‘simultaneous transnational political practice’ (Smith and Bakker, 2005, p.203). Their 
key informants are political entrepreneurs who participate in both Mexican and US 
politics on different levels. These individuals typically mobilize around migrant issues 
and migrant experiences and stress their dual sense of belonging. Such developments 
prompt Hoffmann (2010) to question the binary conception of exit; leave or stay. 
Rather, new spaces of in-between, here-and-there are being constructed.  
 
In a European context this is perhaps especially so. The establishment of the European 
Union and the gradual removal of internal borders further qualify the character of exit. 
An EU-citizen is free to leave her country permanently or to resettle for a time in 
another member-state. But when doing so, she remains within the political Union to 
which her home country belongs. She leaves and yet she stays. To some extent the same 
can be said about a citizen of a federation like Germany or the USA who moves 
internally from one state to another. The legal, political, and cultural differences 
between Massachusetts and South Carolina or Schleswig-Holstein and Baden-
Württemberg are considerable, but when crossing intra-state frontiers the citizen 
remains in the same ‘nationalized space’ (Favell, 2008, p.19, italics removed). Still, this 
parallel is potentially misleading as Adrian Favell argues. Europe is not a ‘nation-state-
society like the US’ or even a multinational state such as Canada. In his study of mobile 
European elites Favell shows that a postnational space is created by these ‘Eurostars’ 
who make extensive use of the freedom of movement in the EU. His informants leave 
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 Benhabib (2011, pp.132-134) discusses this case in a recent essay, ‘Claiming Rights Across Borders’ 
but she does not really address the role of cross-border movement in these examples of transnational 
activism. 
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their home state not to enter another nation but to become detached from national 
belonging as such.  
 
Favell stresses that his Eurostars generally pay taxes and take active part in the cultural 
and social life of the cosmopolitan cities in which they live (Favell, 2008, pp.35-36, 51). 
But his work does not explore the extent to which they participate in public debate and 
political action. This raises the question if their border-crossing reflects a 
disengagement from politics. There are few studies of the relationship between exit and 
voice in the European Union.
20
 The area where it has been most discussed is East-West 
labour mobility after the recent rounds of enlargement. Here conclusions are largely 
pessimistic although the picture is mixed. James Hughes (2005) analyzes voice-exit 
dynamics in the Baltic countries immediately after these states’ EU accession. He 
predicts that entrenched discrimination of Russian minorities combined with new 
opportunities for EU mobility will lead to a mass exit that does not feed back into 
political reform at home. Studying the case of Lithuania Charles Woolfson (2010) 
argues that failure to effect change through voice during the economic crisis has been 
accompanied by and is likely to intensify large scale outmigration. To the extent that 
more voice may be generated by this interplay he expects it to take an anti-democratic 
form.  
 
Neither Hughes nor Woolfson discuss how, if at all, actual and prospective migrants 
might participate in civil society in the destination countries. Guglielmo Meardi (2007, 
2010) addresses this issue in his studies of migration and trade union activism. He finds 
evidence of a weakening of union power but also some trends towards a revitalisation of 
local activism and the formation of transnational ties between East and West labour 
organisations. The emergence of new micro-publics is explored by Alexandra 
Galasinska (2010) in a case study of Polish migration. She analyzes ‘an electronic 
newspaper forum as an example of a transnational space of participation’ and shows 
how Polish ‘migrants and non-migrants’ take part (p.309). Marion Ådnanes (2004) 
compares attitudes and motivation between prospective ‘movers’ and ‘stayers’ among 
the young elite in pre-accession Bulgaria. She does not explore the interplay between 
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 See Bartolini (2005) for a theory of exit and polity formation in Europe.  
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migration and activism but rather challenges a simple depiction of voice as civic and 
exit as private. Although would-be movers express consumerist ideas they also 
associate leaving with freedom and a critical view on the existing political system. 
Voice commitments in contrast are accompanied by conservative attitudes towards 
social and political institutions. Moving beyond an exclusive East-West focus Claudia 
Aradau, Jef Huysmans and Vicky Squire (2010) discuss how sex workers in Europe 
have voiced their concerns and articulated a demand for rights as mobile persons. More 
research is needed, though, to examine the relationship between practices of exit-entry 
and public voice in the EU. 
 
When exploring dynamics of cross-border movement and civic action in contemporary 
Europe it is important to look beyond causal relationship and legal constructions of 
membership. What needs to be addressed is not just how exit may or may not generate 
individual and collective voice but also that public engagement can take on a different 
character. Even when we leave the juridical terrain, border crossing might reconstitute 
agents of voice as transnational activists and thus transform public spaces. Cross-border 
movement opens up new discursive positions while closing down others. The migrant 
who takes part, in absentia, in public argument in her state of origin is easily positioned 
as the émigré – the one who left. On the one hand, this can work against her ability to 
present herself as a credible actor. She chose the (easy) way out and abandoned her 
fellow citizens. Not sharing in their daily life she risks losing the right to speak about 
their problems and concerns. On the other hand, she can also mobilize this experience as 
part of her critical participation. In the US-Mexican context Smith and Bakker, for 
example, tell the story of a migrant ‘who had fulfilled the Mexican-American dream’ 
and decided to run for office in his native district (Smith and Bakker, 2005, p.117). 
They argue that he ‘was successful … not only because of his image of economic 
success but also because of his promise to ‘Americanize’ Mexican politics, which meant 
cleansing them of the vices of corruption and clientelism [sic]’ (Hoffmann, 2008, p.13; 
Smith and Bakker, 2005, p.118). His personal trajectory of border crossing enabled him 
to present himself as both outsider and insider. Similar dynamics could well be at play 
in transnational Europe and would be important for a dynamic conception of citizenship 
across borders. 
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Conclusion 
I have shown in this chapter how dynamic conceptions of citizenship are constructed in 
deliberative and agonistic theories of democracy. Citizenship is presented as a critical 
practice of claiming and reinterpreting rights and civic identification through 
participation in reasonable deliberation in the public sphere or passionate, collective acts 
of contestation. In these endeavours both established citizens and migrants can and do 
take part. This, I argued, is a helpful way of reframing the debate over membership and 
immigration which all too often is structured around a misleading dichotomy between, 
on the hand, a thin, right-based but inclusive status and, on the other hand, a thick, 
national-democratic but exclusive community. In deliberative democracy, however, a 
recurring attempt to safeguard the normatively ‘right’ interpretation of rights against 
alternative perspectives in democratic contestation made this civic ideal too thin to offer 
an adequate alternative. Agonistic democracy with its stress on identification, 
mobilization and the open-ended character of civic action was more promising.  
 
But though agonistic analyses of migration have much to recommend them, they share 
with deliberative democratic accounts an important shortcoming; too little attention is 
given to the actual practices of border crossing and what this means for citizenship. This 
deficiency leaves agonism vulnerable to critique from republicans and nationalists for 
whom ‘exit’ is an important concern. It hinders the crafting of a more robust and 
genuinely dynamic conception of transnational citizenship. There is a complex and 
fruitful interplay between practices of cross-border movement on the one hand and 
public articulations and mobilization on the other. Exit, entry and re-entry can spur and 
enable civic action and transform the character of agents and public spaces. Insufficient 
attention to these strategies thus means that the conditions for and transnational quality 
of voice is not properly recognized. The next chapter sets out an analytical strategy for 
addressing this conceptual challenge.  
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CHAPTER THREE: STUDYING PRACTICES OF CITIZENSHIP  
 
Having defended the merits of an agonistic dynamic conception of citizenship while 
pointing out the limitations within existing research, this chapter develops an analytical 
strategy based on narrative methodology for addressing the gap. The chapter thus serves 
as a bridge between the theoretical debates set out so far and the heuristic, theory-
developing case study that follows in the next part of the thesis.  
 
I begin by discussing how to operationalize a concept of citizenship practices with the 
aim of studying border crossing. I then argue for the usefulness of a narrative approach 
and how we can think of such a method as a critical intervention in a political field. This 
is followed by a ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1975) of the Danish family unification 
dispute drawing out the shifting political battles and legislative changes. The chapter 
ends with a discussion of the selection of the research participants whose narratives 
form the empirical core of the following chapters.  
 
Citizenship as practice 
In the previous chapter I discussed conceptions of citizenship as a dynamic and multi-
dimensional phenomenon of rights, identity and participation developed in different 
ways within deliberative and agonistic theory. This in turn shifts attention towards the 
element of practice which is understood both as a substantive part of citizenship in itself 
(active engagement) and at the same time as a way of claiming and contesting formal 
membership, freedoms and entitlements and  affirming or re-constructing civic 
identification. If exit is to become integrated into such a concept it requires an 
operational discussion of citizenship practices. Where and how to look for civic 
modalities of cross-border movement in contemporary negotiations of membership? 
 
Agonistic and deliberative models  
Let us start by setting out an initial generic model of dynamic citizenship compatible 
with both agonistic and deliberative democracy.
21
 This is depicted in figure 1 below. 
The dotted circle symbolizes the porousness of political boundaries and the ongoing 
                                                 
21
 Note that this is not a generic model of citizenship per se. Other theories and traditions would stress 
other dimensions of citizenship, such as legal-political institutions, that are not captured by this model.  
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negotiation of membership where each of the three dimensions of citizenship – rights, 
identification, participation - are contested. The dotted lines connecting the dimensions 
to the central circle illustrates that citizenship, on this view, is above all a practice 
which unites rights claiming, identification and democratic participation.  
 
Figure 1 
A generic dynamic model of citizenship 
 
Notes: Own rendering 
 
This figure does not distinguish between deliberative and agonistic versions but can be 
specified further following each of these theories or a combination of the two. To 
illustrate, figure 2 below gives an agonistic democratic account: 
 
Citizenship 
practice 
Rights 
Identification Participation 
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Figure 2 
An agonistic model of citizenship 
 
Notes: Own rendering 
 
As the figure shows, civic actors – be they migrants or citizens – claim rights by re-
articulating the ethico-political ideals of liberty and equality. They do so through 
collective acts of contestation where passion is mobilized and civic identification 
affirmed, rediscovered, transformed or lost. A similar model can be constructed for 
deliberative democracy emphasising instead deliberation, human rights and 
constitutional patriotism.  
 
 
 
Citizenship 
practice 
Collective action 
Rights 
Liberty/equality 
Identification 
Passion 
Participation 
Contestation 
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Figure 3 
A deliberative model of citizenship 
 
Notes: Own rendering 
 
Neither of these theoretically specific models include border crossing as a civic act, 
however. The aim of the thesis is to find ways to amend this omission and bring in exit 
as a practice of citizenship. It is to this end that I develop the following analytical 
strategy. This in turn requires a discussion of what is meant by citizenship practices. 
 
Practices of citizenship 
Here it is helpful to compare the term with Engin Isin’s influential notion ‘acts of 
citizenship’ (Isin, 2008; see also Aradau et al., 2010; Rumelli et al., 2011) and draw out 
important similarities and differences for the practical study of membership. Isin 
Citizenship 
practice 
Public voice 
Rights 
Human and civil 
rights 
Identification 
Constitutional 
patriotism 
Participation 
Deliberation 
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distinguishes sharply between practices and acts. The former refer in his terminology to 
sedimented behaviour with which we reproduce and uphold existing regimes. This is 
practices in a Bourdieu inspired sense (habitus) (Isin, 2008, pp.16-21). In the 
performance of everyday routines we come to inhabit and embody the power relations 
and social structures in which we find ourselves. Echoing civic republicans, agonists 
and radical democrats like Hannah Arendt (1958a), Chantal Mouffe (2000) and Jacques 
Rancíere (2004), Isin argues that sociology and political studies have focused on 
regularity and stability. But citizenship is not merely about order and consensus. It is 
also and perhaps foremost about the transformative processes ‘through which subjects 
become claimants when they are least expected or anticipated to do so.’ (Isin, 2008, 
p.17) It is the element of ‘ruptures and beginnings’ which the conception of acts is 
meant to capture (p.27). Drawing on Arendt, Isin thus stresses the originality of these 
performances. ‘To act … is neither arriving at a scene nor fleeing from it, but actually 
engaging in its creation.’ (p.27) In the process, new actors come into being. Isin then 
introduces a further distinction between “‘activist citizens’” and “‘active citizens’”. He 
explains that ‘[w]hile activist citizens engage in writing scripts and creating the scene, 
active citizens follow scripts and participate in scenes that are already created. While 
activist citizens are creative, active citizens are not.’ (Isin, 2008, p.38) These two 
conceptual pairs – practices/acts, active/activists – are thus intimately linked. Active 
citizens practice an already given form of membership through established codes of 
conduct, while activist citizens ‘transform forms ... and modes ... of being political’ 
(p.39)  
 
This performative (cf. Butler, 1997) understanding of citizenship as enactment in which 
particular doings constitute actors with a political standing is also central to Honig’s 
agonistic democracy as we saw in the previous chapter and important for the project I 
set out here. Even so, I am sceptical of Isin’s conceptualization with its binary of 
practices and acts, active and activist citizens. To be sure, there are ways of conducting 
one’s citizenship which are fairly routinized, such as voting in established democracies, 
while other actions are more dramatic and innovative, like ‘the occupation of […a] 
construction crane’ by irregular workers in Italy (Oliveri, 2012, p.800). In that sense the 
distinction does have some traction. There is a risk, though, of overstating the 
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difference. Not only do novel and spectacular acts usually presuppose the build-up of 
resources and experience through existing practices, as Isin recognizes (Isin, 2008, p.17; 
Oliveri, 2012). More importantly, carrying through the transformations inaugurated in 
such beginnings requires multiple actions and actors. The latter in turn are not merely 
understudies faithfully following a script, Arendt reminds us.  Rather, such agents often 
re-interpret the meaning of the original act and take it in unforeseen directions (Arendt, 
1958a; Markell, 2006).  
 
My reservations are not just conceptual, however, but also ethical. In the account of 
active citizens as uncreative - dupes almost - there is an implicit devaluation which I 
find troubling. Vital and robust democracies do not merely have to be constituted and 
transformed through extension and reinvention of membership. They also need to be 
kept alive by old as well new citizens willing to participate in public debate, 
demonstrations, and community projects (Norval, 2007, pp.136-137). If rights are not 
continually claimed they risk becoming empty words (Honig 2001) and if governments 
are not kept in check by an engaged citizenry power may all too easily corrupt. A 
simple division between creative and uncreative performances which treats this as a 
‘qualitative difference’ (Isin, 2008, p.18) is therefore unhelpful.  
 
This has crucial implications for an operationalization of civic practices. In the next part 
of the thesis I explore novel ways of doing citizenship in the European Union such as 
contestatory cross-border movement. But I also analyze classical forms of activism 
including participation in public debate and civil society organizations and argue that 
these acquire new meaning in a transnational context. I consider innovation and 
‘reactivation’ as differences ‘in degree rather than in kind’ (Norval, 2007, pp.134-135) 
and use the term citizenship practices to capture the broad field of actions.
22
 I explore 
the meaning and interplay between these different practices asking a set of key 
analytical questions: Cross-border movement may sometimes generate or enable voice, 
as the previous chapter suggested, but what forms do these articulations take? How and 
to what extent is civic identification affirmed, discovered, transformed or lost? How 
might citizens and migrants narrate various strategies of border crossing as practices of 
                                                 
22
 Isin (2008) also distinguishes between acts and actions. 
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dissent, disengagement or despair? And what spaces of action and modalities of thick or 
thin citizenship are constructed in the process? 
 
Narrative research 
How then study civic practices of voice, exit, entry and re-entry and the negotiation of 
membership they are part of? In the introduction I briefly set out the narrative approach 
I adopt. In the following I discuss why this is a relevant choice for a study of citizenship 
and what ethico-political commitments it reflects.  
 
Why personal narratives matter: research as participation and intervention 
To engage with citizenship as a lived practice requires attention to the construction of 
agency and subjectivity. Studying personal narratives is a useful way of exploring how 
agents interpret and attribute meaning to their own actions and life-experiences. It does 
not mean, however, that these agents are viewed as sovereign subjects (Maynes et al., 
2008). When we make sense of our lives through narrative we do so by drawing on and 
mobilizing discursive resources available to us in the social worlds we inhabit 
(Benhabib, 2002). Embedded in networks of signification, we are never the sole 
interpreters of our actions. How to understand particular acts and events is often 
intensely contested in the politics of membership (Honig, 2009). In European headscarf 
affairs, for example, participants debate if specific bodily practices among Muslim girls 
and woman signify female submission, rebellion or pious devotion. Likewise in family 
unification disputes where politicians, citizens, migrants and scholars dispute the 
meaning of transnational marriages, the right to family life and the role of EU 
citizenship.  
 
This contested field of interpretation is reflected in my study. I situate my narrative 
interviews in the context of legislative constructions of membership and dominant 
political discourses. But in this terrain I give special prominence to the narratives of 
citizens and migrants who have been adversely affected by the regulation and responded 
with strategies of cross-border movement. This is a deliberate choice. As it is the 
meaning of this practice I wish to investigate I find it troubling not to explore how these 
agents experience and make sense of their action. If we do not as researchers invite and 
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listen to the stories, perspectives and articulations of migrants and citizens we fail to 
respect their agency (cf. Bloom, 2010; Tully, 2008). This is particularly troubling in a 
politico-discursive context where it has been very difficult to articulate these 
experiences as meaningful and valid, as we shall see in chapter five. The power 
disparity between governing elites and the persons whose intimate lives are acted upon 
thus warrants such a focus. The thesis is therefore an intervention in this political 
dispute and most of my informants described their research participation as a form of 
public voice. I obviously do not aim to settle the debates over family unification and EU 
citizenship. Rather, the analysis should be read as a theoretically reflexive and 
empirically embedded contribution to the on-going democratic struggle over the 
boundaries of citizenship (cf. Tully, 2008).  
 
Narrative interviewing: some caveats 
Narrative interviewing has historical connections with activist research committed to 
egalitarian politics and critical knowledge production (Chase, 2005). This is a heritage 
that agonistic and deliberative democratic political theorists endorse and it is important 
to my thesis. Indeed, it is part of the attraction of the method for this field of research 
that it stresses the equal dignity and agency of marginalized subjects. There are however 
a set of objections to this methodology which warrants critical attention.  
 
In early feminist and testimonial studies there was sometimes an aspiration of ‘“giving 
voice” to previously silenced groups’ (Riessman, 1993, p.8). This has a paternalist ring 
to it suggesting that family migrants or irregular workers are unable to articulate their 
perspectives without the aid of academic interviewers. As the many recent 
demonstrations by migrants show, this is clearly not the case. The terminology of 
‘giving voice’, however, not only overestimates the power of the researcher but also, 
paradoxically, understates her role and the influence of the wider social context on the 
making of stories. After all, interviewers ask questions and interact to create rapport 
during the conversation and subsequently interpret and re-present the narrative accounts 
produced (Riesman, 2008, p.21). Most contemporary narrative studies thus see 
interviewing as a way - not of speaking for - but of speaking with and listening to 
informants. This means viewing ‘narratives as socially situated interactive 
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performances’ - ‘a joint production of narrator and listener’ (Chase, 2005 p.657). That 
in turn calls for reflexivity and transparency with regards to how stories are invited, told 
and re-presented in the interactional research process. A detailed discussion of the 
interview process and analysis is therefore provided in appendix I. 
 
Another objection to the use of narrative research is that not all are equally skilled story-
tellers. Intersections of class, gender, age, and culture may in different ways condition 
how comfortable we are speaking and how narrative our responses are. To give an 
example, a sociologist exploring family lives of Danish-Pakistani citizens found that 
while elderly parents generally told long stories his younger research participants gave 
briefer answers in the interviews. This reflected, he thought, intergenerational norms of 
authority. His strategy was therefore to mix life story and semi-structured interview 
techniques to suit his different informants (Rytter 2010a, pp.55-56). Such pragmatic 
approaches are clearly useful and do not prevent the interviewer from still paying heed 
to and inviting stories of specific events. At the same time, it is important to be aware 
that narratives come in different genres. Not all stories have a ‘clear beginning and 
endings’, or are even temporally structured (Riessman, 1993, p.17). Some are, for 
example, ‘organized consequentially or thematically’ (p.17). In conducting and 
analysing the interviews I thus listen for different modes of narration.      
 
Finally, even some defenders of narrative research stress that not all experiences can be 
meaningfully articulated. Traumatic events could be psychologically blocked from our 
memories and thus hard to narrate. Some experiences, such as sexual violence and 
torture, may be so shameful that we are unable tell others about them (Riessman, 1993). 
Occasionally talking about these events, except with trained therapeutic professionals, 
might even be harmful. As my focus is on family migrants and not war victims this is 
not a pressing concern. Still, narrative studies with refugees illustrate that traumatic 
episodes can be sensitively explored and that some informants are keen to voice their 
grievances in a safe research context (Hebing, 2009, pp.73-76). 
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Contextualizing the case 
In the following I introduce the case of the Danish family unification dispute in greater 
detail, describing the political and legislative context for the practices and narratives 
explored in the next part of the thesis.   
 
The politics of family unification in Denmark 
Family unification policies have been intensely debated and contested in the Danish 
public as part of a broader struggle over membership and immigration. In 1983 the 
Danish Parliament adopted a new and very liberal Aliens Act with strong protection of 
the rights of refugees and family migrants. It had the support of both left and right 
mainstream parties as well refugee NGOs, but it met with critique from the conservative 
minister of justice and spurred far right mobilization.
23
 Amendments followed a few 
years later but the legislation was still quite liberal. Subterraneous contentions 
continued, now in the administrative practice. In the late 1980s and early 1990s a major 
public scandal developed as it turned out that the Ministry of Justice had not processed 
applications in accordance with the law but had refused or put on hold requests for 
family reunification from spouses of Tamil refugees. This controversy (Tamilsagen) 
eventually led to the resignation of the centre-right government and a suspended 
sentence of four months imprisonment for the former Minister of Justice. This was the 
first in a serious of highly politicized disputes over family unification (Rytter and 
Liversage, 2014; Mørch, 2004, pp.425-440; Gyldendal, 2013a-b).  
 
In 1995 leading members of the right wing Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet) left and 
formed the Danish People’s Party (Rydgren, 2004, p.480; Meret, 2009). During the late-
1990s this new party very skilfully and successfully challenged the established liberal-
humanitarian political hegemony and mobilized support by presenting immigration and 
EU integration as threats to popular sovereignty. Criticizing existing family unification 
laws played a central part in this endeavour to change dominant discourses and policies. 
                                                 
23
 The centre-right government had initially proposed a more restrictive law but a majority in parliament 
consisting of the centre-left parties (the so-called ‘alternative majority’ dominating Danish foreign policy 
at the time) succeeded in amending the bill very significantly resulting in the liberal law that was 
eventually adopted. Their amendments were drafted by Hans Gammeltoft-Hansen who later became 
parliamentary ombudsman and involved in critically investigating first the minister of justice in 
Tamilsagen (Mørck, 2004, pp.425-440) and decades later the maladministration of EU law in the 
Immigration Service.   
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To begin with, the response of centre-left parties, which were then in government, was 
articulated in what Mouffe calls ‘the moral register’. The social-democratic Prime 
Minister at the time, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, famously declared that the Danish 
People’s Party would ‘never become respectable (stuerene)’ (Nyrup Rasmussen, 1999, 
translation adjusted from Meret, 2009, p.22).
24
 This condescending approach only 
served to boost the DPP’s public image as the suppressed voice of the people in 
opposition to arrogant elites thus reinforcing their popularity (cf. Mouffe, 2005). Soon 
the established parties on both right and left changed strategy. The centre-left 
government began introducing a number of conditions limiting the right to family 
unification – primarily directed at resident immigrants rather than citizens (Aliens Act, 
1998, 2000). They struggled, however, to construct a narrative that would persuade their 
many immigration-sceptical voters without alienating other supporters (Rydgren, 2004; 
Karpantshof, 2006).  
 
In the 2002 election, the Danish Liberal Party (Venstre), the biggest of the centre-right 
parties, ran successfully on an immigration critical platform promising severe restriction 
of asylum and family unification rules. A political coalition was established between the 
mainstream centre-right parties that came into power and the Danish People’s Party 
who served as the new government’s parliamentary supporters.25 This was the 
beginning of a new hegemony which lasted, almost unchallenged, for a decade.
26
 
Though some expected a populist party to be unfit for pragmatic, governmental politics, 
the DPP turned out to be a loyal and effective partner that voted in favour of nearly all 
government bills with the exception of EU policies in return for successive reforms 
tightening asylum, immigration and citizenship laws (Meret, 2009, pp.99-100). In this 
                                                 
24
 The Danish term ‘stuerene’ is hard to translate and heavy with connotations. It can refer to dogs which 
have not yet been house-trained and ought therefore to be kept out the parlour lest they should soil the 
carpets. When used metaphorically to describe political opponents in this context it is thus deeply 
demeaning, insulting and exclusionary. It is an excellent example of the kind de-humanization that turns 
adversaries into enemies (Mouffe, 2005).   
25
 The rise to prominence of the Danish People’s Party in many ways resembles the story of the Austrian 
Freedom Party analyzed by Mouffe (2005). Note, however, that unlike Jörg Haider and the Freedom 
Party, neither the Danish People’s Party nor the Progress Party from which it descends has any historical 
ties with fascism or Nazism (Rydgren, 2004). 
26
 A prominent member of the Danish People’s Party described it as ‘a change in systems’ using the 
Danish term ‘systemskifte’ (Krarup quoted in Meret, 2009, p.100) which usually refers to the introduction 
of parliamentarism in 1901 after a long constitutional struggle. This illustrates just much this was a battle 
over the meaning and boundaries of the polity. 
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period family unification rules changed frequently, nearly always in a restrictive 
direction and were often debated in the wider public (Rytter and Liversage, 2014). 
Newspapers and TV media were important arenas for this contestation but also active 
partisans themselves. Especially the right wing broadsheet paper Jyllands-Posten 
supported and helped disseminate immigration and Islam critical discourse, while the 
social-liberal paper, Politiken, articulated liberal and multicultural opposition to the 
government (see appendix II).
27
   
 
In September 2011 a coalition of centre-left parties won a narrow victory for the first 
time in a decade. They disagreed internally over family unification policies, the social-
democrats wishing to continue a fairly restrictive line and the social-liberals arguing for 
more profound liberalizations. Shortly after their accession to power new legislation 
was introduced reflecting a compromise which moderated the regulation in important 
ways without changing the basic structure introduced in 2002.   
   
Overview of legislation 
This section gives an overview of key legislative changes in Danish regulation of family 
unification since the late 1990s. Before this period there were few requirements and it 
was comparatively easy for Danish citizens, residents and refugees to bring in a spouse 
from outside the EU. 
 
In response to anti-immigration mobilization, new legislation was introduced by the 
social-democratic and social-liberal governing coalition in 1998 and 2000 (Aliens Act, 
1998, 2000; Siim, 2007). The 1998-reform, among other things, ruled out family 
unification in cases where the spouses were under the age of 25 and the marriage had 
been arranged by third parties, for example parents (Schmidt, 2011, p.260). In 2000 this 
became a general ban of family unification for persons under 25 unless the marriage 
appeared undoubtedly voluntary. In practice this meant that young couples would be 
asked to prove that their marriage was undertaken freely. Very few applications were 
                                                 
27
 Similar advocacy and lines of division in the Danish media characterized the Danish Cartoon Affair in 
2005-2006 where 12 cartoons of the prophet Mohammad were published by Jyllands-Posten. This affair 
was another important moment in ‘the ongoing kulturkamp over Islam, national values and integration 
that has shaped [Danish] electoral politics for half a decade’ (Meer and Mouritzen, 2009, p. 352; see also 
Lindekilde, 2008; Rostbøll, 2010). 
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turned down on this ground, however (Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and 
Integration Affairs, 2002). The 2000 amendment also introduced the first version of the 
so-called ‘attachment requirement’. It stated that immigrants residing in Denmark could 
only obtain family unification with a foreign spouse, if the couple’s affiliation to 
Denmark was at least as great as their attachment to any other country (Aliens Act 
2000, Liisberg 2004, p.17, 27). 
 
With the change in government and the Aliens Act of 2002 the 25-years rule became a 
24-rule. It barred family unification for any couple under the age limit regardless of 
whether the marriage was voluntary or not. The attachment requirement was extended 
to include Danish citizens as well as resident immigrants and the couple’s connection to 
Denmark now had to exceed their ties to other countries. The rationale was that since 
most transnational marriages involved the grown-up children of immigrants, many of 
whom were Danish citizens, a distinction between citizens and immigrants was no 
longer sensible if the government were to achieve its objectives of reducing 
immigration, promoting integration and preventing forced marriages. The 2002 reform 
also introduced a set of new economic conditions and existing ones were made more 
demanding. The Danish citizen or resident became obliged to demonstrate ability to 
provide for the couple. He or she must not have received social welfare payments 
during the past year before applying or at any time after, until the spouse had obtained a 
permanent right of residence. A bank-deposit of 50,000 DKK (ca. 6,700 Euros) should 
also be made (Aliens Act, 2002). 
 
The 2002-reform was highly controversial and especially the revised attachment 
requirement was criticized (see chapter five and appendix II). Already a year later an 
amendment was introduced. Persons who had been Danish citizens for at least 28 years 
no longer had to fulfill this particular condition. Also exempted were individuals born 
or raised in Denmark since early childhood who had resided legally for 28 years. At the 
same time the so-called ‘presumption rule’ was introduced. In cases of marriage 
between close relations such as cousins the voluntary nature of the union would be 
considered doubtful (Aliens Act, 2003; Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and 
Integration Affairs, 2003; Liisberg, 2004). 
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The rules of 2000, 2002, and 2003 focused on ‘proper’ marital age and practices, socio-
cultural attachment and economic independence. Later the ability to integrate and 
contribute to the Danish economy society became a more prominent concern. Thus in 
2005 marriage migration was made conditional on the spouses signing a declaration of 
integration. Two years later an ‘immigration test’ (Indvandringsprøven) was introduced 
where applicants for family unification had to pass a test of their Danish language skills 
and knowledge of Danish society. The procedures for fee-based test were adjusted in 
2010. That year also saw the introduction of general fees for family unification 
applications and appeals. In 2011 the language requirements were increased. At the 
same time applicants from Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, USA, South Korea 
and Switzerland were exempted from the integration test. The argument was that 
Western or highly developed countries shared cultural and economic features which 
made adaptation easier (Aliens Act, 2005, 2007, 2010a, 2010c, 2011; Ministry of 
Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs 2011a-b).  
 
The 2011 changes were part of a larger reform of the regulation where a new point-
system was introduced. In this merits-based system a foreign spouse would get points 
according to, in particular, his or her level of education, language abilities, and work 
experience. If both spouses were at least 24 years old, 60 points were required. 
Otherwise 120 points were needed. For extraordinarily well-qualified applicants under 
the age of 24, family unification would now become possible. For low skilled migrants 
it became more difficult regardless of age. The attachment requirement was also 
tightened. The couple’s joint affiliation with Denmark now had to significantly exceed 
their connection to other countries. Furthermore, the bank guarantee was increased to 
100,000 DKK (13,500 Euros), and the ‘probation period’ after receiving social welfare 
payments was raised to three years. Finally, fees were introduced for applications and 
appeals (Aliens Act, 2011).  
 
The point-system had barely come into force when a new centre-left government came 
to power. They abandoned this regulatory model and reintroduced the 24-years rule and 
the 2002-version of the attachment requirement. The 28-years-rule became a 26-years 
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rule and the collateral was again reduced to 50,000 DKK. The immigration test was 
abolished. Applicants instead had to pass a Danish language test no later than six month 
after taking up residence in the country. The test was still fee-based but the general fees 
for family unification applications and appeals were cancelled (Aliens Act, 2012).  
 
Informants 
Since the restrictive reform in 2002, transnational couples have responded to legislative 
changes by moving to Sweden thus accessing the more liberal EU regulation and 
Swedish national rules.
28
 In the next part of the thesis I analyze how this practice of 
cross-border movement is interpreted by such couples. The section below describes my 
informants and how they were selected. 
 
Description and selection 
Interviewees were found through self-selection as interested participants responded to 
my advertisements posted online and at various public institutions in the Swedish city of 
Malmö. Others I approached or found through snowballing (for a more detailed 
description of the process, see appendix I). A small interview study based on a 
combination of self-selection and strategic selection will seldom be representative. It is 
likely to ‘over-sample’ informants who have strong feelings on the subject, are 
resourceful and articulate. The objective of this project is thus not to give an account 
which tells us how widespread certain narratives and practices are among Danish-
international couples who have used ‘the Swedish model’ (Rytter, 2010a, p.125). 
Rather, the aim is to develop a collection of interviews sufficiently rich to allow for 
theoretical and conceptual development. In this context it is particularly important to 
steer clear of the Scylla and Charybdis of demonization and romanticizing of cross-
border movement. A worry could be, for example, that a sample was created which 
included only very politically active persons with a strong civic engagement. Such a 
data corpus would generate theoretical – rather than just empirical – distortions in that it 
would preclude an inquiry into the open-endedness of the politics of migration and the 
                                                 
28
 I describe Swedish, Danish and EU rules in different parts of the thesis as I analyze the strategies and 
stories of my informants. See especially chapter one (the section: ‘The case: marriage migration, border 
crossing and EU citizenship’), chapter four, (the sections: ‘The boundaries of membership transgressed’ 
and ‘Limits to European citizenship of last resort’) and chapter six (sections: ‘Exit as liberal anti-politics’ 
and ‘Pragmatic forum-shopping?’).  
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ambivalent or ‘gothic’ character of social action. To avoid this problem I follow a 
strategy of diversification. In my search for informants I have sought to include 
interviewees positioned differentially in political discourses and socio-cultural worlds 
and with varying experiences of border crossing.  
 
The majority of my interviewees are in their twenties as young adults are particularly 
affected by the regulation of family unification. But there are also several informants in 
their thirties and forties and one who is above sixty. Both genders are well represented, 
although there are more women than men in the sample. Most of my Danish 
interviewees come from upper- or lower middle-class backgrounds reflecting that it 
requires socio-economic resources and self-confidence to use EU-law in this way. Still, 
I have interviewed two citizens unable to mobilize Union citizenship owing to 
insufficient economic means and social problems. The foreign spouses come from all 
regions of the world and from very poor and well off families. I also interviewed four 
Danish citizens with refugee or migrant background but in general this group was more 
difficult to establish contact with. To supplement the material I draw on the few existing 
anthropological studies of marriage migration and the Swedish model among ethnic 
minorities (Rytter, 2010a; Schmidt et al., 2009; Jensen and Fernandez, 2013). It is 
important not to overestimate the significance of ethno-cultural differences especially in 
a context where these are used politically to make simplistic distinctions. There are very 
considerable similarities in socio-economic positions among exiles across ethnic lines 
of division, similar articulations of anger and shock and parallel strategies of settlement 
or return. There is, however, bound to be some variation in experiences and 
perspectives. A few studies, for example, find cases of young Danish citizens with 
ethnic minority backgrounds for whom exit to Sweden is both a response to the Danish 
state and a way of obtaining greater autonomy in relation to their parents (Rytter, 2010a; 
Jensen and Fernandez, 2013). This is not reflected in my data corpus.  
 
My informants vary with regards to religiosity which is another highly politicized 
marker of identity in the dispute. A few explain that they are devout Muslims or 
Christians. One self-identifies as an atheist, while others or do not remark on their 
beliefs. One interviewee recounts being an active member of a political party on the 
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centre-right prior to his personal encounter with family unification. Another informant 
has joined a centre-left party upon her return from exile. Some informants describe 
taking part in civil society work before moving to Sweden, and many have become 
active in NGOs or participated in public debate after their experiences with immigration 
control. The sample also includes a majority who have little or no involvement in 
traditional civic activism.   
 
I have sought diversity with regards to cross-border strategies and experiences as well. 
The collection of informants include some who moved shortly after the introduction of 
the 2002 reform, others who moved later; many who had just moved or were about to 
do so, and two who were unable to move. I have interviewed a few who have lived 
more than five years in Sweden and others who only stayed shortly; some who planned 
to settle permanently and some who aimed to return. With regards to actual and 
prospective returnees there is again a range of pathways followed, opened up by the 
interplay between Danish and Swedish national rules, Nordic and EU cooperation. 
These different strategies are explained and analyzed in greater detail in the following 
chapters.     
 
Informants in a complex regulatory terrain 
The diversity of my informants is reflected in their encounters with the complex and 
frequently changing Danish immigration and family unification laws which affect them 
in different ways. For younger interviewees the main problem is the 24-years-rule. 
Where either spouse is below the age limit the young couple will be unable to obtain 
family unification. This rule must be seen in connection with the attachment 
requirement. If a couple in their early twenties decides to live abroad in the home 
country of the foreign partner until they have both turned 24, their joint ties to that 
country are likely be considered stronger than their bonds to Denmark. In that case, they 
will still not qualify for family unification under Danish law. This interrelation between 
the different statutes is not accidental. The explicit aim of the government when the 
legislation was drafted was to prevent such strategies of temporary exile by combining 
different regulatory measures (Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration 
Affairs, 2002, 2003).  
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The attachment requirement on its own is also a challenge (see Rytter, 2010a). If a 
Danish citizen has family ties to the partner’s country of origin, has been on frequent 
family visits and if the spouses share another language than Danish then their 
attachment to this country may well be considered greater than their ties to Denmark. In 
that situation, even if both spouses are above the age of 24 they will still not be able to 
obtain family unification. Only after 28 years of citizenship (or residency since early 
childhood) will they be exempted. Two of my Danish informants who came to Denmark 
as refugees at a young age would have found the attachment requirement difficult to 
meet.  
 
Some interviewees were also barred by economic requirements in Danish law. Two 
Danish citizens did not meet the meet the requirement of economic self-sufficiency 
because they were receiving unemployment benefits (kontanthjælp). Another had 
similar problems as she was on a special labour market integration program 
(revalidering) after a period of prolonged illness following an accident.  
 
Unlike unemployed persons, pensioners and students are not precluded from family 
unification. But like everyone else they have to provide collateral of 50,000 DKK. One 
informant found this difficult while others managed with savings or help from parents. 
When the amount was doubled during the financial crisis this became a particularly 
demanding condition and for at least three of my informants it was a major obstacle. 
 
Some interviewees struggled to prove that their marriage was genuine. Considerable age 
difference between spouses is treated as an indication of a possible pro forma marriage 
by the Danish immigration authorities (Liisberg, 2004) who will then call in both 
partners for separate interviews to test their knowledge of each other. One couple I 
talked with had their application turned down on this basis. Earlier marriage history is 
also taken into consideration by the administration. A Danish citizen I spoke with thus 
worried that her request would be refused because she had previously been in another 
transnational marriage. Successive applications for family unification might well meet 
with suspicion. A third interviewee had similar fears but for different reasons. Her 
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partner had stayed illegally in Denmark and been caught. An application for family 
unification in that context would be bound to look instrumental.   
 
One informant was affected not by Danish family unification law but by rules for 
deportation of resident immigrants convicted of serious criminal offences. Her ex-
husband and her son’s father had been imprisoned and subsequently expelled and 
debarred from entering Denmark following a conviction of rape of a former partner.  
 
Finally, a smaller group of interviewees were not directly prevented by Danish law from 
settling in Denmark but responded to restrictive administrative practices, rapidly 
changing legislation and an often antagonistic political discourse. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter rounds off the first part of the thesis providing an analytical strategy for the 
empirical study of border crossing in the Danish family unification dispute. It is an 
approach devised for a narrative analysis with the aim of politico-theoretical 
development.  
 
To sum up briefly, the objective is to construct a conception of citizenship which 
reinterprets modalities of border crossing as civic practices through a critical 
engagement with agonistic and deliberative democracy. It explores classical political 
acts of collective action and public debate as well as inventive strategies of 
supranational mobility and analyzes their complex interplay in the narrative 
interpretations of migrants and citizens. The study is based on 30 narrative and semi-
structured interviews with Danish-international couples. They were found through self-
selection and strategic selection with the aim of ensuring diversity and empirical 
richness for the purpose of conceptual development.  
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Part two: Stories of cross-border movement 
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CHAPTER FOUR: EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP OF LAST RESORT 
 
R: So how come you’re moving to Sweden? … J: Well we were forced to if 
we wanted to be together (Interview with Julie and Derek 2011, p.4) 
 
The year 2011 was quite eventful for Danish Julie and her Australian husband Derek. 
They had a son, got married, and had to leave Denmark. For the past decade, Danish-
international couples like Julie and Derek have been resettling in neighbouring Sweden 
because they are unable to meet the quite demanding criteria for family unification in 
the Danish Aliens Act. These couples are using the freedom of movement for EU 
citizens and their families within the European Union. By crossing an internal border 
they mobilize the supranational rights and freedoms of EU citizenship which include a 
comparatively extensive protection of their family life. This chapter introduces the 
stories of persons like Julie and Derek. I explore how they make sense of their 
encounter with immigration control and the tactics and strategies they devise in order to 
live together in Scandinavia. What do their narratives tell us about EU citizenship and 
what light do these stories throw on contentious practices of cross-border movement 
within and beyond Europe?  
 
As the first of four chapters in this second part of the thesis, the analysis engages with 
the debate over national and postnational citizenship by discussing an important and 
influential synthesis that promises to unite a thick nation-state membership and a thin 
supranational status. Examining the case of family unification and drawing on 
especially agonistic democracy I discuss the attractions but also the limitations of this 
approach which point to the need for a more radical rethinking of European citizenship 
and practices of border crossing.  
 
European citizenship: a synthesis of thick and thin membership?  
In a time of increased global interconnectedness, where national boundaries are under 
pressure from cross border movement of ‘people and money’ (Goodin, 1992), the 
European Union stands out as the first contemporary example of a non-state polity with 
a citizenship of its own and, moreover, one based somewhat paradoxically on the 
practice of cross-border movement. This has understandably caught the attention of a 
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wide range of academics who argue about how best to make sense of this new civic 
status. Initially the debate centred on whether or not European Union citizenship was 
really a citizenship after all (Weiler, 1999, pp.324-325; Kostakopoulou, 2007, pp.6 23-
626). Comparing it implicitly or explicitly with nation-state citizenship several scholars 
noticed its short-comings (Grimm, 1995; Armstrong, 1996; Miller, 1998; Downes, 
2001). The key element of EU citizenship as set out in the Maastricht Treaty was the 
freedom of movement within the union. This right, however, which had long been 
established in community law, was restricted to economic agents of the internal market. 
Though interpreted rather broadly it did not display the universality of citizenship which 
assigns equal entitlement to all citizens. In addition, critics pointed out that EU 
citizenship contained few political and social rights. Gradually, however, the activist 
interpretations by the European Court of Justice widened the scope and content of EU 
citizenship (Besson and Utzinger, 2007). Based on the principle of non-discrimination 
social entitlements were increasingly granted to EU citizens living in another EU 
country. The economic requirements for free movement were also interpreted narrowly 
by the court thus enlarging the group of persons who could use this liberty (Downes, 
2001; Kostakopoulou, 2007; Joppke, 2010b, but see Carrera, 2005). The Citizenship 
directive adopted in 2004 further underlined this tendency (Besson and Utzinger, 2007). 
It codified and extended the rights of European citizens and their non-citizen family 
members who can use the freedom of movement. In light of these developments, the 
current topic of contention is less whether or not EU citizenship is a citizenship but 
rather what kind of citizenship it is or ought to be.  
 
In this debate about the present and future of EU citizenship, several scholars seek to 
strike a balance between national and supra-national membership while emphasizing the 
primacy of the former. European integration, they argue, must respect the multiple 
‘demoi’ with their diverse national cultures and historical trajectories while seeking to 
promote peaceful cooperation at all levels. EU citizenship should thus supplement but 
not replace national membership (Bellamy, 2008; cf. Nicholaïdis, 2004; Glencross, 
2011). Joseph Weiler has developed an elegant and influential, though also 
controversial, version of this argument. His analysis is particularly interesting for the 
thesis I am defending because it promises a harmonious synthesis of thick national and 
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thin post-national membership, which, if persuasive, could hold considerable potential 
for a rethinking of citizenship, migration and EU mobility.  
 
Weiler claims, in line with nationalists, that the nation-state remains a crucial site for 
collective self-identification. Indeed he argues that ‘nationhood is not an instrument to 
obtain belongingness, it is it.’ (Weiler, 1999, p.338, original emphasis) An EU 
citizenship based on rights and common ideals cannot provide us with the deep sense of 
membership believed to be necessary. If this supranational status is promoted at the 
expense of national citizenship it will therefore generate estrangement and political 
disaffection (p.347). But though the nation-state is valued in this line of argument, the 
inherent dangers of national politics are also emphasized. Unchecked, nationalism all 
too often leads to wars of aggression or xenophobic policies (pp.340-341). For Weiler 
‘[t]he national and the supranational encapsulate … two of the most elemental, alluring 
and frightening social and psychological poles of our cultural heritage. The national is 
eros …. The supranational is civilization.’ (p.347)  
 
The solution to this conundrum is not to establish a United States of Europe where 
Union citizenship overrides or replaces nationality. Such attempts to create national-like 
membership at a higher European level would only reproduce its vices (p.341) without 
preserving its virtues of diversity and belonging. But nor should we abandon EU 
citizenship for that would leave nationalism unconstrained. Instead, it is recommended 
that we combine national and European citizenship so that each can keep in check the 
evils of the other. We should ‘embrace the national in the in-reaching strong sense of 
organic-cultural identification and belongingness and … embrace the European in terms 
of European transnational affinities to shared values which transcend the ethno-national 
diversity.’ (p.346). We must do so in a way that retains the priority of national 
membership while allowing for a number of political issues to be decided at the 
European level (p. 346). Weiler thus provides us with a conception of what Dora 
Kostakopoulou (2000) in a critique has called ‘corrective citizenship’ where EU 
citizenship supplements and perfects but also preserves national membership. The 
former is wholly dependent on the latter (Weiler, 1999, p.346) and merely ‘aspires to 
keep the values of the nation-state pure and uncorrupted’ (p. 341).  
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The attraction of this conceptualization is that it takes seriously the potential and 
dangers of both nationalism and supranationalism. We are cautioned against the dual 
threats of too much passion and too little. Moreover, the Hegelian synthesis promises a 
way to avoid both evils while incorporating what is valuable in each type of regime. 
There are notable conceptual problems with this argument, however. Critics like 
Kostakopoulou (2000) and Joppke (2010b) have questioned the account of nationalism 
and supranationalism Weiler gives. Drawing on agonistic democracy I want instead to 
discuss an inherent difficulty in combining the two. Agonists are typically sceptical of 
such unifying analyses which, while tempting, often gloss over important remaining 
tensions (cf. Honig, 2001a). This is very much the case in the conception of corrective 
citizenship. The aim is to domesticate nationalism and save it from itself, but it is not 
clear why we should expect nationalism to obligingly accept taming. Weiler insists that 
supranationalism ought to be ‘policing the boundaries of the nation against abuse’ 
(p.341). Boundary drawing, however, is no minor issue for nationalists. In some ways, 
defining the scope of the community is exactly what nationalism is all about. Walzer 
(1983) has developed a left-communitarian political theory defending the kind of rooted 
organic polity Weiler portrays. He insists that it is essential for the maintenance of such 
communities that they determine their own membership policy. Some, albeit limited, 
protection for refugees may be required, but the polity has a right to decide who and 
how many newcomers it permits and at what speed. Consequently, any inter- or 
supranational regime that interferes with the drawing of symbolic-political boundaries 
of a nation-state is not merely trimming the fringes of an otherwise benign order. Such 
interventions transform the national community in rather radical ways (cf. 
Kostakopoulou, 2007).  
 
This is illustrated nicely in disputes over family unification, domestic and EU 
citizenship, as we shall see. Marriage migration brings out very clearly the tension 
between liberal values and national membership which both animates and troubles a 
corrective conception of citizenship in Europe. On the one hand, we have the freedom 
of citizens to form and pursue their own life plans - including in the important area of 
love and family relations - as long as they respect the equal liberty of others. The liberal 
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principles Weiler is committed to suggest that nation-states should be wary of 
interfering in the intimate lives of citizens and leave the choice of sexual practices, 
relationships and marriage to consenting adults (Mill, [1859] 1974; Hart, 1963). On the 
other hand, we have the imagined community of the nation (Anderson, 1991) whose 
symbolic boundaries are challenged when citizens marry across borders. If members 
bring in spouses from outside then the make-up of the people is affected. ‘We’ are no 
longer who we thought we were. Family unification therefore potentially endangers 
what nationalists cherish the most: the freedom of a political community to determine 
its own membership and admission policies (cf. Miller, 2005). The case is thus well 
suited to demonstrate in practice the attractions and the limitations of a corrective 
synthesis.  
 
Strategies of last resort: a corrective European citizenship? 
In the following, I take the first steps in the analysis of my interviews with Danish-
international marriage migrants. Tracing out key strategies and arguments presented in 
the data, I show how a corrective thick-thin synthesis resonates rather well, at least on 
the face of it, with many of these couples’ lived experiences, before exploring in the 
next section how it nevertheless runs into serious problems.  
 
National membership affirmed? 
The trajectories and courtship stories of my informants vary considerably. Most of my 
Danish interviewees found their partners while abroad for purposes of study, work, 
holidays or family visits. Other couples met in Denmark or on the internet. Many began 
their relationship by visiting each other for shorter periods. Some also lived together 
rather longer in the partner’s home country or elsewhere. Eventually, though, nearly all 
couples wanted to move to Denmark and establish a life there together, at least for a 
time. The reasons they give differ but practical considerations and family ties are 
typically important. For the Danish spouses, this is their home state where they have 
their social networks, jobs and citizenship. Many are about to begin or are in the middle 
of their studies and in Denmark they have access to free higher education of good 
quality. If they were instead to settle in their partner’s country of origin they would 
often face economic and linguistic barriers in their educational pursuit. Where the 
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spouse comes from a developing country, lack of adequate health care, job opportunities 
and social security are also pressing concerns. Informants who have or plan to have 
children especially emphasize their wish to give them the best opportunities for a good 
life by bringing them up in a Scandinavian welfare state. While the importance of 
Danish citizenship is thus affirmed in these accounts, it is the civil and social rights of 
this status that are particularly important for the desire to live in Denmark. Weiler’s 
conception of national membership as a deeply rooted and passionate sense of 
belonging thus appears to have less traction in this part of their stories. A few do, 
however, stress their emotional attachment to Denmark and their obligation to 
contribute to the common good of the country when explaining their initial wish to live 
there with their spouse.  
 
Let us then explore the strategies and tactics my informants develop in order to realize 
the objective of a family life in Denmark. About a third of the couples I interviewed 
first sought to obtain a residence permit for their partner using Danish and not EU 
regulation. This means trying their luck with one or more of the three main entry routes 
in Danish national law: family unification, labour migration and study. Family 
unification is, on the face of it, the natural starting point as a programme aimed at their 
situation. If granted, it enables foreigners who are married to Danish citizens or 
residents to enter and settle – temporarily at first – in the country. Many of my 
informants did consider applying for family reunion under Danish law. They contacted 
the Danish Immigration Service for advice and spent considerable time reading laws 
and guidelines. Yet because the rules are so strict, most eventually concluded that they 
would be unable to obtain a residence permit in this way. Particularly for the young 
couples, where at least one of the spouses is less than 24 years of old, there is little point 
in trying. In the end, then, only five of the couples I interviewed actually applied.  
 
One who did go through the application process is Derek, the young Australian we 
encountered in the beginning of the chapter. He first came to Denmark with a Danish 
girlfriend he had met in New Zealand. The couple went back and forth for a while, but 
then she got pregnant. When their son was born, Derek applied for family unification. 
His application was declined because he was unable to meet the age requirement. That 
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he was the parent of a Danish citizen made no difference. The Immigration Service 
judged that the baby’s attachment to Denmark was not strong enough to warrant an 
exemption. The family could instead settle in Australia, it was argued. Derek appealed 
the decision and later appealed the appeal. He used appealing as a temporary tactic for 
prolonging his stay while hoping to find a more lasting solution.
29
 Meanwhile, he did 
not have the right to work and the family was hard pressed economically. Eventually 
Derek and his then wife split up, partly owing to the stress and uncertainty of their 
situation. He had to leave the country, but filed again for family unification to stay with 
his son.  
 
While the case was under consideration Derek got in contact with Julie on a dating site. 
They started going out and soon moved in together. Shortly after, Derek got a very 
highly paid job. This enabled him to get a residence permit as part of the green card 
program for employees with salaries of at least 375,000 DKK (approximately 50,280 
Euros). Then Julie got pregnant. Just after their son was born, however, Derek was fired 
and had to leave the country. By then the financial crisis had set in. With no education 
to speak of, his chances of finding another highly paid job were slim. He therefore 
applied for family unification once more to stay with his new wife and son. But again 
the answer was negative. Derek had now turned 24 and was thus old enough, but Julie 
was only 23. The family therefore finally decided to go to Sweden. 
 
Derek tried different tactics but had most success when he became a labour migrant. 
Various green card programmes exist for highly qualified or highly paid workers. 
However, as marriage migrants affected by the 24-years rule are typically quite young,
30
 
they seldom have the necessary qualifications for this entry route. Becoming an au pair 
is another entry option used for example by Grace, the young Filipina woman 
introduced in the preface.
31
 This program offers an 18 month legal stay with some 
                                                 
29
 Note that such tactics later became more difficult to use after the centre-right government introduced 
fees for applications and appeals (see chapter three).  
30
 This may sound obvious; to be affected by the 24-years-rule they must surely be less than 24 years old, 
but that is not the case. Any migrant regardless of age is prevented by this rule from obtaining family 
unification if his or her Danish spouse has not turned 24. That was the problem for several of my 
informants.  
31
 Grace became an au pair before she met her Danish boyfriend, while Mary Ann, whose story is told in 
chapter six, used the au pair programme to enter Denmark in order to be near her partner.   
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remuneration in exchange for what is supposed to be light housework. It is a 
controversial programme because it often exposes migrants to exploitation from their 
Danish host families, as Grace also experienced (Stenum, 2010, pp.139-179).  
 
Rather than trying their luck as labour migrants foreign spouses can enter Denmark as 
students. For my predominantly young interviewees this is an easier way to gain access. 
Some thus did a high school exchange or spent a semester in a Danish folk high school. 
This is obviously a short term solution but it allows the couple some respite while they 
consider their options. Pursuing higher education in Denmark is a longer term strategy 
and requires more academic and economic resources. Katrine and Mark, a Danish-
Canadian couple, chose this route. They met each other during high school in the 
Netherlands where their respective fathers, both with army careers, were posted. The 
two teenagers had been dating for about a year when their families were due to leave 
again. Having just graduated, Mark decided to follow Katrine to Copenhagen and begin 
his studies there. He found a free degree program in construction management and got a 
student visa. When he finished four years later Mark had a year to find a job. Though he 
spoke Danish fluently and had a Danish education it proved difficult due to the onset of 
the financial crisis and the resulting massive unemployment in the construction sector. 
Mark tells about the more than 300 applications he sent, most of which never even 
received an answer. Then, when his job-search permit expired he could prolong his stay 
for another year owing to a special agreement between Denmark and Canada, but 
eventually that too ran out. Katrine, meanwhile, had begun her studies and was not keen 
to move to Canada:   
 
K: Then we were faced with the choice that we didn’t have any other option 
than 
M: get married 
K: get married and go to Malmö. 
M: Yes and choose something called ‘The Malmö model’ 
K: Yes, because ... we were actually denied all other options. We ... could 
either say that [Mark] travels back to Canada or we choose to use the 
Malmö model and that, then, is what we have decided to do, because what 
do you do? We have known each other for seven years, right, and [Mark] 
has lived in Denmark for six years, and it’s after all, well 
M: ... 
K: really hard 
M: ... 
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R: Mm 
M: But then now we’re in the situation where we’ve come to the end of 
those  
K: yes 
M: what can you say, short cuts, so you don’t have any other option … than 
the Malmö model. … (Interview with Katrine and Mark, 2011, pp.3-4) 
  
Mark was fortunate to find a programme which did not have tuition fees for non-EU 
citizens. Many do, however, thus making it more difficult to use this strategy. In 
addition he was able to obtain student loans from Canada enabling him to display 
enough money on his bank account to get a student visa. Again, this is not an option 
open to all marriage migrants. Even for those who are able to gain entry this way, 
studying is only a temporary solution which can leave couples vulnerable to market 
fluctuations, as it did Mark and Katrine.  
 
For this group of couples, then, EU citizenship is presented as a citizenship of last 
resort. It is activated only after options within national law have been exhausted. If the 
spouses want to live together and stay close to the Danish partner’s network, job and 
studies in Copenhagen, they have to resort to EU law. The ingenuity they display in 
their attempts to settle in Denmark again affirm the experienced value of Danish, 
national citizenship rather than postnational membership, though the importance they 
attribute to the former, as we have seen, appears to have less to do with what Weiler 
calls ‘eros’ and more with rights and opportunities and the personal ties of family and 
friends.   
 
Claiming basic rights 
While many couples first tried to enter Denmark through the regulation of the national 
civic order, the majority of my informants moved directly to Sweden. Most couples in 
this group also present their use of EU citizenship as a strategy of last resort.  
 
This is illustrated in the story of Aimée. She is a young woman with dual Danish and 
French citizenship.
32
 Aimée was born in France but grew up in Denmark. When she was 
                                                 
32
 Dual citizenship is not usually permitted in Danish law. There are, however, special exemptions for 
persons who have acquired dual citizenship at birth (Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration 
Affairs, 2004), as Aimeé had. 
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19 she wanted to go back to France. She went to Marseille and met a young man from 
Morocco. He had applied for asylum in France, but the application had been turned 
down. He was therefore residing illegally. They fell in love and decided to live together, 
but Aimée also wanted to go back to Denmark to study. After a time in France 
considering their options they went to stay with his family in Morocco and got married. 
Aimée was well aware of the Danish family unification rules and knew that at 22 she 
was too young to apply. She also worried, however, that if they remained in Morocco 
until she turned 24, they would not be able to meet the attachment requirement. Their 
joint connection to Morocco or France might exceed their affiliation to Denmark. She 
therefore resorted to the EU citizenship exit option.  
 
Since Aimée was also a French citizen she thought she could use EU rules to move 
directly to Denmark and then apply for family unification as an EU citizen living in 
another member country than her own. After a phone conversation with the Danish 
Immigration Service she reconsidered. They informed her that the application would in 
all likelihood be declined. The reason was that her husband had not had legal residence 
in another EU-country before coming to Denmark. At the time, this was considered by 
Danish authorities as a condition for using EU rules for family unification.
33
 Sweden, 
however, interpreted Union law differently and did not require prior legal stay. So 
Aimée went to Sweden and got family unification as an EU citizen. Later she and her 
husband also used EU law to return to Denmark. In the interview I asked Aimée about 
her thoughts on this process:    
 
A: ...Denmark has made some very restrictive rules because they want to 
protect, I think, Denmark and the Danish citizens. But the way I see it I have 
gotten my protection from the EU because it is the EU that has helped me 
live with my husband in my own country. Yes, well, helped me ...to use my 
rights. So in that sense I do feel a bit let down, you know, by my own 
country that I cannot live here with my husband when I have lived so many 
years in Denmark and have family here and have paid so much in taxes, 
worked and studied. There I have thought a lot about how the EU has helped 
me in a good way (Interview with Aimée, 2011, p.7). 
 
                                                 
33
 This interpretation would soon be overturned by the European Court of Justice in the so called 
’Metock-case’, as we shall see in the next section.  
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To follow up, I prompt Aimée to reflect on her use of the EU-route which in Danish 
public debate is often described as a ‘loop-hole’ (smuthul) or a way of circumventing 
national family unification rules (Ritzau 2003, Kræn 2010): 
  
A: Well, so it is. Well, we didn’t go to Malmö, you know, because we 
wanted to live in Malmö. It was something we did out of necessity. So it is a 
way of circumventing the Danish rules. But then that is just a sign that the 
Danish rules aren’t fair [rimelige]. Because, well, I can understand that it is 
a little unfair if our marriage was pro forma and my husband just wanted a 
residence permit in Denmark and we ... didn’t love each other. So, well, I 
can see that perhaps it isn’t fair to do it that way. But that’s not, after all, 
how our situation is. (Interview with Aimée, 2011, p.7) 
 
Aimée and her husband eventually managed to obtain legal residence for him in 
Denmark. However, unlike couples like Katrine and Mark, they did not use any short or 
long term tactics within Danish national law. As she was under 24, an application for 
family unification would be sure to meet with a refusal. Though Aimée does not discuss 
this in the interview, it is safe to assume that other entry routes, such as obtaining a 
student visa or green card, would equally have been closed to them since her husband 
has no formal education. No matter what reasons Aimée might have had for going 
straight to Sweden, the point is this: she interprets their temporary stay in Malmö as a 
necessity. It is not that she wants to spend a year there and explore what it means to be 
an EU citizen or to enjoy the benefits of Sweden’s lower prices on cars. Rather, EU 
citizenship has protected them where, in her view, her Danish citizenship failed. This in 
turn is a perspective shared by most of the couples I have interviewed who moved 
directly to Sweden. Though some eventually grew fond of Malmö, as we shall see later 
on, they only went there because they considered this their sole option for living 
together close to Denmark.  
 
The interview with Aimée brings out another point which applies to nearly all my 
Danish informants and several foreign spouses, irrespective of the pathways they 
followed. They feel wronged by the Danish government which, in their view, has 
denied them a basic liberty. They insist, like Aimée, that a citizen ought to be able to 
live in her own country with the partner of her choice, no matter where that partner 
comes from. This does not mean that my informants advocate an unconditional right to 
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family life. Fraudulent marriages are typically condemned, and most, though not all, 
interviewees find it reasonable that they are required to provide for their partner. A few 
restrict their defence to marriages for love while excluding arranged marriage as a 
justified basis for family unification. Others vaguely suggest that special considerations 
should be given to couples like them who are supposedly good members of society. 
Though seldom fully explicit, a subtext here seems to be that some resident immigrants, 
refugees or ethnic minority citizens are less deserving, whether for economical or 
cultural reasons. Others clearly refuse such differentiation, insisting that all citizens and 
residents, regardless of social position or national origin, should have the same rights, 
including the freedom to live in Denmark with their close family members.   
 
Describing the wrong they find they have experienced nearly all my Danish informants 
and many of the foreign spouses stress their anger against the Danish government. A 
few emphasize their surprise or even shock when realizing that national law does not 
permit them to live in Denmark with their partner. Others explain how they were aware 
of the rules when they met their spouse, but still found it deeply unsettling to experience 
in practice how freedoms and protections they had previously taken for granted were 
not in fact guaranteed. When articulating their frustration they use terms like injustice, 
unfairness or inhuman treatment – liberal concepts associated with the lack of basic 
rights. But many also describe a powerful and disturbing sense of exclusion from an 
imaged Danish community.  
 
My informants’ practices of an EU citizenship of last resort throw new light on Weiler’s 
thick-thin synthesis. To begin with, the analysis so far indicates that Joppke (2010b) is 
right in questioning this romantic conception of a national citizenship based on a deep 
sense of belonging. After all, what really matters to most of my Danish interviewees are 
rights and personal relationships, not, it would seem, the deep community of the nation. 
This looks very much like a thin citizenship light. Indeed, the creative attempts to find 
alternative routes in domestic and supranational law can be interpreted as a pragmatic or 
even instrumental attitude to citizenship.  
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This is not the only plausible reading, though. The anger and sometimes shock many 
informants experience, when they realize that Danish citizenship is not the guarantee 
they thought it was, testify to the immense, and taken-for-granted value this status has 
for them. It suggests that we are better off reading Weiler’s conception of national 
membership not so much as a communitarian affirmation of shared language and 
culture, though that may also come into it, and more as an existential feeling of home, 
where home is understood as a place of shelter and safety. This deep sense of belonging 
is not one we are necessarily aware of in our everyday life. Rather, it becomes an object 
of reflection in the moment it is threatened; for my informants when it turns out that 
Danish citizenship does not in fact provide the expected protection. 
 
Weiler’s analysis is lent further credit when we consider the relationship between 
national and supranational citizenship as constructed so far. The freedoms offered by 
the European Union are mobilized with some reluctance. Moreover, the matter at stake 
is not a trivial one but an area of profound importance to the personal freedom and 
wellbeing of these couples. We could thus read the practice of these marriage migrants 
as an example of Weiler’s corrective citizenship. The supranational order is invoked in 
exceptional circumstances where basic liberal rights are threatened by an excessive 
nationalism and then only when it is clear that domestic solutions are not available. As I 
will argue in the following, however, the national civic order is not just invoked and 
corrected but also transformed by these enactments of EU citizenship (cf. 
Kostakopoulou, 2007). 
 
Transformations of belonging and national sovereignty 
I have shown how important national citizenship is in the stories of Danish family 
migrants, even though a supranational EU citizenship is mobilized. But while 
paradoxically re-affirmed by practices of exit, national membership is also contested 
and unsettled. The juridico-political boundaries of the nation-state are transgressed, and 
civic identification is profoundly altered.  
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The boundaries of membership transgressed 
Moving to Sweden not only enables migrants to obtain a residence permit as the 
spouses of mobile EU citizens and thus sidestep restrictive Danish rules. It is also 
allows them to resettle in Denmark after a shorter or longer stay and in that way to 
actively challenge domestic immigration policies. Below I explore how this is done and 
discuss what it entails for the negotiation of political boundaries.  
 
My informants’ future plans and especially their views on a possible resettlement in 
Denmark vary quite a lot. Some are so angry and frustrated with Danish immigration 
politics that they aim to stay permanently in Sweden or maybe move from there to 
another country. Others are undecided and open to see how things turn out, or they 
change their plans along the way. Finally, some have returned or are keen to do so. 
Turning to this latter group, there are various legal routes they can follow in order to 
relocate on the Danish side of the border. One informant, Charlotte, whose story I 
explore in the next chapter, stayed for a year in Malmö until she turned 24 and could 
obtain family unification under Danish national law. This is a tactic used more in the 
early years after the restrictive reform in 2002 when re-entry options under EU law, as 
the analysis below will illustrate, were still very restricted. As this practice follows 
Danish national regulation, it upholds rather than disturbs national sovereignty. Another 
option is to make use of Sweden’s liberal citizenship regulation. After five years of 
legal residency, a foreign spouse can obtain a Swedish passport. As a European Union 
citizen he or she is then free to move to another EU country and can thus resettle in 
Denmark without having to go through a complicated application process. Lastly, 
couples can use EU free movement and family unification rules to return. At the time of 
the interviews, about a third of my informants had already done so, tried to, or were 
planning to do so as soon as possible. It is by using this strategy, in particular, that they 
contest the boundaries of the polity. Their return means that immigrants, who would not 
otherwise qualify under national rules, can nonetheless reside lawfully on the territory. 
A couple who do not fulfil the age requirement, for example, can settle in Denmark in 
this way. That does not render Denmark’s family unification law null and void. It still 
holds for those who, for economic or other reasons, are unable to use EU rules, as I 
discuss later in the chapter. Even so, the freedom of the nation to determine the 
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boundaries of the political community through majoritarian democratic politics is 
demonstrably challenged.  
 
But how much is it challenged, we might ask? There has been a significant rise in the 
number of Danish-international couples applying for family unification under EU law. 
In the period from 2005 to 2008 the Danish Immigration Service on average took 104 
decisions per year under these rules. This increased drastically to 818 in 2009 and 705 
in 2010 and then fell a little again to 456 and 543 in 2011 and 2012 (The Danish 
Immigration Service, 2011, p.35; 2013b, p.28). Still, seen in a comparative perspective 
figures remain low. In 2010 a total of 7105 decisions were made on family unification 
under both national and EU legislation (p.34). It is thus a relatively small group who try 
to use their EU citizenship to move to Denmark. Leading politicians have therefore 
sought to downplay the importance of the EU option (Østergaard, 2011): With such low 
numbers it is not really a threat to national sovereignty after all. However, the many 
evasion tactics displayed by the administration suggest otherwise, as we shall see. 
 
Over the years the Immigration Service has interpreted EU law very narrowly. The 
ministry claimed that only EU citizens who had worked in another member-state could 
use EU rules and then only if they had a job in Denmark when they returned. This 
excluded pensioners, students and Danes who lived in Malmö but worked in 
Copenhagen (Bøegh-Lervang and Madum, 2010, p.108, The Danish Immigration 
Service, 2006, pp.2-3). In practice it meant that Danish citizens with jobs or studies in 
Denmark had to quit or take leave of absence. Then they had to find work in the Malmö 
area where unemployment was high at the time. After a while they could return with 
their partner provided that they had work and a place to live in Denmark again. On these 
conditions not many chose this option in the beginning (Interview with Susanne and 
Lisbeth, 2011, p.8, cf. The Danish Immigration Service 2011, p.35).   
 
Maiken and Selim, a Danish-Turkish couple, are among the few who did. They had met 
at a beach resort in Turkey. He was working and she was holidaying with her family. 
They fell in love and lived together for six months in Turkey. After a while Maiken who 
was then 20 years old wanted to begin her studies in Copenhagen. Hence they decided 
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to go Denmark. Because of her age, family unification under Danish national law was 
ruled out. In January 2006 Maiken therefore moved to Malmö. Selim had some savings 
which enabled them to buy a flat. They got married in a hurry and applied for family 
reunion in Sweden under EU law. Then they started considering how to come to 
Denmark: 
 
S: … first of all we didn’t know how long we had to live in Sweden in order 
to move back, so, yes, she [Maiken] worked about six months in another 
company in Denmark so that she had to take the train every morning back 
and forth, and then we found out that she needed to work in Sweden for six 
months, but that wasn’t right either. 
M: No. 
S: Because there wasn’t anybody who knew how, I mean, what you have to, 
I mean, how long you have to work – not in the, eh what, Department of 
Immigration Affairs, either. 
M: Department of Immigration Affairs. I refuse to call it Immigration 
Service. 
S: [giggles] Yes, Department of Immigration Affairs, they didn’t know it 
either. 
M: We got a new reply every single time we called them.  
S: Mm  
M: Once, it was 14 days in Sweden - that was fine. The next time it was 
three months. Then it was ten weeks, then it was six months, and then we 
thought 
S: [xxx]  
M: belt and braces 
S: Yes. (Interview with Maiken and Selim, 2011, p.4) 
 
They ended up staying in Sweden for more than a year with Maiken working first in 
Denmark and then in Sweden. Eventually they left for Copenhagen and Selim got a five 
year residence permit as the spouse of an EU citizen. Both Maiken and Selim were 
frustrated with how difficult it was to find out how the rules were interpreted. Not only 
was it hard to get a straight answer by calling the authorities. On the home page of the 
Immigration Service the EU-route was just mentioned very briefly (see also The Danish 
Parliamentary Ombudsman, 2008, pp.44-48).  
 
In 2008 the Danish Parliamentary Ombudsman investigated the administration. He 
found that the information provided about EU citizens’ right to family unification was 
clearly insufficient. His examination also looked at the actual practice of the 
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Immigration Service in handling applications. By then a number of judgments from the 
European Court of Justice had greatly challenged the restrictive Danish interpretation of 
EU law. The ombudsman concluded that the Immigration Service had been slow to 
implement several court verdicts (The Danish Parliamentary Ombudsman, 2008). These 
various ministerial evasion tactics underline how important it was considered to uphold 
a restrictive family unification police and to resist liberalizing counter-effects from the 
citizenship regime of European Union (see Bøegh-Lervang and Madum, 2010).  
 
The symbolic significance of EU citizenship is also clear from the public controversy 
surrounding the so-called Metock case. The ombudsman’s investigation was prompted 
by a series of articles run by a Danish newspaper in the summer of 2008 about the 
Immigration Service and the sparse information they provided to citizens interested in 
using EU law (Bøegh-Lervang and Madum 2010, p.92). It raised considerable public 
debate and brought attention on the possibilities of Union citizenship in this respect. 
When the dispute was at its most intense the European Court of Justice gave a 
liberalizing verdict in a case between four family migrants and their spouses and the 
Irish Minister for Justice (pp.92-93, Carrera and Wiesbrock, 2010).
34
 Coming in the 
middle of the debate over EU citizenship and family unification, the Metock case 
received unprecedented public attention in Denmark. This had little to do with its 
content which was not of direct relevance to most of the Danish marriage migrants 
(Bøegh-Lervang and Madum, 2010, pp.132-133). The significance of the judgment lay 
in the attention it drew to EU law. The public debate around the verdict, the newspaper 
campaign and the ombudsman investigation led to a liberalization of the Danish 
implementation of EU law and vastly increased publically available official information 
about this option. While the real trigger was arguably critical investigatory journalism, 
Metock came to symbolize EU law in the ensuing debate (Bøegh-Lervang and Madum 
                                                 
34
 The case involved four African men who had applied unsuccessfully for asylum in Ireland. They had 
subsequently married British, German and Polish spouses working in Ireland and applied for family 
unification under EU law as the spouses of mobile Union citizens. The Irish Ministry of Justice had 
declined the application on the grounds that the applicants had not had prior legal stay in another EU 
country before joining their spouses in Ireland. The applicants and their partners had then taken the case 
to court and the Irish High Court requested a preliminary reference from the ECJ. In the case the ECJ 
ruled in favour of the applicants. The court argued that the Citizenship Directive regulating the freedom 
of movement of European nationals and their spouses does not allow member states to require prior legal 
stay in another member state (ECJ, 2008). The reason why this had little formal relevance for the Danish 
dispute is that Sweden, where most Danish-International couples went, did not require prior legal stay 
anyhow. If it had, the Swedish model would have been a lot harder to use.  
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2010, pp.132-133). Indeed, political elites used this court case to shift public focus from 
the Immigration Service’s maladministration to the allegedly illegitimate usurpation of 
powers by the ECJ (Wind, 2008). This controversy again shows that the perceived 
threat to the national civic order from EU citizenship was considerable.  
 
Despite persistent resistance from national authorities European Union citizenship has 
enabled citizens and their migrant spouses to circumvent the national civic order. In an 
area which has been eminently important to Danish public debates about identity, 
citizenship and migration for a couple of decades, national policies can be bypassed. 
The boundaries of the nation have thus become more ‘porous’ (Benhabib 2004) and 
harder to regulate by insiders. From the perspective of Weiler’s corrective citizenship 
we might see this as a welcome taming of an excessive nationalism. The liberal 
construction of membership in the Danish nation from before the restrictive migration 
laws is at least partially rescued and re-established. The apolitical essentialism of this 
argument is unconvincing, though. Even in the 1980’s when Denmark’s family 
unification regime was among the most liberal in Europe (Siim, 2007) it was by no 
means uncontested, as described in the previous chapter. An agonistic reading, by 
contrast, draws our attention to the contentious politics of membership displayed in this 
struggle. What is disputed is precisely the understanding and demarcation of ‘genuine 
Danishness’. The inventive strategies of affected couples and the resistance 
demonstrated all along by state bureaucracies and government elite show that this is no 
smooth ‘civilizing’ process but an intense, transnational and multi-level conflict over 
the boundaries of the polity.   
 
Changes in identification 
It is not only the juridico-political terrain which is transformed. Many of my informants 
also narrate how their encounter with restrictive family unification rules has affected 
their sense of belonging and their opinion of Denmark (see also Møller, 2009; Schmidt 
et al., 2009; Rytter, 2010a). Derek, for example, has learned Danish and passed the 
highest level language tests for foreigners. He explains that he has stayed so long in the 
country that he feels a stronger sense of attachment to Denmark than to Australia where 
he grew up. Still, when we meet, he is so angry about the unfair treatment he has 
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received that he no longer wishes to speak Danish and hopes to convince Julie to stay 
permanently in Sweden.
35
 She too describes how her ‘view on us as a people 
[befolkning] has worsened’. She finds it ‘embarrassing that we have ... such rules which 
mean that people who want to work, people who want to be here and have met someone 
and started a family ... that not even they are allowed to be here.’ (Interview with Derek 
and Julie, 2011, p. 19) The frustration and embarrassment this couple expresses are 
echoed widely by my informants. A particular striking example is Laura, a Danish 
woman who moved to Sweden because her husband was too young to obtain family 
unification. Reflecting on her experience, she remarks that: 
 
L: … in the end, I think it’s going to cost Denmark a lot … to be so 
hostile … I personally have lost a lot of respect for the Danish society 
where previously one was perhaps more of … loyal [lydhør] citizen 
who wanted to do one’s part for the Danish society - I don’t think like 
that at all today. Now I think of what is best for me and don’t have 
those obligations towards Denmark. (Interview with Laura, 2011, 
p.18) 
 
When I interview Laura, she and her husband have lived four years in  and he will soon 
be able to apply for Swedish citizenship. This is very important to her. Not because she 
feels particularly well-integrated in their new country of residence. Like many of my 
Danish interviewees, Laura commutes daily across the Øresund bridge to her job and 
studies in Denmark. Even before the financial crisis began, unemployment was high in 
Southern Sweden, so working in the Copenhagen area was often necessary for Danish 
spouses who are obliged under EU rules to provide for their partners. Though grateful 
for the friendliness of her neighbours and the welcome they have received from the 
Swedish immigration authorities, informants like Laura therefore find it hard to develop 
closer ties to their local community. It is thus not so much affective bonds as practical 
realities that make her look forward to the day when her husband can obtain a Swedish 
passport. With a European citizenship he and their family will have the security and 
freedom of movement which they now lack and which has prompted their involuntary 
exile. For Laura, being ‘kicked out of Denmark’ (p. 6) has undermined her sense of 
belonging and her wish to contribute to the collective good. A thick, national citizenship 
has been replaced by a thin, rights-based membership. Ironically, it is precisely the 
                                                 
35
 Later, however, the family does move back to Denmark. 
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political attempt to preserve a thick and selective ideal of Danish citizenship that 
generates a more instrumental attitude among some citizens and migrants who feel 
excluded.
36
  
 
Other interviewees, however, describe how they have developed new ties through their 
cross-border movement. Enrique from Cuba went to Sweden with his Danish wife Maja 
because of the 24-years-rule. Initially their plan was to move to Denmark as soon as 
Maja was old enough to apply under Danish law, but by then Enrique had begun to feel 
at home in Malmö and did not want to be uprooted yet again. They therefore decided to 
stay at least until he had got Swedish citizenship. Reflecting on the importance of 
acquiring this status, Enrique, like Laura, stresses its instrumental value: it enables him 
to travel all over the world and take up work in another European country. Moreover, 
like many informants, Maja and Enrique emphasize the costs of involuntary exile. After 
their daughter was born, they were both ill with stress owing at least partly, they think, 
to the prolonged uncertainty of their situation. Maja was in hospital for several months 
while Enrique worked long hours and took care of their child. But though the safety and 
security which Swedish citizenship represents is particularly important in their lives, 
there is more to it, as Enrique explains: 
 
E: … Sweden [xx] means, have become something to me, like - 
of course I will always be Cuban, I will always feel that I am 
Cuban – but Sweden has been so nice to me. … we just came 
here, we get the paperwork, still I wasn’t even Swedish, still 
they didn’t care, they just opened the door for us and … [Maja] 
has been in health care here in Sweden, I’m gonna get student 
support of the Swedish government … so I am getting to more 
than like … 
M: [you] love Sweden [said teasingly] 
E: [giggles] I like Sweden very much.  
M: [giggles] 
E: Yeah, all what I have seen and yeah I like it, it’s really, really 
good here. So… it will be feeling very nice when I get 
citizenship, of course. (p.26) 
 
Enrique has developed a strong civic identification with Sweden which complements 
his attachment to his country of origin. Other informants too report warm feelings of 
                                                 
36
 Note, though, that Laura has participated intensely in Danish public debate, as discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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gratitude and appreciation towards this state where they were able to live together. That 
goes for some foreign spouses, like Enrique, but also for Danish citizens who, angered 
by the policy of Denmark, turns towards their neighbour country.  
 
It is interesting to note how for many informants the feelings of thankfulness and 
approval are directed towards Sweden, though it is EU rules and not Swedish national 
regulation they use to settle there. Of course, EU law is implemented by member state 
administrations and Sweden has adopted a liberal interpretation in marked contrast to 
Denmark. Still, it suggests that national political community matters a great deal even 
for those whose sense of belonging to Denmark has been impaired. There are several 
who, like Aimée in the previous section, stress how the EU has come to their rescue. 
But their point is precisely that while they welcome the protection of the Union it ought 
not to be necessary: a state should guarantee the privacy and family life of its citizens. 
Some informants’ attitudes towards the EU have, however, been markedly affected by 
their cross-border experiences. A few explain that though they have always been in 
favour of EU integration, this point of view has been reinforced by their encounter with 
the challenges of family unification. Two interviewees even describe a change in 
opinion. One is Line, a young Danish woman who has moved to Sweden with her 
Egyptian husband Jamil. As she puts it: ‘I remember not being a huge EU fan until I 
experienced personally that EU-legislation saved my ass, basically.’ (Interview with 
Line and Jamil, 2011, p.31) 
 
Line also recounts how her emotional attachment to Denmark has suffered and her 
appreciation of Danish citizenship is now entirely based on the rights and freedoms it 
provides. But at the same time she has become politically mobilized, volunteering for 
the NGO Marriage without Border which helps Danish-international couples: 
 
L: …I wanted to contribute to the work that was being done because I had 
benefited from it myself so I felt that I could give something back. … I had 
needed it at the time and I knew how valuable it was for me and what it did 
so I just wanted to help other people at the same situation. I identified a lot 
with people in this situation. We’ve taken chances a few times having 
people to stay with us that we didn’t know because they were in this 
situation, they were running out of time and they didn’t have a place to live. 
And yeah, so I mean, there’s a level, there’s an element of identification, I 
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think, with people in the same situation who need help, right, so I wanted to 
give something back. And the other thing of course was purely political 
interests and that I wanted to try and change things and I didn’t just want to 
sit and accept (Interview with Line and Jamil, 2011, p.29-30). 
 
My informants’ stories bring out clearly the problem with Weiler’s integration of thick 
and thin citizenship. While Denmark’s restrictive family unification rules may be a 
pertinent example of a rampant nationalism in need of liberal-supranational constrains, 
the encounter with invasive domestic regulation and the mobilization of EU-citizenship 
undermines or drastically alters the very attachment to the nation-state which this 
synthesis was supposed to preserve and protect. For informants like Laura, Line and 
Julie, Denmark and Danish citizenship has become disenchanted. Though they still, and 
perhaps more than ever, appreciate the value of a European passport, their sense of 
emotional belonging and existential safety has been damaged.  
 
The analysis lends support to a central claim in agonistic and deliberative democracy, 
namely that in political struggles over the boundaries of the polity civic identification is 
transformed. It illustrates how the claiming or loss of civil rights is often a passionate 
and contentious affair which profoundly affects how actors understand themselves. The 
case, moreover, demonstrates that the ethico-political character and direction of such 
changes are open-ended – an important point stressed by agonists in particular. For 
Laura, for example, a sense of political solidarity and community is severely damaged 
to the point where citizenship becomes merely an instrument for the protection and 
private freedom of herself and her family. For Line similar transformations from 
affective national identity to rights-based membership go hand in hand with democratic 
political mobilization and a powerful identification with other transnational couples.   
 
Limits to European citizenship of last resort 
So far I have discussed how EU citizenship is activated and narrated as a strategy of last 
resort by the majority of my informants and what implications this has for national 
membership. The wider picture is more complex, however. A smaller group of 
informants, mainly those above 30 who are not affected by the 24-years rule, describe 
their recourse to supranational rules as animated by pragmatic considerations, 
frustration and mistrust in domestic politics rather than as acts of necessity. Or they 
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interpret their border crossing as practices of conscientious objection, like Helena whom 
we met in the preface. Such alternative storylines are analysed in detail in chapter six. 
But it is not all who are able to able to use EU law – whether as a strategy of last resort 
or otherwise. 
 
To achieve the protection of EU rules couples and families must be in a position to 
mobilize this legal framework – usually by residing for a while in another member state. 
Like social mobility, territorial mobility is stratified. Money, relevant transferable skills 
and social capital make it easier to move and establish a life elsewhere. Though Union 
law has few requirements for family unification compared with Danish national 
regulation, citizens are, as we have seen, obliged to provide for their spouses and 
children since they must not become ‘an undue burden’ on the social system of their 
host country (Citizenship Directive, 2004). Not all are able to do so, as the stories of a 
few of my informants illustrate (see also Schmidt et al., 2009).
37
 Eva, a Danish woman 
in her thirties, has a two- year-old daughter with her Tanzanian fiancé and has at the 
time of the interview been out of work more or less since giving birth. As a recipient of 
unemployment benefits (kontanthjælp) Eva is not allowed to bring her partner to 
Denmark under Danish family unification rules. But since she and the child depend on 
the Danish state for their livelihood Eva feels unable to leave. Even if she did go to 
Sweden she would still need a job in order to obtain a residence permit for her spouse. 
Their economic vulnerability also makes moving to Tanzania a very risky option. The 
family therefore lives apart to the distress of Eva who, aside from missing her fiancé, 
worries about her daughter growing up without regular contact with her father. Eva’s 
Danish citizenship has shielded her and her child by providing them with a social 
safety-net and Eva stresses how grateful she is for that. Still, her socio-economic rights 
come at the expense of a civil right to family life in Denmark. EU citizenship does not 
enable her to change this situation in any fundamental sense.
38
 For citizens like Eva it is 
                                                 
37
 This state of affairs where mobile citizens are privileged over static citizens (or where EU citizens from 
another member state have more extensive rights in their country of residence than nationals of that 
country) is referred to in the literature as ‘reverse discrimination’ (Staver, 2013). See Bauböck (2007b) 
for a discussion of potential solutions.    
38
 Note, however, that it does offer some minor options. At the time of the interview, family unification 
under Danish law was ruled out not merely for citizens who were presently receiving unemployment 
benefits but also for citizens who had done so within the last three years prior to handing in their 
application as described in chapter three. If anything, this was what really frustrated Eva. Even if she did 
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therefore not a status they can resort to when other options fail.
39
 This underlines how, 
though exit can be an important strategy for claiming rights, it is not an option equally 
open to all. Hence, there are noticeable constraints on the extent to which supranational 
rights can augment and transform national membership.
40
  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has offered a theoretical and empirical intervention in the debate over thick 
and thin national and postnational membership. I focused on Weiler’s elegant synthesis 
which promises to preserve the merits of a deeply rooted nation-state membership while 
keeping its xenophobic dangers at bay with the supplement of a rights-based 
supranational citizenship. Analyzing the stories of Danish-international couples I found 
that most interviewees enact an EU citizenship of last resort which both affirms and 
transforms national membership. They use their status as EU citizens where core rights 
are at stake and then only when options within national law have been exhausted. This 
resonates rather well with Weiler’s corrective citizenship although the analysis suggests 
                                                                                                                                               
find a job she would still need to wait another three years before she could bring her fiancé, thus adding 
very substantially to the separation between father and daughter. If, on the other hand, she found a job in 
Sweden she would be able to apply for spousal reunion right away as EU law does not operate with such 
quarantine periods.    
39
 Apart from economic dependency, health issues and care responsibilities are other possible barriers to 
cross-border mobility. One informant, Nina, is suffering from severe concentration problems following an 
accident which makes it difficult for her to work full-time. She receives special support (revalidering) and 
is in a situation similar to Eva’s where she is unable to bring her partner to Denmark and is very unsure 
about her ability to establish herself in Sweden. A third interviewee, Aisha, is receiving unemployment 
benefits (kontanthjælp) but also has children with social and developmental problems who need extensive 
help from the Danish social services. Note that in each of these cases, the informant is unable to obtain 
family unification for her spouse under both Danish and EU law.     
40
 In 2011 the ECJ ruled in the Zambrano case that a child who was a Union citizen could claim rights 
based on EU law even though no cross-border movement had taken place. The case concerned a 
Columbian citizen, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano and his Columbian wife, who had both applied for asylum in 
Belgium. Their applications were rejected but the unstable situation in Columbia meant that they could 
not be forced to return. The couple stayed on and had two children who were given Belgian citizenship. 
Zambrano worked illegally and supported the family. He applied for a residence permit and was refused. 
In subsequent legal proceedings Zambrano claimed a right to family unification as the parent of an EU 
citizen and the case was referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. The Court found that while the 
Citizenship Directive was not applicable as no internal movement had taken place, the children had a 
right to enjoy the opportunities and freedoms of EU citizenship under the Treaty. If the parents and with 
them the children were expelled this right would be infringed (ECJ, 2011). Some legal scholars have 
interpreted this as a radical shift in EU case law launching ‘a real EU citizenship’ no longer dependent on 
free movement (Kochenov, 2011, p.55). Others are more cautious in their assessment suggesting that the 
generalizability of the case is limited (Staver, 2013). The interpretation adopted by Danish immigration 
officials lends support to this latter argument. Only when both parents are third country nationals and the 
child is a Union citizen is a member state unable to refuse family unification. Eva’s case illustrates this 
limited scope. Her daughter is a Danish citizen but the child’s stay and economic protection in Europe is 
not dependent on her father obtaining a right of residence (Ministry of Justice, 2013).  
107 
 
that nation-state membership is valued at least as much, if not more, for the rights and 
safety it is assumed to provide than for its more romantic connotations of community.  
 
At the same time, however, I showed how national membership is also radically 
transformed in this dispute over family unification. Most of my informants, the Danish 
citizens in particular, reported how their views of Denmark and their civic identification 
had changed. The national sense of belonging so important to Weiler had been 
undermined or profoundly altered. Moreover, the legal and political boundaries of the 
nation-state had been transgressed through the inventive use of EU citizenship. The 
intense political and administrative struggle over family unification and cross-border 
movement shows that national and supranational citizenship is not easily reconciled in a 
harmonious synthesis. The analysis therefore lends credit to the supposition that a more 
fundamental re-thinking of citizenship is required. This re-conceptualization should be 
attentive to the contentiousness and transformative character of struggles over migration 
and membership in a transnational Europe but also to the costs and barriers to action in 
these on-going disputes. In the next three chapters I set out to develop such a dynamic 
conception through further careful interpretation of my informants’ narratives of family 
life and cross-border movement while drawing on agonistic and deliberative theories of 
democracy. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: EXIT AND VOICE 
 
This chapter contributes to the reconstruction of a dynamic and empirically situated 
conception of citizenship across borders by exploring the interplay between voice and 
exit in the Danish family unification dispute. I analyze the relationship between public 
debate, collective action and cross-border movement from the dual perspectives of 
deliberative and agonistic democracy. 
 
In the previous chapter we saw how civic identification is transformed through practices 
of negotiating membership. The following analysis focuses on another dimension of a 
thick, democratic citizenship: participation in public life. State centric republicans stress 
how active engagement in the common affairs of the polity takes place within the 
territorial and symbolic boundaries of the nation-state. Existing studies, however, find 
that emigration and immigration can sometimes interplay fruitfully with domestic and 
transnational voice. Yet the civic character of such practices needs further conceptual 
and empirical analysis. In the following I therefore investigate the conditions, 
limitations and modalities of this voice-exit nexus in the present case by drawing on 
deliberative and agonistic theories of democracy.  
 
The first part of the chapter analyzes how border crossing in different ways generates 
and facilitates public deliberation. The second part explores how practices of exit, entry 
and re-entry prompt and enable organized agonistic activism.  
 
Border crossing and public deliberation 
I begin by examining Maria’s story as she recounts it in our conversation. Maria tells 
me how she met Lweendo, her daughter’s father, during an internship in Zambia. They 
fell in love and decided that he should come with her when she returned home. Just 
before leaving, Maria became pregnant. It was now all the more important to her that 
they should live together in Denmark and she began looking into the rules for family 
unification. This was when she realized that Lweendo, who was only 21 at the time, 
would not be able to meet the age requirement. But she also read that exceptions could 
be made in special circumstances. Since the two of them were not only getting married 
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but also starting a family Maria was confident that they would get permission for him to 
stay. About six months after their daughter was born the couple thus applied for family 
unification with a request to be exempted from the 24-years rule. The application was 
declined but the couple appealed. Lweendo was then told that he had to leave the 
country while their case was being reassessed.  
 
At this point Maria contacted the press and the couple’s story was published in a 
prominent Danish newspaper.
41
 She also appeared in a TV programme together with a 
member of parliament from one of governing parties who defended the 24-years rule. 
Reflecting on what made her participate in the media debate, Maria explains: ‘I suppose 
it was anger about us not being able to stay. It wasn’t about the fact that […Lweendo] 
wasn’t allowed to stay during the appeal process. It was just … that we couldn’t get 
permission to stay in Denmark.’ (Interview with Maria 2011, p.9) As it turned out, the 
couple’s public action did have some, albeit very limited, effect on their case. Shortly 
after, they were informed by the Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration 
Affairs that Lweendo could remain until the case reassessment was completed. The 
initial decision to refuse him a procedural residence permit had been a mistake. This 
was a short respite, though, as the appeal was unsuccessful. Lweendo could not obtain 
family unification. After a visit to Zambia the family therefore moved to Sweden.  
 
In Maria’s narrative, it is thus the prospect of her husband’s or the whole family’s 
involuntary exit that prompts the couple to voice. Similar stories are told by other 
informants who have articulated their discontent before they left, from the Swedish 
exile or upon their return to Denmark. The immediate stress of migrating can exhaust 
the energy for voice, but once stability is re-established some find the resources to 
protest. This ‘trigger effect’ of exit is interesting. In Hirschman’s analysis of the fall of 
the German Democratic Republic citizens who wanted to get out began to organize 
demonstrations where they called for a right to leave. In the present case couples are 
deprived not of the freedom to exit but of the right to stay and in their anger some of 
them respond by voicing their discontent. This illustrates that when governments 
regulate border crossing tightly, whether by preventing its citizens from leaving or 
                                                 
41
 The newspaper article is publicly available but not cited here to protect Maria’s anonymity. 
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compelling them to go, this can spur acts of public protest. Such voice action could take 
many different forms from the mass protests in East Germany in 1989 to the rather more 
solitary engagement displayed by informants like Maria, as I discuss below. 
 
In her anger Maria not only participated in the Danish media debate. She also 
corresponded with a Minister and two MPs from the governing parties.
42
 In these 
exchanges Maria describes the family’s situation, stressing in particular her daughter’s 
need to grow up with her father close by and the health risks to a baby in Zambia where 
child mortality rates are high. She emphasizes the right to privacy and family life as 
established by human rights conventions. Though focusing on her own family’s 
particular predicament, Maria also offers a more general challenge to the law’s 
legitimacy. Discussing the government’s aim of hindering forced marriages she refers to 
studies which show the number of such marriages to be very small and not always 
deterred by the 24-years rule. The answers she receives vary. One interlocutor replies 
with sympathy, but disputes Maria’s claim that her human right to family life is in fact 
at stake. Only couples whose physical safety would be at risk in the partner’s home 
country can be exempted from the 24-years rule on those grounds, she points out. 
Recalling the response from another MP, Maria says:  
 
… I got a straight answer that … the 24-years rule was there to hinder 
forced marriages and she was aware that there was a side-effect of the 24-
years rule which affected someone like me and that of course was not 
intended, or it wasn’t that we weren’t allowed to stay in Denmark, but … 
she simply could not have it on her conscience that there were so many girls 
who were forced to marry and were suffering terribly and she was willing to 
sacrifice someone like me on that account. (Interview with Maria, 2011, p.9) 
 
Through their public voice and petitioning of parliamentarians Maria and Lweendo thus 
offer facts, interpretations and arguments querying the legality of the refusal in their 
particular case as well as the legitimacy of the law itself. This in turn prompts 
responsible politicians to justify the specific decision and its legislative basis. The 
couple’s appeal to human rights is met with a different, more restrictive understanding 
of the protection of family life. The latter approach finds some support in case law from 
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 The following is based both on Maria’s account of the experience in my interview with her and on the 
copies of most the correspondence which she has provided me with.  
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the European Court of Human Rights that gives states considerable discretion to refuse 
family unification when pursuing lawful objectives such as protecting the freedom of 
other citizens or controlling immigration (Staver, 2013, p.72; see especially ECtHR 
2008).
43
 On the other hand, a recent ruling by the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court in 
a similar case provides a much stronger defence of the right to family life by placing a 
substantial burden of proof on the state to demonstrate that measures adopted are 
necessary and proportional.
44
 Thus while the outcome of the correspondence is not, of 
course, what Maria and Lweendo are hoping for, an exchange is taking place with 
reasonable arguments on both sides where rights are claimed, disputed and balanced 
against the rights of others and the interests of society. This is thus an example of how 
the prospect of involuntary exit can generate a deliberative process. Maria’s story is not 
exceptional in this respect. With their interventions Danish citizens and their spouses 
have sought to bring public attention on how the family unification rules affect Danish-
international couples and families. They have pointed out potential inconsistencies and 
adverse consequences of the regulation and have put pressure on responsible officials to 
justify their policy choices. This in turn has helped to stimulate and to some extent 
qualify the democratic debate over membership. 
 
A far-from-ideal speech situation 
About a third of the informants have exercised their citizenship by taking part in public 
debate and telling their story to Danish, Swedish or international media. But doing so is 
by no means easy. In the following I examine some of the challenges experienced by 
my interviewees, which demonstrate how far from the ideals of deliberative democracy 
the institutional and discursive conditions for civic participation can be. 
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 Note, though, that the Danish Institute for Human Rights produced a report in 2004 which criticized the 
Danish family unification regulation, including the 24 years rule, for breaching the right to family life in 
the European Convention for Human Rights (Lagoutte and Liisberg, 2004) 
44
 The case, Quila and Bibi v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, concerned two citizens of, 
respectively, Chile and Pakistan, both married to British spouses, who had been refused family unification 
under the UK’s 21-years rule. This rule had been introduced in 2008 to guard against forced marriages. 
The court’s majority decision supported the claims of the young couples with Lord Wilson arguing that 
the home secretary ‘clearly fail[ed] to establish … that the amendment is no more than is necessary to 
accomplish her objective and … that it strikes a fair balance between the rights of the parties to unforced 
marriages and the interests of the community in preventing forced marriages. On any view it is a sledge-
hammer but she has not attempted to identify the size of the nut.’ The 21-years rule was subsequently 
abolished. When comparing it with the Danish 24-years-rule it is important to note that while the stated 
objective of the former was solely to prevent forced marriages, the latter also aimed to reduce 
immigration and promote integration.   
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To begin with there is the problem of access. Affected persons can only speak out in 
newspapers and on TV if these media are interested in bringing their stories or 
publishing their letters to the editor. Charlotte, a former activist in the Danish NGO 
Marriage without Borders (Ægteskab uden Grænser), describes the situation in this 
way: 
 
It was rather difficult to get the media’s attention on this … especially the 
first couple of years [after the 2002-reform - RW] when it was just accepted, 
well it was a bit like for or against, well if there was anyone who argued 
against the restrictions then you were told that you were in favour of forced 
marriages, well, a bit like the whole Iraq problematic: ‘Would you rather 
want Saddam Hussein?’ Black or white: Are you for or against? So … there 
wasn’t very much focus on all those who were caught in the rules and 
besides I think the media soon reached a sort of saturation point … they 
couldn’t bring some unhappy love story every evening. It’s like then there is 
not news value in it anymore so we had huge difficulties getting attention on 
it. (Interview with Charlotte 2011, p.7)  
 
In some periods, though, Danish media have been quite keen to interview transnational 
couples. This was particularly so during the summer of 2008 when the 
maladministration of EU rules was discovered and also in 2010-11 when the point-
system was introduced. But even then not everyone has been able to voice their 
experiences in this way. A few informants tell me about their unsuccessful attempts to 
contact the press. The supply of angry couples, they suspect, vastly exceed the demand.  
 
Others find that their story does not fit the script of tragic romance which these 
publicized narratives typically follow. Accounts of the separation of two young, 
heterosexual lovers by a third party - be it parents or, as in this case, a paternalist state - 
figure prominently in modern, Western cultural repertoires (Evans, 2003; Singer, 2009; 
cf. Jensen and Fernandez, 2013). It is this storyline which many couples in cooperation 
with various media mobilize. The power of the narrative derives from its appeal to our 
emotions and widely held ideals of romantic love and individual freedom which gives 
each person the right to choose how to live his or her life. Maria, as we have seen, has 
participated in such stories with her husband, but when they later divorced, owing in 
part to the stress of their situation, she found she was not interesting to journalists 
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anymore. They could no longer use her ‘to show this family that is not allowed to be 
together’ (Interview with Maria 2011, p.12).  
 
Though not divorced, Laura, whom we met in chapter four, tells about a similar 
experience. In the summer of 2008, when the Danish debate over family unification and 
EU-law was at its highest, Laura participated in several interviews with Danish and 
Swedish media. A reporter interviewing her for a television feature was very keen to 
film her husband although he had from the beginning declined to take part. Without his 
visible presence, the TV-channel would be unable to re-present Laura’s voice in 
accordance with this romantic script. Anja and Miguel, the one couple among my 
informants who did manage to obtain family unification under Danish law, experienced 
similar problems. Keen to tell their story publicly to provide a more nuanced account 
stressing both possibilities and limitations of the Danish immigration policy, they were 
unable to find interested journalists. A story without the tragic separation of a family 
was apparently a hard sell. Finally, it seems plausible that couples in arranged marriages 
are likely to find this dominant media framing difficult to navigate as they cannot so 
easily appeal to the norm of individualistic, romantic love.
45
  
 
Even those who do fit the script may find it constraining. Maiken and Selim, the 
Danish-Turkish couple we met in chapter four, describe it this way: 
 
M: I don’t wanna participate in [... media interviews]. Then it’s some feature 
in Good Evening, Denmark [Go’aften Danmark, Danish TV program] 
where you are filmed walking along a beach hand in hand gazing worriedly 
out over sea and are sad and stuff like that. 
S: [giggles]   
M: And [someone] is to sit and feel sorry for you in Good Evening, 
Denmark – I don’t care for that. 
S: No, I don’t care for that either. 
[…] 
M: I can’t take those kinds of features, human interest stories … 
S: I think it’s embarrassing to try 
M: yes, mega-embarrassing! 
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 Homosexual couples might also be marginalized, though this is by no means a given. The wide support 
for gay rights in Danish public discourse makes it possible to fit same-sex relationships into this storyline. 
The persecution of homosexuals in many countries has been advanced by a few politicians as a reason for 
making sure these couples can realize their life together in Denmark (Lindquist 2010a-b). 
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S: to try to participate in such programmes... 
M: Yes, it’s that victim role that you don’t want, I think. Then you are to be 
cuddled and, ‘oh, it’s so hard on us’. 
S: Yes. 
M: Well, I do think it’s super hard on us, but 
S: but not in that way. 
M: No. (Interview with Maiken and Selim 2011, pp.18-19) 
 
Exclusionary effects aside, the problem with the ‘unhappy love story’ framing is that it 
in some sense individualizes and privatizes the experience. This may not only feel like 
an exposure of interviewees intimate life – ‘emotional porn’, as Maria (p.12) puts it – 
adding to the interference they have already been subjected to by invasive state 
regulation. It also invokes a humanitarian discourse
46
 that makes it difficult to present a 
properly political critique in which government handling of a shared problem is 
addressed (cf. Mouffe, 2000). It suggests that while individual narratives appealing to 
the compassion of fellow citizens is important (cf. Rorty, 1993), there is also need for 
rhetorical strategies that allow for a more collective and political articulation. Some of 
my informants, Maiken and Selim included, therefore explain that they prefer to tell 
about their struggles and express their frustration in a research project. They stress the 
need for anonymity when relating very personal details, especially if these involve 
sensitive topics or illegal actions. Or they perceive academic work to provide a more 
serious treatment of the issue which they hope will carry more weight with decision 
makers.  
 
There are other reasons as well why some informants ‘self-select’ out of the media 
debate. In the previous chapter we met Eva, who was unable to obtain family unification 
for her partner under Danish and EU law because she relied on welfare support for 
herself and her daughter. Though deeply frustrated, Eva found it very difficult to 
articulate her distress publicly because of the social stigma of dependence. As she 
explains it: ‘I think you have a bit of humility when you have received unemployment 
benefits (kontanthjælp) for a while ... [Y]ou feel like a second-class citizen’ (Interview 
with Eva 2011, p.8) Unlike other informants who were able, for example, to invoke 
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 As Mikkel Rytter and Anika Liversage (2014) point out, a humanitarian discourse was also mobilized 
to justify restricting access to family unification by presenting this as a means to protect young minority 
citizens from forced marriages (see also Jørgensen, 2014, and appendix II). 
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discourses of economic contribution and self-reliance to protest against their exclusion, 
Eva thus feels shamed into silence.
47
 This again illustrates how social norms about what 
it means to be a ‘good citizen’ greatly shape and constrain what stories can be told in 
public (cf. Jensen and Fernandez, 2013).  
 
For ethnic minority citizens negotiating conflicting normative codes of membership can 
be particularly challenging (cf. Schmidt, 2011). Young adults with family ties to, for 
example, Pakistan or Turkey often find themselves caught between the marital 
preferences of state and family (Rytter, 2010a). On the one hand, publicly criticizing 
practices of transnational arranged marriages that are valued by the parental generation 
and the wider community is arguably difficult. On the other hand, defending arranged 
marriages is also complicated in the context of legislation and political debates where 
distinctions between arranged, forced and pro forma marriages are often glossed over or 
erased (Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2002; Jørgensen, 
2014; Hervik and Rytter, 2004). Additional difficulties arise from the paternalist 
discourse frequently deployed by supporters of the law both within and outside 
parliament. The government’s official remarks to the bill introducing the 24 years rule 
for example states that:  
 
The older one is, the better one can resist the pressure from the family or 
others to enter into a marriage against one’s will. The purpose of the 
proposal is thus to protect the young (de unge) from a pressure in relation to 
entering into matrimony and at the same time free the young from a pressure 
to explain to the immigration authorities that they wish to get family 
unification even though this is not in reality the case. (Ministry of Refugee, 
Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2002, p.37, my translations) 
 
These young adult citizens are thus presented as so oppressed by their families that they 
cannot be relied on to express their own wishes.
48
 The paradoxical effect of this 
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 Eva is thus an example of how some are prevented from exercising voice as well as exit (see also 
Barry, 1974). 
48
 Already in 2000, as noted in chapter three, the then centre-left government introduced a 25-years rule 
which required all applicants for family unification under the age of 25 to attend an interview with the 
Danish immigration authorities to ascertain that the marriage was voluntary (Aliens Act, 2000). Very few 
applications for family unification were turned down as a result of this process. There could be various 
reasons for this - preemptive effects of the law, self-censure on the part of the applicants or just very few 
forced marriages in general. The acceding centre-right government, however, interpreted it as an 
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argument is that ethnic minority citizens are denied a voice in order to ensure their 
proper emancipation. Articulations confirming the government’s construction can be 
heard as meaningful but oppositional narratives are already discounted as inauthentic.  
 
Apart from the difficulties of access, discursive frames and modes of storytelling in the 
public debate, several of my informants raise doubts about the efficacy of voice in the 
media. They worry that the group affected by the regulations is too small and easily 
ignored by the majority and the political elites. Moreover, the conflict-driven or even 
antagonistic character of the Danish public debate over family unification is a challenge. 
In her encounter with the press Laura, for example, found that they kept pushing for a 
confrontational litigation framing. One TV-channel thus ‘wanted […her] to say that 
[…she] would sue Denmark’ for unlawful administration in her case. But on her own 
and with little hard evidence she had no desire to make such a statement.
49
 The political 
rhetoric has also been very fierce. We have seen Charlotte compare it to US ex-
president George W. Bush’s performative statement at the beginning of the Iraq war in 
2003 which separated the world into allies and enemies. This militarized analogy is of 
course over-stating the problem, but it nonetheless has resonance. If we look at the 
debate over family unification that same year in the Danish parliament and in leading 
Danish newspapers we do see that positions are very starkly and dramatically opposed 
(Jørgensen, 2014; appendix II).  
 
On the one side, we have liberal-international critics of the law who insist, like many of 
my informants, that access to family unification is a basic human or civil right. As one 
letter to the editor puts it: ‘Most Danes, who were given the choice between living in 
Denmark or giving up their marriage, probably ask themselves what a Danish 
citizenship is worth in reality when one of the most basic rights is not respected, that is, 
the right to marry whom one wishes to without being excluded from one’s own 
country.’ (Annemarie and Henrik Volborg quoted in appendix II) In their view, the 
                                                                                                                                               
unequivocal proof that the rule did not work as intended, hence the need to ban all family unification for 
young adults under the age of 24 (Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2002).   
49
 It is interesting to note how this juridical framing of contestation again individualizes, positioning 
Laura on her own against the state (cf. Honig, 2009b; Aradau and Huysmans, 2009). Marriage without 
Borders did try to prompt and facilitate a joint law suit but without success. Indeed, the absence of 
litigation in the dispute over EU law is striking. In part this might be explained by the lack of a litigation 
culture in Scandinavia (cf. Wind et. al., 2009, thanks to Marlene Wind for this observation).  
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restrictive legislation threatens the very core of a liberal democratic citizenship. On the 
other side, we find populist-nationalist as well as mainstream party defenders of the 
legislation. The former see the strict requirements as necessary ‘to protect Denmark 
against being overrun by the flood of migrants’ as a prominent member of the Danish 
People’s Party argues (Søren Krarup quoted in appendix II). The latter present the 
regulation as equally essential but to guard against forced marriages and promote the 
integration of those immigrants and descendants already here. The answer Maria 
received from one of her parliamentarian interlocutors illustrates this line of argument. 
It either ignores the adverse impact on couples, who are not at risk of being pressured 
into an unwanted marriage, or construct this as a sad but unavoidable side effect of the 
fight for the emancipation of young ethnic minority citizens.  
 
Both critics and defenders of restrictive regulation thus present a treasured object - be it 
citizenship, individual freedom or the nation – as subject to an existential threat. For the 
proponents of the law, this justifies using extra-ordinary measures, such as limiting the 
freedom of some other citizens. This ‘securitization’ (Buzan et al., 1998; Rytter 2010a, 
pp.25-29) enables them to dismiss the claims of affected couples like my informants as 
a kind of collateral damage, to continue the combat metaphors. It likewise makes it 
possible for critics of the law to tone down the issue of forced marriages. In such a 
climate, important nuances and research-based evidence are often missing. During 
parliamentary debates and in key legislation, differences between arranged and forced 
marriages are underplayed or discursively erased, although the former is perfectly legal 
and the latter prohibited under Danish and international law. Reliable information about 
the extent of forced marriages and the effects of the law to prevent it is also hard to 
come by in this public dispute (Hervik and Rytter, 2004; Jørgensen, 2014). For 
opposing voices it can thus be difficult to be heard and given proper consideration. 
Conditions for the forceless force of the better argument are consequently uncommonly 
hard.  
 
Deliberation reconsidered 
Hence, while my informants’ stories demonstrate that cross-border movement can spur 
and enable public voice, they also draw out some important barriers to a deliberative 
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engagement. As we have seen in the introductory chapter, critics of deliberative 
democracy often stress how difficult it can be for vulnerable or marginalized groups to 
voice and be heard in public debates. The discursive positioning of ethnic minorities and 
citizens on welfare subsidies in the debate suggest that similar dynamics are at play 
here. But the case also shows that even for resourceful, well-educated citizens, most of 
whom are ethnic Danes, conditions for deliberation are difficult and very far from ‘the 
ideal speech situation’ (Habermas, 1996, p.322).50 The perspectives of some affected 
persons are thus entirely absent, while the articulations of others’ grievances are 
severely constrained by dominant cultural norms and media codes for what counts as a 
good story. Finally, the securitization of family unification enables responsible 
politicians to dismiss the concerns of many who protest against the adverse effects of 
the regulation.  
 
That the debate is far more constrained and exclusionary than the rational and 
egalitarian ideals of deliberative democracy would recommend is deplorable but it is not 
necessarily a problem for the theory. After all, a deliberative democratic conception of 
citizenship is at least in part prescriptive. It gives a normative account of membership 
practices which though seen to be embedded in is never reducible to the social world as 
we actually find it. It is precisely this relation between what Habermas calls ‘facts and 
norms’ that is meant to enable us to criticize the conditions for participation discussed 
above. A deliberative democratic perspective may thus help us to see what is wrong 
with the public debate over family unification. Such a distorted deliberative process 
violates regulative ideals of epistemic validity (Habermas, 1996) ‘egalitarian 
reciprocity’ and ‘universal respect’ (Benhabib, 2002, p.107): Citizens and decision-
makers lack potentially important information when debating the policy and are not 
pressed to consider certain silenced angles of the problematic. Furthermore, though all 
citizens and residents have the same formal right to free speech, the structuring of the 
public sphere make access to the effective use of those rights very unequal with the 
consequence that some affected persons are in practice denied a voice in the public 
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 Note that for Habermas (1996, pp.322-323) the ideal speech situation is not an abstract ideal ‘to be 
approximately realized’ in the actual social world but a set of ‘counterfactual presuppositions assumed by 
participants in argumentation’. 
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negotiations of laws to which they are subjected. The paternalist construction, 
moreover, of young adult minority citizens denies them moral autonomy.   
 
Still, the gap between the ideals of a theory and the lived experiences of parties on the 
ground can be too great. Habermasian deliberative democracy places great faith in the 
self-correcting learning processes arising over time from the interplay between 
democratic decision-making in parliaments and ongoing debates in the informal public 
sphere. But when a debate is gridlocked to such an extent that even privileged and 
capable citizens find it hard to articulate their experiences freely and have their 
perspectives given due consideration then conditions are difficult indeed for such 
progressive transformations.  
 
Here relevant insights might be gained from the growing literature on ‘deliberative 
democracy in divided societies’ (Dryzek, 2005; Muldoon, 2003; Deveaux, 2004; 
Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; for an agonistic critique see Schaap, 2006). John 
Dryzek, for example, advocates detaching deliberations in the public sphere from 
collective decision-making so that debates do not immediately feed into legislative 
processes. He points out that in the run up to elections and constitutional referenda the 
political stakes are very high. In these circumstances listening to the arguments of others 
often takes a backseat to mobilizing support through divisive rhetoric. By contrast, if 
public deliberation occurs at distance from policy reform it is comparatively easier to 
establish some level of understanding across ideological or identity-political lines of 
division.  
 
Just how such a distance is to be achieved is less clear in Dryzek’s proposal. One 
avenue he advocates is the design of various micro-publics such as deliberative polls 
(Fishkin and Luskin, 2005) and citizens’ juries whose recommendations should be 
purely advisory.
51
 A challenge for this recommendation is that citizens whose lives are 
profoundly and adversely affected by public policies, such as my informants, often want 
                                                 
51
 Note that Dryzek (2005) is by no means an uncritical advocate of deliberative micro-publics. He points, 
for example, to studies which find that direct encounters among partisans make it difficult for participants 
to change their opinion without losing face. It is only given very specific institutional designs that he 
recommends such forums and then only as part of a broader public sphere.  
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these regulations altered.
52
 Some of my interviewees do stress the importance of 
changing the hearts and minds of their fellow citizens but they also express a desire to 
have their experiences taken seriously by responsible politicians. Dryzek also argues in 
favour of deliberative forums which focus on individual needs rather than political 
contestation. He cites an empirical study which suggests that this allows participants to 
reach a degree of mutual understanding on practical issues even if they disagree about 
fundamental social and political values. A focus on basic needs, however, returns the 
deliberative process to the terrain of humanitarian discourse which as we have seen is 
what some interviewees find so problematic. While distancing deliberation from politics 
might generate a more reasonable and inclusive exchange of views the costs of such 
depoliticizing moves are considerable.
 
 
 
This is not to deny that the creation of alternative public spaces would be helpful given 
the constraints within the mainstream media and parliamentary debate. To carry out 
such institutional experiments, however, requires political will which presupposes 
precisely the attitude of openness that appears to be lacking.
53
 If these forums are to be 
established in civil society, thus ensuring their genuine distance from the state, 
organizational resources and collective civic action would be necessary. Yet for all the 
attention to institutional design, when it comes to the social and political generation of 
organized activism deliberative democrats have very little to say.
54
 In the following I 
therefore draw on agonistic democracy to analyze stories of civic mobilization and 
collective engagement among Danish-international couples.  
 
 
                                                 
52
 Dryzek (2005, p.234) does not, of course, argue for a complete decoupling of parliamentary action and 
the public sphere. He acknowledges that in the case of too much distance ‘there is a danger the public 
sphere may decay into inconsequentiality. Such decay would undermine the legitimacy of the state itself.’ 
But elections, he insists, are generally poor connecting devises.  
53
 Ironically, Dryzek makes a similar critique of Any Gutmann and Dennis Thompson. They stress that 
participants must demonstrate ‘”the capacity to seek fair terms of cooperation for its own sake”‘(Gutmann 
and Thompson quoted in Dryzek 2005, p.219). But as Dryzek points out this puts the cart before the horse 
since it is the absence of such an attitude that makes reconciliation necessary in the first place (see also 
Schaapp, 2006)  
54
 Agonistic democrats are often - and not without justification - criticized for neglecting institutions 
(Dryzek, 2005; Benhabib, 2006; Schaap, 2006). They do, however, give considerable attention to the 
generation of social movements, revolutions and organized activism that can at times found or transform 
democratic institutions (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Mouffe, 2000). 
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Border crossing and organized activism 
Let us first turn to Charlotte’s story. Charlotte met her husband-to-be in Lebanon where 
she was travelling and following a language course. It was in the year 2000 when family 
unification policies were on the political agenda in Denmark but before the more drastic 
restrictions had been introduced. The two kept in contact for a while and in 2002 
Charlotte’s boyfriend got a work permit in the Netherlands where she joined him. This 
was not a great success. She did not speak the language, had no job and felt rather 
isolated. After a year Charlotte was therefore eager to begin her studies and wanted 
them to move to Denmark. But by then the 24-years threshold had been introduced. Still 
only 23, Charlotte would not yet be able to obtain family unification under the Danish 
Aliens Act. Following the public debate she had, however, heard the founder of 
Marriage without Borders explain that couples could use the freedom of movement in 
the EU to go Sweden. This then was what the couple decided to do. Charlotte found an 
apartment in Malmö and her now husband immediately got a residence permit. From 
there Charlotte commuted daily to her university in Copenhagen until she was old 
enough to be permitted to return to Denmark with her partner. In the interview she 
explains how, faced with the stress of moving to Malmö, she was not immediately able 
to contact Marriage without Borders for advice, let alone to get involved. However, 
before she came back to Denmark she had joined the organization and would 
subsequently become very active in its various advocacy and support work. Reflecting 
on her mobilization, she explains: 
 
C: ...I am already politically interested and so you just get so vehement – 
well fortunately I’m not so angry anymore, but you get so bitter and 
outraged as I have never been in my life and … well for some it makes them 
passive and others it just makes them on fire so you feel that you have to do 
something to express that dissatisfaction. And then also to get an 
opportunity to help others because you yourself have been in that situation 
and been all lost and alone in the world and then it’s nice to be allowed to 
help others who are in the same situation and … don’t know what they 
should do (Interview with Charlotte 2011, p.6).  
 
Charlotte’s story illustrates how cross-border movement can trigger and enable 
participation in organized activism. Line, who has also been deeply involved in the 
work of Marriage without Borders, explains that she had no previous experience with 
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civil society volunteering and had ‘not been brought up very ... politically active and 
engaged’. Rather, her encounter with exclusion ‘sparked something in [... her] because 
it became very personal’ (Interview with Line and Jamil 2011, p.30). In the narratives of 
Charlotte, Line and others we see that anger is a key driver. Theirs is very much an 
agonistic mobilization where individuals come together and take a stand against a policy 
they passionately disagree with and wish to dissent from. Acting is presented as civic as 
well as therapeutic. If channelled into democratic activism, frustration can be a source 
of political change where it might otherwise be a cause for depression or withdrawal, as 
Mouffe has pointed out. On the other hand, the risk of burn-out is also evident in a 
hostile and at times almost antagonistic political environment. Maria, for example, 
describes how she had to leave the board of Marriage without Borders for a while and 
disengage herself completely from the dispute after a very intense period of 
participation because following the public debate made her so angry and upset. 
Charlotte, for all her activism, lost her civic loyalty towards Denmark and wants to 
leave.  
 
The role of cross-border movement in this political awakening is complex. The prospect 
of exit and the experience of being excluded from their country prompt engagement. 
The initial stress of moving is a barrier, but the relative protection of exile once the 
couple is settled or the safety they achieve upon re-entry makes this civic activism 
possible. Line explains that she did not volunteer for Marriage without Borders until a 
few years after they had moved to Sweden when their personal situation had become 
more settled. This echoes with the accounts by other informants who likewise stress the 
need for some level of stability in their own lives before they can find the resources to 
help others. For Charlotte and Maria, this is a respite they find upon returning to 
Denmark. Either way, exit or re-entry is presented as a strategy which in important ways 
facilitates this organized civil society activism by enabling couples to establish a 
reasonably secure life together.  
 
The civic action of Marriage without Borders ranges from public advocacy to phone or 
online guidance and informal support via the so-called ‘Sweden’s Network’. The 
classical political activities, which I focus on here, are planned and carried out by the 
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board of the organization. My informants Charlotte, Line, Maria, Cecilie and Susanne 
have all been involved in various parts of this work which includes submitting extensive 
comments on new legislative proposals to Danish public authorities, arranging meetings 
with immigration officials and organizing socio-political events or happenings. Raising 
public awareness is also a key element. This is done by writing letters to the editors of 
newspapers, helping to establish contact between journalists or researchers and couples 
interested in telling their stories and by speaking out in public on behalf of the 
organization. In addition, the NGO has conducted and disseminated its own research 
into the effects of the Danish legislation on its members (Møller, 2010). Finally, 
Marriage without Borders participates in a wider European network of organisations for 
transnational couples – the European conference for bi-national and bi-cultural 
relationships – where representatives from member organisations meet annually to 
exchange information about domestic and EU regulation. The hope is in future to be 
able to influence EU policy making in the field of family migration.  
 
This activism aims to change laws and discourse in a more liberal direction but, as my 
informants readily admit, successes have been few and far between. In the past decade 
many new restrictive measures have been introduced and only few liberalizing 
adjustments. The support in parliament for especially the 24 years rule has been 
pervasive across the political spectrum with only a couple of smaller parties on the 
centre-left vocal in their critique (Jørgensen, 2014). The landscape of civil society 
organizations for migrants and ethnic minorities is quite fragmented and Marriage 
without Borders has not been able to establish bonds of cooperation or mobilize their 
support, although many Danish citizens from for example the Pakistani community in 
Copenhagen have moved to Sweden to obtain family unification (Rytter, 2010a). 
Throughout most of the period the NGO has thus been quite isolated in its endeavour. 
There have, however, been two important moments where something resembling a 
broader, liberalizing ‘advocacy coalition’ (Jenkins and Sabatier, 1994) has emerged.  
 
Immediately after the reform in 2002 an intense debate began in the Danish press with 
critics challenging in particular the new attachment requirement (see appendix II for an 
in-depth analysis). This rule was explicitly targeted at ethnic minority citizens marrying 
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partners from their parents’ country of origin, but it also prevented many ethnic Danes 
from settling in Denmark with their foreign spouses. Especially expatriates, who had 
lived abroad for a while with their partners and families, were affected. Opposition to 
this regulation was led by the social-liberal newspaper, Politiken, and the Danish Social 
Liberal Party (Det Radikale Venstre) with whom the paper has strong, historic ties. 
Marriage without Borders also took active part as did various expatriates and 
sympathizing citizens. Ironically, some indirect support came as well from leading 
members of the Danish People’s Party for whom the unintended impact on ethnic Danes 
married to Americans and Canadians was hard to square with the party’s ethno-
nationalist discourse. This debate eventually led to an amendment which meant that 
persons who had held Danish citizenship for at least 28 years would be exempted from 
this particular requirement as described in chapter three. Given the unlikely political 
bedfellows in this campaign it is not surprising that the amendment was far from being 
an unequivocal liberalization and failed to satisfy many of those involved. Danish and 
international human rights advocates thus argued that the 28-years-rule was an indirect 
discrimination of naturalized citizens (Ersbøl, 2004; Gil-Robles, 2004), and the Social-
Liberal Party opposed the bill in parliament (Jørgensen, 2014). Furthermore, the 
amendment was accompanied by the introduction of a ‘presumption rule’ for cousin 
marriages. It implied that transnational marriages between first or second cousins, an 
otherwise lawful practice within Denmark, would be presumed to be involuntary. This 
was a rule aimed at the Turkish and Pakistani communities where such marital practices 
where fairly common (Rytter and Liversage, 2014).  
 
In 2010-2011 there was again an intense debate over Danish national regulation now 
focusing on the new point-system for family unification. Coming in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis this reform rearticulated marriage migration by drawing on 
predominantly neoliberal, economic discourses of self-reliance and human capital 
(Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2011b). Apart from 
introducing skill-based selection criteria the new law also doubled the required 
collateral as we have seen. With this partial shift from a culturalist to a socio-economic 
framing new groups of citizens were affected and a new discursive terrain for 
opposition and mobilization was opened up. A law which so strongly favoured well-
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educated and high-income applicants could easily be presented as a challenge to norms 
of social equality embedded in Scandinavian welfare states. This was reflected in the 
newspaper debate. Humanist and anti-Muslim arguments continued to be put forth but 
were now accompanied by social justice articulations (see for example Trier Mogensen, 
2010; Dam Kristensen and Krag, 2010). A Facebook group, Love without Borders 
(Kærlighed uden Grænser), was established by young Danish citizens with political 
connections to the centre-left parties. This new semi-virtual collective actor arranged 
demonstrations and happenings with the support and cooperation of Marriage without 
Borders, the expatriate organization Danes Worldwide, a major trade union and various 
politicians (Love without Borders, 2013; Marriage without Borders, 2010). Unlike the 
earlier advocacy coalition, this one brought together a range of actors on the centre-left 
through the re-articulation of shared interests in opposition to the government (cf. 
Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). Initially, the Social-Democrats and their partners in the left-
wing Socialist People’s Party responded to the government’s proposal with some 
cautious interest, although prominent backbenchers and local party members voiced 
their protest. The two parties then formulated their own alternative point-system (Kræn, 
2010). During the following 2011 electoral campaign the social-liberals and the far left 
party (Enhedslisten) continued their opposition to restrictive family unification rules and 
the latter in particular gained massive popularity at the expense of the more moderate 
Socialist People’s party. After a narrow electoral victory the new centre-left government 
abolished the point-system. Instead, the previous regulation, including the 24-years-rule, 
was re-introduced but with minor liberalizing adjustments (see chapter three).   
 
A partisan micro-public and cross-border movement 
Alongside its activities directed towards changing policy and public opinion, Marriage 
without Borders also provides assistance to couples and families who seek to navigate 
the complex legal terrain. Through chat forums, e-mail and phone services citizens get 
or offer advice on everything from how to find an apartment or register with the 
Swedish tax authorities to how to apply for family unification under Danish, Swedish 
and EU law.
  
Since the Danish Immigration Service for a long time provided very little 
or no information about the options created by European Union regulation, as we saw in 
chapter four, this is a very important enterprise which has helped to make these cross-
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border strategies an actual possibility for many Danish-international couples. Most of 
my informants thus report having found helpful guidance via these services.  
 
In chapter two I argued that the seemingly individual and private character of cross-
border movement makes it hard to square them with agonistic democracy. This case 
study, however, demonstrates how practices of exit, entry and re-entry can be part of an 
organized endeavour to negotiate the boundaries of membership. Though the actual 
border crossing is typically carried out by separate couples and families, the process of 
moving is facilitated and encouraged by this network of civil society activists. There are 
even examples of how members of the NGO in solidarity with fellow transnational 
couples have provided temporary housing for persons in acute need of a place to stay in 
Sweden. Many kinds of border crossing - from human trafficking to forced expulsion of 
ethnic groups - are of course profoundly organized and collective activities without 
being in any way civic. What makes the present case an enactment of citizenship is the 
claiming of basic rights through cross-border movement, the display of solidarity and 
the engagement of the NGO to contest and reform restrictive policies.  
 
The online forum of Marriage without Borders constitutes a transnational micro-public 
where citizens and migrants can articulate their concerns and offer support across 
borders. This is not, however, the kind of communicative space deliberative democrats 
usually favour. It is a partisan forum used by couples affected by the Danish 
immigration rules and no exchange of argument takes place with citizens who favour 
the restrictive family unification regulation. Agonistic democrats also emphasize the 
importance of establishing alternative public spaces where migrants can tell stories and 
have their voices heard (Glover, 2011). From this perspective, partisanship is considered 
a merit which helps the construction of community and solidarity. This resonates with 
the findings here when protagonists articulate their empathy for strangers who are 
likewise affected by the regulation, express gratitude for the help they have received or 
explain their desire to help others in similar distress. Unlike the media debate, this arena 
is open to all who need advice or wish to share their experiences. The counselling is 
often done by members of the board but anyone can contribute as indeed several of my 
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informants have done.
55
 Persons who lack the time, resources or inclination for more 
extensive activism can thus still help others by sharing their insights and know-how. 
This again offers a way of transforming frustration and resentment into civic 
engagement.  
 
It might be objected that this micro-public is decoupled from the general public sphere 
and policy debates with the problematic de-politicization this engenders. This is not the 
case however. The use of EU law to avoid or contest Danish family unification rules has 
over the years become a topic of contention in media and parliamentary debates. It is 
hard to see how that could have happened if there had not been couples who had 
actually followed these pathways aided and spurred on by fellow travellers in Marriage 
without Borders. Moreover, the NGO’s various counselling services help to empower 
citizens and migrants not just to claim rights for themselves but also to take part in 
public debates. Nearly all the present and former activists among my interviewees thus 
explain how they had received support from this organization which enabled them in 
time to get their own situation sufficiently sorted out and motivated them to get 
involved in advocacy and solidarity work.  
 
International community and regenerative spaces 
Apart from its political advocacy and online support Marriage without Borders also 
organizes an off-line social network in southern Sweden where exiled couples meet on a 
regular basis. Susanne, one of the pioneers, had experienced it as ‘pure therapy to spend 
time with people who [...were] in the same situation’ (Interview with Susanne and 
Lisbeth 2011, p.5). In cooperation with others she therefore established this informal 
social forum which has continued to thrive as new members have taken over. The 
format and atmosphere of these gatherings is nicely described by Maria: 
 
Approximately every sixth week there is a dinner where all couples are 
Danish-and-something-else, right, and then somebody hosts but all bring a 
dish ... A delicious buffet with all kinds of food from all over the world. ... 
                                                 
55
 Counselling is carried out by volunteers who draw on their own experiences or the collective 
knowledge built up in the organization, but who do not necessarily have a professional legal background. 
In light of the frequently changing laws and administrative practices as well as the lack of official 
information on the EU route until 2008 this means that advice may occasionally be inaccurate or out of 
date.  
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and then ... you hear others’ stories and realize that there are so many people 
... well, perfectly ordinary, lovely ... generous people, people with a plan, 
who want to do something, are in education or have job, who aren’t allowed 
to stay in the country ... and it’s ... just so supportive [givende] because we 
got such a community ... we were all the time in the same boat so we had 
something to share [være sammen om]. (Interview with Maria 2011, p.13)  
 
Many informants tell how friends, family and colleagues are often surprised and 
incredulous when they hear that couples like them are unable to live in Denmark under 
Danish family unification rules. The network therefore creates a haven where, owing to 
common experiences, no explanations are required and newcomers can receive valuable 
practical and emotional support. In addition to the experience of being ‘kicked out of 
Denmark’, which as we saw in chapter four is often deeply stressful if not traumatic, 
many informants also tell about loneliness and isolation in the beginning of their stay in 
Sweden. While the Danish citizens usually understand some Swedish, they are 
unfamiliar with the system and little things like how to get a bank account can be a 
challenge. For the foreign spouses the transition and adjustment period until they have 
learned some Swedish and found a job is often particularly hard, far away as they are 
from friends and family and with their partners working or studying in Denmark most of 
the day. Here the Swedish network offers a valued opportunity to get to know other 
people. Indeed, for most of my interviewees, who have lived long in exile, this 
‘international community’, as Line characterizes it, has become a crucial part of their 
social life.  
 
Where the advocacy activism of Marriage without Borders has at times been dominated 
by especially young, well-educated, Danish women, the Sweden’s Network is rather 
more diverse. As Line points out, the participating spouses often come from 
‘completely different social levels or educational backgrounds or religions or 
continents’,56 yet strong bonds of solidarity and friendship often develops (Interview 
with Line and Jamil 2011, p.17). This again tallies quite well with an agonistic 
perspective as civic community is constructed less on the basis of pre-given 
                                                 
56
 This is confirmed in my own research where the informants and spouses who have participated in the 
Sweden’s Network do indeed come from as varied destinations as West Africa, North Africa and the 
Middle East, Central and South America, North America and Northern Europe and with very diverse 
socio-economic backgrounds. 
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characteristic and more through shared experiences in a profoundly politicized and 
conflict-ridden terrain (White, 2010; Tambakaki, 2011). It also demonstrates, however, 
that overtly political, organized contestation is not the only form of engagement that 
warrants attention. Agonistic democrats should also look out for regenerative social 
spaces where the costs of cross-border movement are ameliorated and civic sensibilities 
nurtured. In Democracy and the Foreigner Honig (2001b) argues that migration often 
engenders a sense of loss the suppression of which can be psychologically impairing. 
She suggests that relations of support and solidarity with others who share similar 
experiences and can witness and legitimize the mourning process are necessary for a 
successful healing. The intensity and at times antagonistic character of the political 
dispute these couples and families are entangled in makes this particularly important. 
Several informants thus point out that although it is Denmark’s restrictive family 
unification regulation that has brought them together in the network, politics does not 
necessarily dominate their conversations. This is not simply a forum for kindling shared 
resentment and constructing oppositional identity. Rather, over time bonds of trusts and 
friendship develop which go beyond their shared predicament.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how border crossing, public debate and organized activism can 
interplay fruitfully. As existing studies have established, exit need not undermine voice 
but can on the contrary help to create it. While East-German citizens articulated their 
protest and organized collectively in response to a state that prevented them from 
leaving, it is often the prospect of involuntary exile which prompt transnational couples 
to voice in the Danish family unification dispute. But exit, however undesired, also has 
a facilitating effect. It enables affected citizens and their spouses to participate in public 
debate and engage in various forms of organized civil society work either from their 
exile, once they have found their feet there, or upon re-entry. 
 
This offers valuable insights to the debate over citizenship, migration and mobility. 
Against the state-centric, republican view that cross-border movement in the EU reflects 
and creates a thin, market-based citizenship it demonstrates that important democratic 
participation is happening across borders. Many of my informants thus practice a thick, 
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participatory citizenship. They take part in public debate and activism, exchange 
reasons and mobilize the compassion of their fellow citizens and create new bonds of 
civic solidarity.  
 
Analyzing the exit-voice nexus I found evidence of democratic deliberation. However, 
my informants’ stories also revealed a public discourse very far from the ideals of 
inclusive and rational debate. A narrow media framing and an antagonistic political 
climate constrain what experiences and perspectives can be heard and make the 
exchange of reasoned arguments very difficult. An agonistic reading had more 
purchase. In many ways the mobilization of citizens who became active in Marriage 
without Borders resonated with this theoretical perspective. A negative dialectic was at 
play where collective action grew out of passion and political dissent and a new 
affective and participatory civic community was created, although successful political 
transformation was limited. Acting was important not just in order to create change but 
also to transform frustration into civic resistance rather than depression. This brought 
out the importance of supportive, civil society spaces for rest, respite and understanding 
in a heated politicized environment.  
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CHAPTER SIX: PERFORMATIVE CITIZENSHIP  
 
So far we have seen how exit, entry and re-entry sometimes spur and facilitate public 
deliberation, organized contestation and the making of transnational publics. With this 
chapter and the next I explore more intimate connections between cross-border 
movement and civic action.  
 
It is well-known in the literature that border crossing in the EU legally reconstitutes 
citizens. By moving between member-states they mobilize an otherwise largely dormant 
supranational citizenship-status with the supplementary rights this entail (Bellamy, 
2009; Kostakopoulou, 2007). This, of course, is precisely what most of my informants 
are doing. What I want to show in the following is that practices of exit and re-entry 
within the union need not be confined to the juridical terrain but can also be 
performative acts of politicized protest.  
 
The chapter begins by discussing a story of exit as a form of liberal anti-politics where 
moving to Sweden is presented as a practice of conscientious objection to a politics that 
has exceeded its legitimate sphere of regulation. This kind of action is then compared 
and contrasted with a narrative that constructs re-entry as a means of deliberative 
transformation and a performance of agonistic protest. Both stories, albeit in different 
ways, draw attention to the political character of acts which are often interpreted within 
a legalistic frame. I then explore an account of exit and re-entry which shares features 
with the two previous ones but offers a greater challenge to a juridical lens by drawing 
attention to transgressive, extra-legal practices of citizenship across borders. This is 
contrasted with a lawful but seemingly un-civic strategy of forum shopping. 
 
Exit as liberal anti-politics 
Carsten is a Danish man in his mid-forties. He comes from a lower-middle class 
background, has an education in teaching and care work and is at the time of the 
interview studying to become an engineer. He has been in the Philippines as a tourist 
several times, encouraged by a good friend who had moved there to live with his 
girlfriend. This was how he met Mary Ann. She is a Filipino woman in her early thirties 
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with a university degree in business management and comes from a fairly well-to-do 
middle class family. In the interview she describes how, as the daughter of prominent 
local politicians, she was expected to behave impeccably to avoid causing 
embarrassment. When she went to college the sudden freedom was therefore a bit 
overwhelming and she spent most of her time having fun and was not serious in her 
studies. Eventually, her parents had enough and kicked her out, but they later relented 
and she went back to college, now rather more sombre and hoping to complete her 
degree. It was about this time she started chatting with Carsten on an internet site. To 
begin with, she worried a bit that this would shipwreck her studies once again, but as 
their conversations grew longer and more frequent she found that they were actually 
able to support each other in this respect. At one point Mary Ann was thinking about 
quitting college. In her mid-twenties and with mediocre academic results, she feared she 
would not be able to get a job with her degree in the competitive Filipino labour market 
which favours very young, high-flyer applicants. Carsten, however, convinced her to 
stay on, drawing on his own experience with unfinished studies and was also able to 
support her a little economically. She in turn advised and encouraged him when he was 
struggling with his engineering programme. By then their relationship had developed. 
Following a period of long, nightly chats Carsten had visited Mary Ann once or twice 
and they were talking about finding a way for her to visit him.  
 
After she graduated, Mary Ann came to Denmark as an au pair which, as we saw in 
chapter four, is one of the entry options. During her stay she became pregnant. At first, 
her host family assured her that this was not a problem for them, but later they changed 
their minds and asked her to move out. She called the immigration authorities who 
informed her that she could remain in the country and look for another au pair position 
as long as she was careful to leave when her 18-months visa expired. Unable to find 
another host family she lived with Carsten for the remainder of the period. Just after 
their son was born, Mary Ann and the baby travelled back to her family in the 
Philippines, while Carsten began to prepare for them all to move to Sweden. Eventually 
the family was reunited there. In the interview Carsten explains why this route was 
chosen rather than applying for family unification under Danish law. In their case, 
neither the 24-years rule nor the attachment requirement would have been a problem. As 
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a student, however, he found it difficult to supply the required collateral. Still, there was 
more to it than that:  
 
C: ... I knew that the demands of getting her to Denmark were very high and 
one thing was that I couldn’t live up to them, the other thing was that I 
definitely didn’t want to live up to them because, as I say, I think they are, 
yeah, beyond any reasonable approach, inhumane to people who just want 
live together and spend their life and don’t want to, yeah, just want to live 
their life without making any, what do you call it, without being a burden, 
just living our life quietly. (Interview with Carsten and Mary Ann 2011, p.3) 
 
Carsten thus present his act of exit as a kind of conscientious objection; by using EU-
law he refuses to submit to an immigration policy that he find morally indefensible. 
This performative statement resonates with what Christian Joppke (1995, p.121) in a 
very different context has termed ‘anti-politics’. Discussing opposition strategies in a 
totalitarian state Joppke quotes a Polish dissident who made the following observation: 
‘This war surprised you in the company of a pretty woman, not while you were plotting 
an assault on the Central Committee headquarters’ (Adam Michnik quoted in Joppke 
1995, p.18). The point, I take it, is that many dissidents did not become civic actors 
because they were particularly politically interested, but because the state prevented 
them from getting on with their personal lives by regulating tightly the private sphere. 
The concept of anti-politics not only refers to the mode of mobilization, though. It is 
also a certain kind of practice. In the Warsaw-pact countries, solidarity, collectivity and 
public devotion were part of a repressive regime ideology and citizens were compelled 
to take part in recurring, tightly scripted and choreographed manifestations thereof. 
Resistance in Poland and Czechoslovakia, Joppke argues, therefore took on the 
character of dissidence which, while collectively organized in for example the Polish 
Solidarity Movement, involved an important element of disengagement. Non-
participation, in other words, was a way of performatively enacting a right to privacy 
that was otherwise denied. Applying this reasoning to East Germany where there was a 
comparative lack of radical critique, Joppke points out that exit served as the equivalent 
(p.122). By leaving, citizens were expressing their dissent from a political system that 
did not respect their basic liberal freedoms.  
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When describing Carsten’s exit analogously as ‘anti-politics’ caveats are obviously 
required. Denmark, far from being a totalitarian state, is a well-functioning democracy 
with free speech, a free press and a generally good protection of fundamental rights. But 
in the area of migration, public discourse and policy have been very harsh. Particularly 
with regards to family unification, the explicit requirements are clearly invasive, as 
recognized by supporters and defenders alike, and so too are the implicit norms these 
reflect about whom and when you should marry in order to be a well-integrated and 
loyal citizen (cf. Rytter, 2010a). It is in this light that we should read Carsten’s 
profoundly liberal plea to be left alone by the state. When faced with extensive demands 
to demonstrate the family’s capacity and willingness to live their private life in 
accordance with state sanctioned codes of conduct, interviewees like Carsten prefer to 
leave. But while he manifests his dissent through exit, Carsten has also articulated his 
experiences and given advice to others in the chat-forum of Marriage without Borders 
and at a site for Danish and Filipino citizens. His account of what animates this activism 
nicely illustrates the paradoxically political and un-political character of anti-politics:   
 
C: …we are a community of ordinary people that are basically caught in an 
extraordinary situation by a very unwilling Danish government. I have a 
strong political motivation in this because I hate that way the immigration 
rules are set up as they are now. I hate that Denmark has a right wing 
government that is dependent on a very hostile party. (Interview with 
Carsten and Mary Ann 2011, p.8) 
 
Hence, though Carsten’s exit is an act of withdrawal based on the insistence of a right to 
a normal family life, it is nonetheless profoundly politicized. This is all the more 
evident when we compare his narrative interventions with Mary Ann’s perspective on 
their experience.  
 
Settled in Sweden, Carsten is eager for them to stay there, partly because he is so 
infuriated with his own country and partly because this will enable his wife to get a 
Swedish citizenship with the extra freedom and protection that entails. Many 
informants, as the previous chapters have already shown, are keen to acquire this status. 
What makes Swedish citizenship so attractive is not merely that it is so much easier to 
obtain than Danish nationality with no requirements except five years legal residency in 
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the country. Since 2001 Sweden has also permitted dual citizenship (Bauböck 2003, 
p.703) which means, as Carsten points out, that Mary Ann can keep her Filipino 
nationality. In Denmark, the rules are currently different
57
 and foreign nationals 
generally have to renounce their present citizenship to become full members of the 
Danish polity.
58
  
 
Mary Ann, though aware of the appeal of a Swedish citizenship, is less sanguine about 
this plan. While frustrated and puzzled by a policy that prevents them from living 
together in Denmark she does not altogether share her husband’s anger, finding that the 
Danish Immigration Service actually treated her quite decently during her au pair time. 
Moreover, she felt safe and comfortable in their old place in Copenhagen, while the 
town where they now live has many immigrants from Muslim countries which make her 
a bit ill at ease. Echoing several other foreign spouses, Mary Ann is finding her present 
life in Sweden lonely and she is eager to get a job in order to escape the confines of her 
current, domestic routines. She believes, again similar to other interviewees, that this 
would be easier in Denmark. Not only is Copenhagen’s labour market bigger; in many 
service sector jobs she would not be faced with the same language requirements 
prevalent in the more tightly regulated Swedish economy. She explains, however, that 
after many discussions of the issue she has come round to Carsten’s point of view. The 
certainty that their family can always be together no matter what and that her son will 
not be separated from his father carries more weight, and if she gets a European 
passport she will also be able to look for work anywhere in the Union.  
 
Consequently, while both Carsten and Mary Ann place immense value on citizenship as 
a status that guarantees basic rights to family life and free movement, she is more 
pragmatic in her take on their situation and does not articulate the same ethico-political 
indignation. Still, it is worth noting that if hers appears to be a more instrumental 
                                                 
57
 The centre-left government that came into power in September 2011 - just a few months after my 
interview with Carsten and Mary Ann - has made it one of its stated objectives to amend the rules to 
allow dual nationality. This in turn would bring Denmark in line with many other Western countries that 
in recent years have liberalized their nationality law in this respect (Vink and de Groot, 2010; Vink and 
Bauböck, 2013, p.10). At the time of writing, the idea is gaining support in parliament but also meets 
opposition, primarily from the Danish People’s Party (Vestergaard, 2013).     
58
 There are exceptions for refugees and persons whose countries will not permit them to give up their 
citizenship (Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2004). See also footnote 32. 
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approach it reflects a desire to gain social and economic independence by working 
outside the home in line with the norms of gender equality and good citizenship 
projected by Danish family unification rules. It shows that the relationship between the 
instrumentality and the embodied normativity of membership is not as a straightforward 
as the arguments of statist republicans would have it.  
 
Deliberative and agonistic democratic re-entry 
It is interesting to compare Carsten and Mary Ann’s narrative with the story of Line and 
Jamil. Line is one of the young activists in Marriage without Borders whom we 
encountered in chapter four and five. She met Jamil when she was spending a semester 
in Cairo during her university studies. The two began working together and gradually 
fell in love. Jamil had army service coming up so staying in Egypt would mean a long 
period of separation early on in their relationship. Family unification in Denmark was 
not possible since Jamil was too young. Instead, they thought about moving to Kuwait, 
but then heard of the Swedish model. Line got a job in Copenhagen and took leave from 
her studies. They got married, went to Malmö and applied for family unification under 
European Union rules.  
 
At first, the idea was to return to Denmark as soon as possible. EU law not only enables 
citizens to bring their spouses to another member state, but also to move back 
afterwards to the home country. But in 2005, when Line and Jamil left for Sweden, this 
was not generally known in the Danish public, as discussed in chapter four. The initial 
plan was therefore that Line should change her citizenship from Danish to Swedish. 
Nordic cooperation would enable her to do so after two years. Then they could use EU 
rules to go to Denmark in just the same way as they had moved to Sweden. However, 
the first two years in Malmö were very tough. Jamil, like Mary Ann, was feeling lonely, 
could not find a job and Line had to work double shifts to make ends meet. She 
eventually went down with stress and was ill for six months. By the time she got well 
Jamil had passed his Swedish exams, found temporary work and was thinking about 
getting an education. Unlike Mary Ann, he had never gone to college. Before he met 
Line he had imagined himself working all his life in his own shop. Now he had to 
reconsider and, though not particularly keen on that profession, he began a two year 
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programme to become a care assistant in the social and psychiatric sector. Thus 
established, he did not want to go to Denmark just yet and start all over. So they decided 
to wait another three years enabling Jamil to get citizenship in Sweden. In the 
meantime, they both finished their studies and found relevant employment. At the time 
of the interview Jamil had got his Swedish passport and they had started looking for a 
place to live in Copenhagen. But again they had postponed moving since his employers 
had now offered him specialization training which he would like to complete first. Their 
aim, with some uncertainty, was still to move to Denmark. As in Mary Ann’s account, 
we thus see how pragmatic considerations like career plans play an important role in the 
couple’s decision making. Yet their hopes of a re-entry also have a distinctly ethico-
political dimension which I explore in the following. To do so I provide a rather lengthy 
quote wherein Line and Jamil elaborate on their views of return: 
 
J: … I really think that everyone should come back to their country and 
vote. Seriously, this is very, very important because it’s 
L: Yeah, and show examples. We’ve talked about that often. I mean, I’m 
sorry to interrupt you but this is important as well. Because one thing is the 
whole how the system works, right. So we got thrown out due to a political, 
to systems, but we’ve had several experiences of, you know, this kind, 
people telling [Jamil]: ‘Are you Muslim? But you’re really nice’, right. I 
mean, it’s even embarrassing but this has happened quite a lot. Or people, 
yeah similar things, like, you know: ‘I need you to meet my dad because he 
hates Muslims but you’re different’, stuff like that. I mean, it’s ridiculous 
but we’ve had this happening a lot. So one thing is the political level, but 
another thing is  
J: social 
L: it’s probably even more valuable to show an example that will shake 
peoples understandings a little bit or at least add some grey to the black and 
white or, you know 
J: Exactly. This is what I felt also, like: How you will know me if actually I 
don’t talk to you and I don’t have anything to do with you? You 
understand? I mean - to know me you have talk to me. I have to 
communicate with you. I have to show you and see actually from your side 
and I show you from my side. Then we meet and then you know me and 
then I know you. I mean, Otherwise it will not work, I mean […] We have 
to show actually who we are to let people understand that actually we are 
not dangerous, we don’t beat, we don’t bite people, you know, and, I mean, 
hurt others. We are living as you are. (Interview with Line and Jamil 2011, 
pp.25-26) 
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Analyzing the paragraph let me begin by exploring the role of voting stressed by Jamil 
in the beginning. In the previous chapter I showed how this couple and especially Line 
has participated in various forms of activism from their home in Sweden with the aim of 
changing Danish immigration politics. I discussed different informal barriers in 
connection to the media debate, but there is also one significant formal challenge; the 
question of political suffrage. ‘External voting’ is today permitted (and in some cases 
compulsory) in a range of countries across the world and in most EU member states 
(Bauböck, 2007a; Nohlen and Grotz, 2000). It means that citizens who live outside their 
own state can vote in domestic elections. This in turn is an important institutional 
parameter shaping but also often shaped by migrants’ transnational political activism 
(Bauböck, 2010; Smith and Bakker, 2005; Gammage, 2004). If emigrants can go to the 
polls then their ability to influence politics in their country of origin quite obviously 
increases.  
 
External voting rights have gradually been introduced in Denmark in recent years, albeit 
with reservations. All citizens, who when they leave declare their intent to return again 
within two years, retain their suffrage for that period. In addition, external voting rights 
beyond the two years are granted to various specific categories of citizens such as 
diplomats, students, government officials and employees posted abroad for Danish 
companies or NGOs (Ministry for Economic Affairs and the Interior, 2013).
59
 My 
Danish informants who live in Sweden but work in Denmark seldom fit into these 
special status categories. Most Danes who have moved across the Øresund bridge 
continue to work in Copenhagen or find jobs in the Swedish public or private sector and 
are thus not posted abroad. Citizens like Line, who stay away for several years, 
therefore lose their ability to vote for the Danish parliament. This is a source of 
frustration for several informants. As EU citizens they are allowed to participate in local 
elections in Sweden and can vote for the European Parliament, but their chances of 
changing Danish national politics are arguably reduced since responsible politicians 
have less incentive to listen to their views. Returning to Denmark is therefore an act of 
                                                 
59
 According to the Danish Constitution (Grundloven §29), citizens must reside on the territory to be able 
to vote in Danish parliamentary elections. The various exceptions mentioned above are regulated in the 
Election Act (Valgloven, §2). 
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legal-political reconstitution as they regain their suffrage. It is in this light that Jamil 
presents re-entry as a civic duty.  
 
The significance of return for Jamil and Line goes beyond interest in politics and 
electoral math. When Jamil insists on dialogical exchanges as ways of generating 
learning processes, his argumentation has a distinctly deliberative flavour. This is 
particularly striking in his hope that negative stereotypes and xenophobic fears can be 
overcome through discursive practices fostering what Arendt (1961) calls 
‘representative thinking’ – the ability to imagine oneself in someone else’s situation and 
look at the world from their perspective. But though Jamil clearly describes an ethics of 
communication, it is not the disinterested Habermasian reason-giving where 
interlocutors endeavour to leave their particularities aside. ‘The force of example’ 
(Ferrera 2008) stressed by Line and Jamil comes from demonstrating – as much through 
action as through argument – that the views and presumptions of others are in need of 
critical readjustment. This mode of engagement derives its persuasive power precisely 
from the individuality manifested which disturbs simplistic ways of labelling others and 
opens up new interpretive frames for grasping the social world. We are here much 
closer to Benhabib’s situated and context sensitive approach to deliberation. It is 
important to note, though, that while both Arendt and Benhabib focus on words and 
deeds made in public, Jamil and Line also emphasise the importance of interpersonal 
encounters and relationship among for example friends and colleagues. The underlying 
assumption appears to be that such micro-processes, though not politically 
consequential on their own, can help to create a social environment less receptive to the 
politics of fear. That in turn is another reason why re-entry is so important for them. It 
not only empowers citizens to influence politics through voting but also enables face-to-
face exchanges in civil society with the potential of bottom up transformation this might 
entail. Quasi-private and public interaction are thus presented as mutually supportive 
practices of citizenship.  
 
While intercultural dialogue is central to this narrative of cross-border movement, a 
more agonistic engagement is also articulated. Recounting his reflections on whether or 
not to remain in Malmö Jamil explains: 
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J: Basically, we heard a lot from others: ‘Why you want to leave to 
Denmark? They throw you out. Don’t move back, you know. Here is better. 
Sweden, like, welcome you and you should be here. You should not go back 
to Denmark. Denmark will not give you anything. They throw you out’. But 
I thought, I had actually this belief that no, if I don’t go back to Denmark, 
Denmark will stay the same, you know. So actually one of the reasons we 
wanna go back to Denmark [is] just to let them know that: ‘Ok, we are back. 
Whatever you did decide for us, you know, we are back. We decide for our 
self.’ (Interview with Line and Jamil 2011, p.11) 
 
Here Jamil interprets a future re-entry as an act of civic contestation. The aim is still to 
renegotiate the boundaries of the polity but through a passionate, symbolic protest rather 
than by exchanging reasons and learning to see from the perspective of others. 
Returning to Denmark Jamil hopes to demonstrate and reclaim their freedom and 
agency in the face of restrictive immigration control. Like Carsten, he thus expresses an 
unwillingness to accept and submit to the power of the state in matters of love and 
family life. But his is a different kind of refusal. Rather than turning his back on an 
illiberal migration regime Jamil insists on the right to be present and take part. This 
commitment is agonistic because it is animated by disagreement and articulated as an 
act of political contestation, and civic because it manifests a profound concern not just 
with individual interests but with the general welfare of Danish society.  
 
While Carsten with his exit thus enacts a politicized, liberal citizenship, Jamil and Line 
construct re-entry as a deliberative and agonistic democratic practice. Their story is a 
particularly striking example of how a thick and thoroughly engaged citizenship can be 
performed across borders. Still, the indeterminacy or what Honig calls the gothic 
character of civic action is important to emphasise in this context. Though the couple’s 
past activism is well-documented
60
 their return to Denmark has been postponed several 
times for various reasons, and at the time of the interview it was still uncertain if, how 
and when it would be realized.
61
 Again, this by no means detracts from the merits of 
their exemplary narrative; it just underlines the open-endedness and multiple 
                                                 
60
 It is evidenced not only in my own conversation with them and other informants, but also in various 
sources from Marriage without Borders and in newspaper articles where Line is interviewed.  
61
 The couple did eventually move back to Denmark, as Line informs me in a later email correspondence. 
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motivations of politics and cautions us against a simplistic distinction between virtuous 
national and self-interested transnational membership.  
 
Border crossing and democratic taking 
Where Jamil’s interpretation of re-entry has both deliberative and agonistic elements, 
Ajda’s narrative is rather more transgressive and contestatory. Ajda came to Denmark 
when she was very little. She and her parents were refugees from Iraq. They were 
granted asylum and later Danish citizenship and Ajda grew up in Denmark. On a family 
visit she met her husband-to-be. They fell in love and kept in touch for a couple of 
years. When Ajda turned 19 they decided to get married and live together. Family 
unification under Danish national law was not an option because Ajda was too young, 
but they had heard about other couples who had used EU law to go to Sweden and 
chose to do the same. Recollecting this decision, she describes her reaction at the time: 
 
I felt from the beginning very, very angry with the system as a whole and I 
thought: How unfair that they shall decide who one shall live with and 
decide that I have to wait. … I felt like I got thrown out of Denmark. I had 
really got the kick, that’s how I felt it. I was not at all allowed to be in 
Denmark. And I was really, really upset about it. But I just felt that way, as I 
said, that I wanted to live where I would decide. Nobody shall decide where 
I shall live, right. So I just went to Sweden and then I began to feel a bit: 
Oh, Sweden is better than Denmark. I did, to be honest. Because they are 
much more, they have some more humane rules, I think. A family 
unification: If two people get married then they are also allowed to live 
together. They are not in Denmark.  (Interview with Ajda, 2011, p.4) 
 
Like Carsten, Ajda thus present her exit to Sweden as a defiant response to a law that 
seeks to regulate her intimate life by determining where she can live with whom. It 
becomes a way of asserting her personal freedom in relation to the state. As she soon 
realizes, however, there is a fine line between independence and isolation. She reports 
how her commuter life was often stressful and lonely (see also Rytter 2010a). The few 
young women she knows in Malmö have decided to settle there permanently and are 
focused on childrearing and home-making rather than on education and career. She 
describes how, without her social network in Denmark, it became very hard to uphold 
an identity as a self-reliant young woman actively involved in civil society. This felt 
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particularly trying since her experience with family unification had heightened her 
political awareness, as she reflects on later in the interview: 
 
When we came to Denmark we were refugees. It was 18-19 years ago and 
then we just got – it wasn’t like now – so we just got a residence permit and 
then we got citizenship. ... But … after I moved to Sweden I felt how it is 
for all those 100,000 others who don’t have citizenship and have to go 
through all that … Because you easily forget when you have got everything 
sorted out, ... you know that your future is in Denmark and Denmark is such 
a safe place, right. It’s really cool to live in Denmark, actually. You are 
allowed to do so many things. So … I began to appreciate it and then I 
began to think: Oh, but it’s such a pity for all the others who aren’t allowed 
- all those who, like me, live in [a refugee camp]. I have lived there myself. 
They are not even allowed to be here (Interview with Ajda 2011, p. 20).  
 
Ajda, as the quote illustrates, narratively connects her present experience of exclusion 
with childhood memories of her life as a refugee. The meaning of her past is re-
evaluated and her sense of solidarity is enlarged, as she comes to identify with the plight 
of rejected asylum seekers awaiting expulsion. Had it not been for Denmark’s formerly 
liberal policies, her life would have been very different and she herself might have been 
a different person:  ‘[T]hen maybe I had not been active and educated and all that. … 
[P]erhaps my parents had had to marry me to somebody because ... they didn’t know 
better.  Now they know more about society ... because they have gotten the 
opportunities for that. They know how important it is for a girl that she has her freedom’ 
(p. 20). In this way, Ajda mobilizes a feminist discourse which is central to the defence 
of restrictive family unification rules in law and public debate (Ministry of Refugee, 
Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2003; see appendix II). In doing so, she seeks to 
demonstrate not only that she is already an emancipated young woman who therefore 
does not need the state’s protection. She also contends that her capabilities are due not 
to the current invasive regulations but to prior, enabling, welfare-state conditions. It is 
this latter, autonomy-enhancing political community which present and future 
newcomers are prevented from enjoying. The contrast between Danish policy then and 
now thus becomes an object for critical reflection and civic action.  
 
Hence, while Ajda, like Laura whom we met in chapter four, feels thrown out of 
Denmark and, at least for a while, turns away in anger, her civic identification is at the 
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same time reinforced as she develops transnational or cosmopolitan solidarities. Though 
somewhat constrained in her ability to exercise her citizenship, she has managed to take 
part in the Danish media debate from her exile. Hers is thus not a thin, but rather a thick 
democratic citizenship. 
 
When Ajda and her husband moved to Malmö, their intention was to stay five years 
until he had got Swedish citizenship. Then they would re-settle in Denmark. But the 
strain of a commuter life became too much and after three and a half years they changed 
their plan and moved back secretly. They kept their address in Malmö and went there 
from time to time, but lived de facto in Denmark. At the time of the interview their aim 
is to continue their clandestine residence until her husband can obtain his Swedish 
citizenship. Then they will be able to choose freely where to settle. This return route 
transgresses Danish and Swedish immigration and citizenship laws in different ways. 
With a temporary residence permit in Sweden Ajda’s husband is entitled to visit 
Denmark for up to three months at a time without applying for a visa, but he is not 
allowed to actually live there. Ajda is still under 24 so the couple would be unable to 
obtain family unification under Danish national rules. If and when Ajda’s husband 
applies for citizenship in Sweden he will presumably do so under false pretences as he 
has not lived the required five years in that country.  
 
The couple’s ‘semi-legal’ (Rytter 2010a, pp.131-137) re-entry is obviously a risky 
enterprise as Ajda is well aware. If discovered, her husband will have to start all over in 
Sweden and he may be deported. Both Swedish and Danish immigration authorities 
have introduced measures to control and prevent such strategies (The Danish 
Immigration Service, 2013a; author interviews). But despite the stressful insecurity of 
their situation she explains that she finds the return liberating:  
 
[I]n Sweden … I felt it really trying that I couldn’t be active. That was really 
difficult for me and I felt … as if there was a part of me that disappeared 
and ... I became a person that I did not want to be. ... I couldn’t be myself 
and I had to be more, sort of, inward-looking and I didn’t like that. So when 
we moved I just felt: Oh ... now I don’t need to think of having to pay 200 
DKK [app. 27 Euros] every time I’m going to a meeting or an editorial 
meeting on the magazine or something. Now I can just do it. (Interview with 
Ajda 2011 p.19) 
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Re-entry thus enables Ajda to counter the ‘domestication’ of her life which she, like 
Mary Ann, is struggling with in her exile and re-establish herself as an independent 
young woman active in society. Prompted to consider what her complex cross-border 
life-situation has meant for her sense of belonging, Ajda explains: 
 
 …I feel sort of mentally homeless. ... Well, I feel I belong in Denmark but 
then not quite. In Sweden I have also had something, so all those who have 
not been in Sweden they don’t really understand me. They don’t understand 
how hard it is... I am homeless. So I just use, I think I use all the things I do 
as a kind of safety-net, one might say. Yes, I somehow get a bit of identity 
that I am a person ... who tries to change something, right, an activist 
[ildsjæl], well, if you can put it like that. (p. 22) 
 
Deprived of a safe space, Ajda’s personal and civic identity is no longer connected to 
any particular location. Civic practice has taken the place of rights and a more stable 
form of attachment. Where Jamil, for example, has acquired the full protection of a 
Swedish passport, Ajda’s citizenship has thus become largely performative (Butler, 
1997; Nair, 2012). She therefore needs to re-enact it continually through her civil 
society participation. This is a precarious strategy. It takes energy, resources and some 
daring to engage in grassroots activism while her personal situation is so insecure. Her 
age, gender and ethnicity add to her vulnerability. As she explains, public engagement 
is generally not considered appropriate behaviour for a young woman in her 
community. Though Ajda’s husband is more open-minded than most, it can be a 
difficult terrain to navigate, she points out.  
 
Interpreting Ajda’s story, it is helpful to bring in Honig’s concept of ‘democratic taking’ 
discussed in chapter two. Danish family unification law has deprived Ajda of the ability 
to realize the private and family life she desires. In response she moves to Sweden but 
this in turn limited her opportunities for engaging in grass-root activism and thus 
endangered her self-identity. Instead of waiting patiently to get back her freedom she 
grasps it for herself. She acts as if she already had the right to return to Denmark with 
her husband and participate in civil society. This does not immediately legalize her 
partner’s stay or give her back her civil rights. Rather, through her strategic 
performance she re-creates herself as an active citizen. In this way she looks very much 
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like a democratic taker. A careful engagement with her narrative, however, enables us to 
critically extend the concept of democratic taking on two dimensions; who can act, and 
what constitutes action. 
  
Let us begin with the first question, the subject positions of democratic takers. Honig, 
drawing on Ranciére (2004), describes this kind of activism as undertaken by migrants 
situated ‘so far outside the circle of who “counts” that they cannot make claims within 
the existing frames of claims making. They make room for themselves by staging non-
existent rights, and by way of such staging, sometimes, new rights, powers and visions 
come into being.’ (Honig 2001b, p. 101) What does it mean to be thus positioned? 
Looking at Ajda, it is clear that her political freedom has been significantly reduced. 
Not only is her ability to engage in civil society circumscribed. Without formal 
residence in Denmark she cannot vote in national election. On the other hand, Ajda has 
been in the media. Though this is in many ways an exclusionary arena, difficult to enter 
and navigate, as we saw in the previous chapter, Ajda has managed to voice her critique 
in the established public sphere. As a Danish and European citizen Ajda could have 
stayed fairly well-protected in Sweden with her husband. They might also have used 
some of the lawful channels for re-entry which other informants have employed. Thus 
while Ajda’s situation is undoubtedly precarious it seems too dramatic to describe her as 
far outside the circle of who counts. As she clearly resembles a taker of citizenship this 
suggests that Honig’s theorization needs adjusting.  
 
The metaphor of a circle encapsulating those who count and separating them from those 
who do not is troubling. It suggests that membership of a polity follows a simple binary 
logic of either/or, inside/outside. Contemporary European migration regimes are rather 
more complex with civil, social, and occasionally political rights distributed to some 
groups of resident EU citizens, transnational immigrants and refugees who have not 
acquired full national citizenship status (Soysal, 1994; Benhabib, 2004). Moreover, 
incorporation and exclusion are dynamic processes. Even the formally included with 
full citizenship status can be deprived of important freedoms and be forced to re-claim 
their membership performatively (Nyers, 2011). Ajda’s story is a pertinent illustration 
of this. Honig is more persuasive when she writes elsewhere that ‘[n]ot all takings are 
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performed by immigrants or foreigners, but they are all performed by subjects who are 
not fully included in the system of rights and privileges in which they live.’ (Honig 
2001b, p.99, my emphasis) This, however, directs us towards a much more fluid and 
multi-dimensional understanding of the juridico-political terrain. Ajda’s story thus 
demonstrates the analytical and political purchase of the transgressive performativity 
(Butler 1997) of citizenship which is inscribed in the concept of ‘democratic taking’, 
but at the same time it cautions us against a too narrow focus on the radically 
disenfranchised.     
 
If we move on then to the question of what constitutes democratic taking, Honig, as we 
have seen, emphasizes collective action. Ajda’s story, with her stress on the importance 
of participation in civil society activism and her identification with the plights of others, 
again resonates well with this conceptual framework. At the same time it draws our 
attention to the political significance of the actual cross-border movement in a way 
Honig’s work, notwithstanding its careful engagement with public narratives of 
migration, does not really do. Ajda’s exit to Sweden is articulated as a protest and a way 
of claiming a right to family life that she does not have in Denmark, and it is through 
her semi-legal re-entry that she re-invents herself as a civic activist. Her complex border 
crossing strategies enable her grass-root activism, transform her civic identification and 
constitute an act of democratic discontent. Reading her story thus prompts us to adopt a 
broader perspective on the possible modalities of ‘democratic taking’ which draws out 
the civic and political potential of practices of cross-border movement. Through her 
transgressive border crossing Ajda re-enacts herself as an agonistic democratic citizen. 
 
Pragmatic forum-shopping? 
This last section contrasts Ajda’s semi-legal yet civic narrative with a lawful but 
apparently un-civic practice of forum-shopping. Danish Anja and her Cuban husband 
Miguel are the only couple among my interviewees who managed to use Denmark’s 
national rules for family unification to obtain a residence permit. 30-years-old Anja and 
26-years-old Miguel were unaffected by the 24-years rule. They had no problems with 
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the attachment requirement either
62
 and were able to meet the economic conditions in 
place at the time. Three months after submitting their application Miguel was therefore 
granted a temporary leave to stay. They moved to Denmark, he signed up for a language 
course and shortly after began studies at a technical school. Notwithstanding the 
successful outcome of their entry strategy the couple subsequently decided to study a 
semester in Spain thus enabling Miguel to obtain a residence permit under EU law 
instead. The reasons they offer for switching rules are partly instrumental. European 
Union regulation gives spouses a right to stay for five years while a Danish permit will 
need to be renewed after two years (Citizenship Directive, 2004). At the end of the five 
year period Miguel will have a right to permanent residency. Family migrants can also 
apply for indefinite leave to stay via domestic rules but at the time of the interview these 
had just been severely restricted, making EU rules again far more attractive (Aliens Act, 
2010b).
63
 Finally, changing to union law would allow the couple to retrieve the 
collateral of 50,000 DKK which they had had to provide initially, half of which had 
been supplied by Miguel’s not very well-to-do parents.  
 
The activation of EU law carried out here resembles regulative ‘forum shopping’ and in 
some sense confirms the worst fears of statist republicans. Unlike citizens unable to use 
Danish and/or EU law, couples like Anja and Miguel have access to dual systems of 
rights and can chose whichever is the more advantageous. This is both a challenge to 
the equality of citizenship and a disenchantment of a significant political status which is 
reduced to its comparative instrumental value.  
 
Still, the story is more complex. Anja and Miguel, their temporary exit to Spain 
notwithstanding, articulate a profound commitment to Denmark. Having lived abroad 
for years has made Anja aware of how much she values Danish society, while Miguel 
feels a must stronger attachment to his new home country than to Cuba. He explains, 
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 Anja spoke Spanish fluently and the couple had lived together for a year in Cuba so it is likely that their 
attachment to this country would have been deemed greater than to Denmark. This was not relevant in 
their case, however, since the attachment requirement does not apply to persons who have held Danish 
citizenship for more than 28-years as indeed Anja had.  
63
 A point-system was introduced in late 2010 where applicants for permanent residence had to earn 
points based on their labour market participation, educational skills and civic commitment (Aliens Act, 
2010b). The same logic was shortly after introduced also for temporary access to family unification 
(Aliens Act, 2011).    
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half-jokingly, that even if Anja were to stay in Spain, he would come back to Denmark 
because this is where he feels at home. For both of them this is the country they want to 
live in, raise their children in and be fully part of. Indeed, it is precisely, though 
somewhat ironically, to achieve this permanence which will enable them to put down 
roots that they are using EU law. Thus, as subtext to the instrumental arguments 
presented, a deeper emotional and existential undercurrent runs through the interview: 
 
A: … I would sleep better at night knowing first he was getting his 
permanent residence because then I don’t have to worry about anything 
anymore. Right now I am, like, we don’t know what happens. I know I am 
overly preoccupied with this. I wake up at night dreaming that they’ve 
kicked him out of the country because now they have made a new law and 
he doesn’t fulfill whatever he has to fulfill anymore and we have to leave. 
And sometimes it can be a week where I keep dreaming this over and over 
again, and I’m like: I need to sleep, I need to relax. So that’s another reason 
why. If we go to Spain I just have to be patient for five years. After five 
years he is gonna get his permanent residence, and in time he is gonna get 
his citizenship and then, no more worries, no more questions asked. We can 
just live and focus on something else. (Interview with Anja and Miguel 
2011, p.11) 
 
This narrative illustrates how stressful a securitized immigration politics and discourse 
can be for those who are exposed to it. Even someone like Anja, who found her way via 
domestic law, feels her ‘ontological security’ (Giddens, 1991; see also Rytter, 2010a) 
threatened by the lack of reliable policies providing a robust defence of the right to 
family life. In some respects, then, their exit to Spain is part of a struggle for the basic 
protections of citizenship. That in turn illustrates the merit of a ‘gothic’ approach 
analysing the interplay between thick and thin practices of citizenship and recognizing 
the multiple motives, desires and aspirations we bring to the politics of membership. 
 
The story also brings out an important paradoxical feature of a dynamic conception of 
citizenship: Couples who contribute actively and often deliberately to the on-going 
negotiation of political boundaries find this state of recurring change wearisome and 
undesirable. To be sure, they prefer it to closed borders, however stable and predictable, 
but enacting citizenship across borders is often something they would not otherwise 
have done.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter started off from the observation that while the legally constitutive effects 
of border crossing within the EU have received considerable academic attention, its 
potentially political character has been somewhat neglected. Following on from this I 
explored three different ways in which exit or re-entry was narrated by informants as 
acts of civic contestation.  
 
The four storylines - liberal anti-politics, deliberative and agonistic protest, democratic 
taking and forum shopping – show a substantial breadth in how border-crossing can be 
practiced and narrated. The strategies described range from lawful to semi- or illegal. 
The discourses mobilized include a liberal defence of privacy and autonomy, 
democratic norms of civic engagement, cosmopolitan constructions of solidarity, 
feminist ideals of emancipation and pragmatic-instrumental scripts of convenience.  
 
The analysis showed that deliberative and agonistic democracy, if critically 
reinterpreted to include acts of contentious border crossing, have important purchase. 
Both perspectives helped to make sense of practices of citizenship which might 
otherwise be overlooked as instrumental or outright illegal. But the discussion also 
showed limitations of this approach. The story of liberal anti-politics highlights that not 
all politicized border crossing and rights claiming is best captured by this analytics. 
Rather than seeing this as a problem, I find it demonstrates that these democratic 
theories can be extended in this way without becoming empty, catch-all frameworks 
that lack conceptual and analytical distinctiveness.  
 
The chapter contributes to a dynamic reconstruction of citizenship by elucidating how 
practices of border crossing can be a way of protesting against exclusionary boundary 
politics and thus participating in transnational, democratic negotiation of rights and 
membership. Such acts can, I showed, be performed by migrants as well as citizens and 
is neither the prerogative of the very privileged nor of the radically excluded.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL DIS/OBEDIENCE 
 
In the previous chapter I showed how border-crossing was narrated by a few informants 
as a deliberative and agonistic protest in the family unification dispute. Building upon 
this finding I take here the analysis a step further and develop a concept of 
‘transnational civil dis/obedience’ helping us to identify key traits of such civic 
practices. The concept offers an interpretive frame for grasping and assessing cross-
border movement within and beyond the European Union where citizens and migrants 
mobilize international or supranational law to evade and contest national rules 
considered unjust.  
 
As we have seen, the presence of complex and sometimes conflicting juridico-political 
orders enables persons and groups to sidestep or openly challenge the legality and 
legitimacy of one set of rules by appealing to the regulation of another regime 
(Kostakopoulou 2007, p.645). This is especially but by no means exclusively the case 
within the European Union. To construct and illustrate my argument I analyze the story 
of Martha and Guillermo. Martha’s narrative is used as an ‘exemplar’ (Ferrera, 2008) 
that is particularly well-suited to bring out the central tenets of what I term transnational 
civil dis/obedience.  
 
Martha’s principled and politicized account of her and her husband’s cross-border 
movement challenges state-centric, republican accounts which portray EU-citizenship 
as thin, market-based and instrumental and see free movement as an undesirable 
invitation to forum shopping. Against such views I argue that Martha’s narrative has a 
striking ‘family resemblance’ (Wittgenstein, 1953) with forms of civil disobedience 
(Rawls, 1971, pp.363-393; Arendt, 1972; Cabrera, 2010, pp.131-153). She and her 
husband, however, do not so much break the law as avail themselves of alternative 
regulations and are thus not ‘disobedient’ in the way we would usually understand it. I 
therefore conceptualize their actions as dis/obedient. I argue that in the context of 
complex legal pluralism it is possible for citizens to act in ways which are at the same 
time dutiful and transgressive, legal and non-compliant. While such ‘schizophrenic’ 
practices certainly go against conventional understandings of citizenship and political 
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community, they also offer new ways of contesting, avoiding and perhaps transforming 
state power when basic freedoms are at stake.  
 
From shopping to dis/obedience 
Since the end of the Second World War we have witnessed a gradual development and 
expansion of transnational law and institutions. Nowhere is this more pronounced than 
in the EU where national, international and supranational legal norms coexist in a 
complex relation of supplementation and competition (Walker, 2008). This has opened 
up a range of strategies for citizens, social movements and commercial agents. Dora 
Kostakopoulou, for example, points out that: 
 
…individuals, in both their personal and corporate identities, can shift subject 
positions and activate their link with a normative system (i.e. the human 
rights regime or the EU) when their link with another normative system either 
is blocked or fails to yield a desirable outcome. Individuals are thus no longer 
locked within a single, unified and finite network commanding unqualified 
allegiance. (Kostakopoulou, 2007, p.645) 
 
Kostakopoulou’s argument implies that we should, on balance, welcome the ‘disorder 
of normative orders’ (Walker, 2008, p.376, original emphasis) which constitutes the 
legal terrain of contemporary Europe. The ability to move – physically, legally, and 
symbolically – between different and overlapping political communities helps to guard 
against the overwhelming power of the state. But this is not merely a negative freedom 
of leaving each alone. By appealing to human rights or mobilizing our EU citizenship 
we often also engage in processes which transform the nation-state and push for greater 
inclusion and more porous borders (Kostakopoulou, 2007, pp.642-646; cf. Benhabib, 
2004; Soysal 1994). 
 
This is an interesting contention but one that needs careful examination. A proper 
appreciation and assessment of the potential of the transnational juridico-political field 
and the practices it gives rise to calls for further conceptual development and critical 
analysis. What constitutes a ‘desirable outcome’? To whom is it desirable – individual 
citizens, companies, democratic majorities – and how to weigh their respective 
concerns? The lack of ‘a single unified network commanding unqualified allegiance’, 
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which is here presented as emancipatory, is precisely what worries more state-centric 
republicans or national-communitarian critics, as we have seen. Free movement, it is 
feared, will encourage citizens to shop around between different states to get the best 
deal for themselves reflecting and promoting a thin citizenship. ‘Jumping the waiting 
list’ in health care, for example, by moving to another country shows a lack of solidarity 
and could lead to a negative spiral undermining European welfare states (Bellamy, 
2009, p.20, 2008; Scharpf, 2009; Joppke, 2010b). In legal studies, the phenomenon 
described by Kostakopoulou is thus often referred to as ‘forum shopping’. Individuals 
opt in and out of different juridical systems and litigation forums according to what best 
serves their private concerns (Juenger, 1988-89; Clermont and Eisenberg, 1994-95).  
 
To understand this line of critique and how to address it let us therefore take a closer 
look at the concept of forum shopping. The first thing to notice is that forum shopping is 
often used as a derogatory term. This does not mean that scholars are uniformly critical 
of the phenomenon. Juenger (1988-89, pp.570-571), for example, who offered the first 
thorough academic account, points out how such inventive strategies may serve a range 
of different causes, some admirable and others not. Some scholars directly advocate 
certain forms of forum shopping as a way to advance international human rights (Helfer, 
1999). Still, the term is generally pejorative and acknowledged to be so (Jüenger, 1988-
89, p.553). Forum shopping portrays individuals as consumers of law rather than 
subjects and authors of law. It presents us with an image of privatized agents transacting 
in the market place instead of taking part in a political community. Implicit or explicit is 
frequently the presumption that individuals act instrumentally to promote their own 
interest at the expense of justice (see for example Clermont and Eisenberg, 1994-95). 
 
This presupposition is no doubt often justified, yet as a general assumption it is 
nonetheless problematic. Legal counsel may be obliged to consider the best interests of 
their clients when deciding on forums for litigation (Juenger, 1988-89, pp.571-572). But 
if the concept of forum shopping is employed more broadly as a metaphor describing 
the movement of persons between different legal systems, then a range of other 
concerns and agendas could enter the picture. In Israel, for example, marriage falls 
under the jurisdiction of the religious authorities. Many citizens who wish to get a civil 
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marriage therefore go to Cyprus where they can get a secular process at the registrar’s 
office. But though they are indeed evading their own state’s regulation it is not evident 
that they do so for narrowly self-interested reasons. Upon closer inspection we might 
perhaps find that the Cyprus strategy has some minor material advantages such as a 
faster process. Even so, I suspect that this is seldom what is at stake. Nor does it, in my 
view, make much sense to suggest that the couples simply prefer the goods on sale in 
another marriage market. That would fail to capture any possible ethico-political 
significance of their action. It is quite plausible that some spouses at least are engaged 
in principled action akin to conscientious objection. They refuse to abide by and 
condone a system that does not permit secular unions.
64
 
 
What this example suggests is not that a concept of forum shopping has no use. It may 
well have purchase in helping us to capture some undertakings by businesses and 
citizens in a transnational arena as we saw in the previous chapter. But as an analytical 
frame it is applied far too broadly and does not provide us with adequate criteria for 
distinguishing between different kinds of practices. Why, for example, should we 
accept, as this terminology indicates, that the strategies of an international oil company 
which seeks to avoid paying damages for the pollution it has created, is comparable in 
any ethico-politically relevant sense to the actions of the Israeli ‘marriage tourist’? Or 
that such corporate evasion of responsibility is somehow analogous to so-called ‘asylum 
shopping’ (Thielemann, 2012, p.30) where refugees travel to Sweden rather than Greece 
in order to enhance their chances of protection? We need an analytical framework that 
does not merely assume identity between such cases, but instead enables us to 
distinguish between forms of action and to critically discuss similarities and differences. 
This presupposes concepts that do not settle the debate in advance by employing an all-
embracing market logic which blinds us to the political and civic character of some 
modes of border crossing.  
 
I will argue in the following that we can gain useful inspiration from the literature on 
civil disobedience. The point is not that this framework in itself is a better interpretive 
lens, but rather that a critical re-appropriation of it can provide us with insightful new 
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 I am grateful to Yonathan Reshef and Nimrod Kovner for this example.  
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analytical tools. This is especially so when civil disobedience is conceptualized drawing 
on deliberative and agonistic theories with their emphasis on democratic participation.  
 
Transnational civil dis/obedience 
The twin concepts of civil disobedience and conscientious objections have been the 
subject of considerable debate in political theory (compare for example Rawls, 1971, 
pp.363-393; Arendt, 1972; Dworkin, 1985, pp.104-117; Smith, 2004; Brownlee, 2004; 
Thomassen, 2007). Though views differ with regards to their precise interpretation, they 
describe and give meaning to acts within a political system which are conscientious but 
non-compliant. Henry David Thoreau ([1849] 1991), who is usually associated with the 
emergence of the term civil disobedience,
65
 refused to pay taxes to a government that 
tolerated slave-ownership and waged a war of conquest against Mexico.
66
 In the 1960s, 
US civil rights activists openly disobeyed laws of racial segregation, they found unjust. 
Today’s Greenpeace activists often violate private property to protest against corporate 
environmental hazards which in their view are indefensible.  
 
In a recent study Luis Cabrera (2010, pp.131-153) has applied the concept of civil 
disobedience to irregular migration and cross-border movement. He argues, drawing on 
in-depth ethnographic research, that migrants who cross the US-Mexican frontier 
illegally in search of a better life for themselves and their families can be seen as 
performing acts of civil disobedience or ‘conscientious evasion’ (cf. Rawls, 1971). They 
refuse to submit to an unjust global order where place of birth greatly affects (non-
)access to the most basic goods and freedoms (see also Mezzadra, 2004). Cabrera 
suggests that their practice appeals to an ‘emerging global normative structure’ of 
human rights. Irregular migrants ‘are acting in some ways as though there were in place 
the sort of fully integrated global institutional structure’ of citizenship which 
cosmopolitans often hope to promote (Cabrera, 2010, p.146).   
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 As Leigh Jenco (2003, p.358, n.6) points out, this is somewhat misleading; Thoreau’s essay was 
originally titled ‘Resistance to Civil Government’ but was posthumously renamed ‘Civil Disobedience’.   
66
 Ironically there is much debate about whether Thoreau’s action really qualifies as civil disobedience or 
is better described as conscientious objection (see Rawls, 1971; Arendt, 1972; versus Rosenblum, 1987; 
Jenco, 2003).  
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For my purposes, what makes this argument particularly interesting is how Cabrera 
critically reinterprets and extends a concept of civil disobedience that is otherwise 
typically used within the bounded political community of the state (see also Smith, 
2004, and Isiksel, 2010). His argument helps us to see that if we accept the view that 
injustice transcends political boundaries or is even built into the current international 
system, unwarranted crossing of borders may be legitimate as a protest or remedial act. 
An objection to this use of the concept might be that civil disobedience, as a civil and 
political act, must address a political community of fellow citizens (cf. Rawls, 1971; 
Arendt, 1972) and in that conversation foreigners are by definition outsiders. This view, 
however, fails to properly grasp the character of this kind of activism. Historically, civil 
disobedience has often been employed to question and reinterpret the boundaries of 
membership - by for example the suffragettes and the US Civil Rights Movement (see 
for example King, 1991).  
 
While Cabrera’s argument denationalizes conceptions of civil disobedience by alerting 
us to the spread of cosmopolitan moral norms, it does not fully take account of the 
‘disorder’ of legal pluralism especially in the EU.67 The development of complex 
transnational regimes like the European Union changes the relationship between 
obedience and disobedience. New modes of action emerge which are neither simply one 
nor the other. It is to capture such practices that I propose the term dis/obedience. This 
re-appropriation (Butler, 1995) changes the meaning of the concept and the action it 
designates. Acts of civil disobedience are ‘suspended between legality and legitimacy’ 
as Habermas (quoted in Thomassen, 2007, p.203) puts it. A law is broken when and 
because it is considered unjustified.
68
 By contrast, acts of dis/obedience are suspended 
between different orders of legality and legitimacy. This makes it possible for an action 
to be non-compliant without being illegal. The lawfulness and morality of supranational 
legislation can be employed by citizens and some categories of migrants to challenge 
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 Though Cabrera’s civil disobedience argument focuses on the US-Mexican context, he does offer a 
comparison with the EU which includes insightful accounts of migration into and within Europe. But his 
analysis overlooks the significant interplay between internal and international mobility enabled by EU’s 
legal pluralism (Cabrera, 2010, pp. 181-201). 
68
 Please note that while the specific law that is broken may be the one which is deemed illegitimate, it 
need not be so (Rawls, 1971, pp.364-365). Sometimes it is more convenient or appropriate to violate 
another set of rules, for example private property rights, to protest against inadequate environmental 
regulation. 
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national law and the power of the state. To see how let us turn to the story of Martha 
and Guillermo. 
 
In the interview Martha explains how she went to Guatemala to work as a volunteer in 
an orphanage after finishing high school. This is where she met Guillermo, a young 
local co-worker. The two started dating just as Martha was about to leave. She went 
home briefly and then returned to Guatemala. The relationship became serious and they 
decided that Guillermo should come to Denmark. When he was first visiting her they 
applied for a student permit but were unsuccessful. Martha knew that since she was 
under 24 they would not be able to get family unification via Danish law. Still, she 
hoped they might find a way.  
 
But then parliament began debating the new skill-based point-system for family 
unification. For couples, where one of the parties was under 24, the number of points 
required was very high. Guillermo had little formal education and thus poor chances of 
qualifying. Martha therefore decided that they should go to Sweden, stay there for a 
short while and then use EU law to return to Denmark. She found a job in Copenhagen 
to provide for them and they moved across the border. At the time of the interview they 
had lived three months in Sweden and were planning to apply soon for a residence 
permit in Denmark.
69
  
 
As Martha points out in our conversation, she and Guillermo are not breaking any laws 
by their action. On the contrary, she is simply using her right as a citizen of the 
European Union. Freedom of movement is a key feature of EU citizenship (Citizenship 
Directive, 2004). It is central to EU’s internal market and the peaceful interaction 
among Europeans. By availing themselves of these rights Martha and Guillermo 
indirectly helped bring to life the supranational legal order on which union citizenship is 
based. From the perspective of the EU they are thus ideal citizens and their act of 
leaving could be described as civil ‘obedience’.  
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 In a later email correspondence Martha informed me that she and Guillermo did return to Denmark 
shortly after the interview and Guillermo was granted a residence permit as the spouse of an EU citizen. 
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But with regards to Denmark their action looks rather different. A central aim of the 
2002-reform was to reduce immigration. By returning Martha and Guillermo would 
activate EU regulation to counter this objective. It might be argued that Danish law 
never really aimed to keep out couples such as Martha and Guillermo. The official 
remarks on the law focus on resident immigrants and descendants. It is their 
transnational marriages which are constructed as problematic. Ethnic majority citizens 
like Martha, though affected by the law, are not referred to at all (Ministry of Refugee, 
Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2002). Moreover, Guillermo is a Christian from a 
region, Central America, which is seldom mentioned, let alone vilified, in Danish 
popular debates over immigration.  
 
Even if we grant this, the 2011-reform and its emphasis on economic utility alters the 
picture markedly. According to the law’s extensive scoring system Guillermo, with his 
limited formal education, is clearly an unwanted immigrant (Ministry of Refugee, 
Immigration and Integration Affairs 2011b, pp.30-36). By entering Denmark he and 
Martha are thus acting against the explicit intention of Denmark’s family unification 
rules. Hence, from the perspective of Danish national legislation this is an instance of 
non-compliance even though it is not unlawful. A contra-factual perspective can 
illustrate the argument: If it was not for the presence of EU law, which Denmark qua its 
union membership is obliged to respect, then Martha and Guillermo’s return would have 
been illegal.
70
 That this cross-border strategy is indeed undesired by Danish officials is 
illustrated by the tactics employed by the administration to prevent its use and the 
depiction of the EU route in public debate as a ‘loophole’ in the law, as discussed in 
chapter four.  
 
Through their conjoined practice of exit and re-entry Martha and Guillermo therefore 
act simultaneously as obedient and disobedient citizens. Their performance is 
transgressive with regards to Danish law but affirmative with respect to EU regulation. 
Theirs is an act of dis/obedience. 
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 Thanks to Christian List for pointing this out. 
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But is it also civil? Analyzing Martha’s story further I hope to show how it follows the 
wider grammar of civil disobedience. Through a close textual analysis I draw out the 
conscientiousness, necessity and public character of their performance. These are core 
criteria for civil disobedience on which there is wide consensus in the literature 
although opinions vary about their precise interpretation, as we shall below.
71
 On this 
basis I argue that a civil dis/obedience concept enables us to address key statist 
objections to EU citizenship and free movement and distinguish civic from non-civic 
practices of border crossing.  
 
Conscientiousness 
In the classical tradition of civil disobedience it is underlined that non-compliant acts 
must also be conscientious. To separate them from ordinary crime a civic ethos is 
required (Rawls, 1971, pp.363-365; King, 1991; Thoreau, 1991). John Rawls (1971, 
p.365) in his liberal theory of civil disobedience argues that such acts must be ‘guided 
by and justified by political principles, that is, by the principles of justice which regulate 
the constitution and social institutions generally’. He contends that especially violations 
of basic liberties can justify non-compliance while socio-economic inequality is a more 
problematic contender as it is subject to considerable disagreement (pp. 371-373). 
Others take a broader view. Cabrera (2010, pp. 143-146), for example, in his argument 
about irregular migration presents drastically skewed distributions of material wealth or 
the absence of a basic standard of living as a defensible motivation for acts of civil 
disobedience. William Smith (2004) in a deliberative democratic account argues that 
distorted public debates where the perspectives of some affected parties are excluded or 
where power differentials are overwhelming likewise justifies civil disobedience. For 
Martha and Guillermo, a reasonable case can be made that basic freedoms, such as the 
right to private and family life, is at stake just as we can point to a skewed, securitized 
public debate. Still, as agonistic democracy reminds us, liberties, entitlements and even 
the discursive rules for debate are not writ in stone. Is US border control an 
infringement of the moral claims of impoverished Central-Americans? Does the 
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 A further criterion often discussed is that disobedient citizens ‘must be willing to face arrest’ (p. 136) to 
draw public attention to their cause and demonstrate ‘fidelity to the law’ (Rawls, 1971, p.366; King, 
1991; Cabrera, 2010, p.136; Habermas, 1985). Yet legal punishment, while perhaps strategically valuable 
at times, is not intrinsic to civil disobedience. Publicity and fidelity can be established by others means 
(Dworkin, 1985, pp.114-116; Smart, 1991, p. 207; Greenawalt, 1991, pp.185-188). 
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protection of family and private life entail a right to family unification? These are moral 
and political questions that are just as contested today as the rights of African-American 
citizens were in the US in the 1960s. Indeed, it is precisely the meaning of basic liberal 
democratic principles that typically are at stake in struggles over civil disobedience 
(Thomassen 2007, p.211, cf. Singer 1991, p.125).  
 
From an agonistic perspective it is therefore important to stress that what counts as civil 
disobedience is itself a political question that cannot be settled in advance. This does 
not, however, mean that anything goes. A powerful articulation of the ethico-political 
principles of liberal democracy is required. Persons who engage in this kind of activism 
must seek to persuade their interlocutors - whether through reasoned arguments, 
passionate rhetoric or imaginative narratives - that they are not acting for trivial or 
narrowly self-interested reasons (Rawls 1971, p.365; Brownlee, 2004; cf. Thomassen, 
2007). This in turn helps us to see why for example a polluting company that uses cross-
border strategies to avoid costs is likely to find it difficult to make a strong normative 
case for civil dis/obedience. Company representatives would have to convince others 
that they are wronged by a request to clean up a mess which may greatly harm innocent 
members of local communities. Unlike the forum shopping framework, a civil 
dis/obedience analysis thus has the potential for helping us to distinguish politically and 
conceptually between different kinds of cross-border action.  
 
How then does Martha justify her and Guillermo’s cross-border dis/obedience? The 
couple, as we have already seen, moved to Sweden primarily because of the Danish 
point-system for family unification. Martha explains that she was very upset when this 
new set of rules was debated in parliament and the public:
 
 
 
M: ...I was angry because they created an atmosphere in Denmark … of ‘we 
can only use those whom we can get something out of’ and ‘they just take 
all our money’. Well, I have lived in a developing country. I know that we 
actually have quite a lot of money, and they don’t take that much money 
after all. I just got so angry because they had to interfere so much in my 
private life. Well, those rules they after all started out as and had to go 
against forced marriages, but isn’t it also wrong to make, what can you say, 
forced-non-marriages? That is, to force people not to be together – isn’t that 
wrong too? … I felt it was like in the old days when the parents had to 
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decide who should get married. Now it was just the politicians who should 
decide who we should marry. (Interview with Martha and Guillermo, 2011, 
p.50)
 
 
 
Martha is challenging the point-system’s utility focus where spouses are admitted or not 
according to their skills. In developing this critique she refers back to one of the 
government’s main objectives when the first restrictive family unification rules were 
introduced - hindering forced marriages. It is a justification which has continued to play 
a key role in public debate, as we have seen, and is emphasized in the new legislation as 
well (Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2011b, p.5). Martha 
accepts this rationale but re-appropriates it ingeniously to criticize the law. Coining the 
term ‘forced non-marriages’ she points-out that the regulation in its current form does 
precisely what it originally aimed to prevent. It forces young adults to act against their 
own free will in a matter essential to their personal freedom. The parental analogy 
Martha constructs conjures up an image of the state as a feudal patriarch who wants to 
use his daughter to obtain beneficial alliances and therefore prevents her from following 
her heart. This contrast between individualistic romantic love and marriages arranged by 
guardians without concern for the young adults’ wishes is central to the law’s 
delineation of legitimate and illegitimate unions. Martha does not question this 
conception of ‘a proper marriage’ (Bonjour and de Hart, 2013). But by playing around 
with it creatively she draws out the ironies of a law that acts in the same interfering 
manner as the parents whose rein it seeks to check.
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Martha’s critique of utility driven migration control is thus closely bound up with her 
commitment to romantic love. This in turn has consequences for the scope of her 
argument. Where a few other informants criticize the presence of migration and border 
control per se and advance cosmopolitan ideals of universal free movement Martha’s 
claims are more constricted. In the interview she thus stresses that she appreciates the 
need to regulate the intake of unqualified labour immigrants. Not only on account of the 
receiving society but also because they often end up in vulnerable positions and poorly 
paid jobs. But she contends that ‘when it is our spouses then it is just something 
different’ (Interview with Martha and Guillermo, 2011, p.51). In clarifying her 
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objection Martha notes that she  ‘certainly [does not] think that love can in anyway be 
about how long an education one has or how fast one is at learning Danish’ (p.52). She 
thus objects not to the principle of skill-based selection as such but to its application in 
the domain of marriage migration. What is considered legitimate in one policy area is 
deemed illegitimate in another as it conflicts with the ideals of romance and autonomy 
which ought, on this view, to govern spousal relations. The result of this invasion of 
market logics into the ‘life world’ (Habermas, 1992, p.112) is an unequal treatment of 
citizens on the basis of whom they choose to marry.  
 
This commitment not just to the freedom but also to the equality of citizens is central to 
Martha’s justification of their cross-border dis/obedience. In her critique of forced-non-
marriages she concedes that the Danish rules do not strictly speaking compel her and 
Guillermo to live apart. Though they are unable to settle in her home country they could 
move to his. This is what the Danish state recommends to couples in their situation 
(Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2002, pp.41-42, 2011b, pp. 
39-42; author interviews). Yet doing so, Martha argues, would prevent her from 
enjoying key social rights which Danish citizens are otherwise guaranteed: 
 
M: My parents … have paid taxes all their lives – well for example in the 
USA parents save up so that their children can study […] but in Denmark 
the parents pay taxes so that the state can pay for their [children’s] 
education, and my parents have done that too. Why then can’t I be allowed 
[to study in Denmark]… I just think it was unfair. (Interview with Martha 
and Guillermo, 2011, p.51) 
 
Martha is pointing out that the intergenerational pact between citizens and the Danish 
welfare state is violated when a citizen is bereft of a right to education which her 
parents’ contribution to society has otherwise entitled her to. She is not arguing that free 
higher education is a basic human right. Nor is she claiming that a citizenship, such as 
the American one, which does not include this entitlement, is of less value. What she 
considers unfair is the unequal treatment of her vis-á-vis other Danish citizens on the 
grounds of her choice of partner. This again is an interesting and ingenuous claim. A 
central justification of the point-system is that the economic contributions and cultural 
adaptation of family migrants are low and thus threaten the social contract of the 
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welfare society (Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2011b, pp.5-
6). Martha’s contestation challenges the consistency of this line of argument. The effort 
to protect the bond between citizens in the welfare state ends up eroding it by unequally 
curtailing social rights.  
 
To sum up, Martha articulates ideals of liberty and equality by re-appropriating the 
imagery of romantic love, autonomy, and the welfare contract. In doing so, she defends 
a civic right to love across borders against state interference and encroachments of 
market-logics. Her story clearly illustrates how border crossing can be defended on 
conscientious and political grounds. This does not of course mean that all will be 
persuaded by Martha’s arguments. Civil disobedience is always an appeal to an 
audience that may or may not be persuaded (cf. Brownlee, 2004). The point is merely 
that evocative and reasonable arguments and storylines are made which are likely to 
meet with some agreement as well as contestation.  
 
Publicity 
Still, more is required for an act to be civil. Cabrera (2010, p.134), following Rawls’ 
(1971, p.364) concept of civil disobedience, notes that it requires publicity. The 
rationale is simple: The political potential of secret acts is negligible since few will 
know that the law is actually being challenged. The hoped for transformations in 
regulation and public opinion cannot then come about and no protest is enacted (King, 
1991; Rawls, 1971; Arendt, 1972). Again, views differ as to the precise form this 
publicity should take. Deliberative democrats stress the articulation and exchange of 
arguments (Smith, 2004; Brownlee, 2004). Hannah Arendt (1972), offering an 
interpretation more in line with agonism, stresses the need for collective action. For her, 
civil disobedience to be civil rather than private must be a concerted act where 
individuals come together to re-enact public spaces challenging existing boundaries. 
Irrespective of the character of public manifestations some caveats are required, though. 
Take the example of individuals and organizations that aid and hide rejected asylum 
seekers. These civic actors often act for conscientious reasons in a commitment to the 
ethico-political principles of liberty and equality. They can voice their critique of 
restrictive asylum practices and organize demonstrations, but must be careful to avoid 
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disclosing the identity and whereabouts of the refugees they help (cf. Greenawalt, 1991, 
pp.185-186).  
 
Returning to Cabrera’s analysis, he points out that clandestine Mexican immigrants 
cross the US border in secret. Yet, as he notes, the massive presence of irregular 
workers in various sectors of North American society makes it hard to ignore the 
phenomenon. In addition, large demonstrations by migrants have ensured publicity 
(Cabrera, 2010, p.135). Much the same can be said about Danish-international couples 
moving between Denmark and Sweden. The actual act of moving is usually done in 
private by individual families, although as we have seen often facilitated and promoted 
by Marriage without Borders. At the same time, many couples have drawn attention to 
the effects of the rules and the plights of marriage migrants by taking part in public 
debate, talking to reporters or academic researchers, participating in demonstrations and 
civil society organizations, or petitioning politicians. During our conversation I ask 
Martha and Guillermo if they too have considered contacting the press with their story. 
Martha explains that they were interviewed to a Danish newspaper before leaving for 
Sweden: 
 
M: [I]t was at the time when they changed the rul[es] ... there was this big 
debate this autumn about the point-system and all that. And I simply got so 
angry and so it’s difficult ... you get so angry and it’s so difficult. One has to 
get it out somehow and then I actually think it’s a good opportunity if you 
get the press to do it. If you just sit and are angry in your own little room 
then you don’t change anything. (Interview with Martha and Guillermo, 
2011, p.50) 
 
For Martha, like for many of my other informants as we saw in previous chapters, voice 
whether in the media or as research participants is about expressing their distress and 
contributing to political change. Telling their story to outsiders is a way of handling 
frustration that otherwise threatens to overwhelm and depress as well as a strategy for 
bringing public focus on experienced inequities in need of redress. In the newspaper 
interviews Martha and Guillermo also underline that they intend to use EU rules 
because the restrictive and in their view unduly interfering Danish rules do not allow 
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them to live together in Denmark.
73
 Attention is thus drawn not just to problems of the 
law but also to the couple’s border crossing counter-strategy. That in turn might inspire 
others to use the opportunities for legally sidestepping and contesting national 
regulation. This again underlines that exit need not undermine but can sometimes 
generate voice within and across borders. This challenges the statist and nationalist 
worry that public democratic participation is threatened by strategies of cross-border 
movement. All in all, Martha and Guillermo’s actions thus fully meet the publicity 
condition.  
 
Necessity 
Finally, justifying non-compliance typically involves an argument about the necessity of 
the action: The law had to be transgressed in order to prevent a serious wrong and no 
other adequate remedy was available (Cabrera, 2001, p.143; Rawls, 1971, pp.371-373; 
cf. Habermas, 1996, pp.382-384). Again, though, it is important to emphasize, in 
agonistic fashion, the contestability and political character of such claims (Thomassen, 
2007, p.16). In the early sixties, many criticized Martin Luther King and his fellow 
activists for impatience and for not pursuing their cause in the legal system (Cabrera, 
2010, p. 144; King, 1991). It is only in hindsight that the righteousness and urgency of 
the civil rights movement appears to us so entirely beyond dispute. This is worth 
bearing in mind when assessing contemporary cases (Singer, 1991, p.128). Necessity 
arguments should therefore be read as ‘performative speech acts’ (Austin, 1976; cf. 
Thomassen, 2007). They do not describe an already given situation which can be 
assessed outside of political struggle but rather seek to create that reality retroactively 
(cf. Honig, 1991) by appealing to the imagination, principles, and sensibilities of fellow 
citizens. 
 
So let us examine if and how Martha narrates the necessity of their cross-border 
dis/obedience. Below, she defends their chosen strategy explaining why they plan to use 
EU law to return to Denmark rather than moving to Guatemala or settling more 
permanently in Sweden: 
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M: I see it a bit like a duty in a way. Sometimes I want to stay in Sweden 
because it’s too much trouble and that sort of thing, but then after all I think 
that we have to. I think it’s really unjust the way the rules are in Denmark 
and we have to fight for it. We can’t just sit still and let it harm us. We have 
to fight for us. So I see it as a duty to fight for it. And I think that if all the 
couples like us disappear in Sweden or [Guatemala] then there is never 
anyone who sees us and then there is never anyone who discovers that we 
exist and then we can just continue to have these rules. So I think we need to 
make ourselves noticed, and we need to get into Denmark again to get to 
know people and to change their ways of thinking and their minds. 
(Interview with Martha and Guillermo, 2011, pp.48-49)  
 
 
This is a necessity argument. It describes the Danish rules as unjust and therefore 
representing a serious harm. Alternative actions, such as moving elsewhere, are 
dismissed as ineffectual because they help to uphold rather than change the 
unacceptable status quo.
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In analyzing this statement we can note interesting similarities and differences 
compared with Cabrera’s (2010, pp.143-146) analysis. He argues that many irregular 
migrants from Central America are justified in violating the immigration laws of the 
USA as this is often their best if not only way to avoid poverty and hopelessness. The 
stakes for Danish-international couples are rather different. Their basic livelihood is 
typically not in danger but their ability to live together in Europe is. Safeguarding their 
family life is central to all my informants. But in addition a few like Martha also express 
a strong commitment to wider change when defending their border crossing. It is to alter 
perceptions and policy by making themselves seen and heard that Martha insists on their 
returning. This is an argument about preventing harm to all citizens, present and future, 
who are unable to live with the partner they love in Denmark. It suggests that statist and 
nationalists sceptics are too hasty in their account of cross-border movement as a threat 
to civic solidarity.  
 
Such agendas for political transformation as articulated here are typical of iconic 
exemplars of civil disobedience like the civil rights movement. Indeed, some 
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commentators insist that only this kind of action falls within the remit of the concept 
(Rawls, 1971, pp.363-371; Bedau, 1991, pp.6-7; Habermas, 1985, pp.102-106; but see 
Dworkin, 1985, pp.106-107). That in turn underlines how closely Martha and 
Guillermo’s action follows the grammar of civil disobedience in this respect. This does 
not mean that their argument is not open to debate. Liberal nationalists might dispute 
whether preventing family unification really amounts to a serious harm (Miller, 2005, 
p.196), while cosmopolitans could critique the emphasis on the rights of citizens over 
immigrants or family members over refugees (Honohan, 2009; Gibney, 2005). These 
potential objections do not subtract from the civic character of Martha and Guillermo’s 
action but merely underlines the contentiousness and contestability of any necessity 
claim. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have developed and defended a concept of ‘transnational civil 
dis/obedience’. It designates conscientious acts of border crossing undertaken in order 
to circumvent and contest domestic rules by mobilizing international or supranational 
law. These acts are legal yet non-compliant, disobedient yet obedient, civic and 
contestatory. In the analysis I re-appropriated the concept of civil disobedience adapting 
it to a context of complex jurisdictions with overlapping, competing and supplementary 
regulation. Here acts of dis/obedience become possible which are suspended less 
between legality and legitimacy than between different orders of legality and 
legitimacy.  
 
I argued that, while legal under EU rules, Martha and Guillermo’s strategies of exit and 
re-entry challenged Danish family unification law. Their undertaking was non-
compliant making them disobedient national citizens. At the same time their actions 
indirectly brought to life a European area of free movement in accordance with the 
objective of EU-integration. Hence from the perspective of the EU they were ideal, 
obedient citizens. The analysis showed, moreover, how Martha presented their actions 
as conscientious and political. Moving to Sweden and back again she and Guillermo 
contested rules that, in her view, violated the civil right to privacy and family life. 
Border crossing was articulated as necessary both in order to re-claim these freedoms 
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for themselves and to help change policy and perceptions in Denmark. In addition, the 
couple had helped to draw public attention to the effects of Danish family unification 
rules. In this way their actions met the criteria of conscientiousness, necessity, and 
publicity of civil disobedience.  
 
The concept of transnational civil dis/obedience has a broader relevance within and 
beyond the EU, particularly in the area of family life and reproductive rights. As 
discussed with regards to Israel, mutual recognition of marriage in international law 
enables couples to sidestep mandatory religious ceremonies and in that way perform a 
kind of conscientious objection across territorial boundaries. Transnational civil 
dis/obedience also holds potential for analyzing the well-established journeys from 
Ireland, where abortion is illegal, to the United Kingdom, where it is not. It likewise 
offers insights into current struggles within the US where gay couples attempt to evade 
and contest hetero-normative marriage regulation by moving from conservative to 
liberal states. 
 
The analytical lens of transnational civil dis/obedience helps us to critically appreciate 
such practices of territorial border crossing that are made possible by but also enact 
complex and overlapping constitutional orders. It enables us to address key criticisms 
from statist or nationalist perspectives which see tactical cross-border movement, 
particularly in the EU, as thin, private, market-based and instrumental. Against this 
view, the concept defended here draws attention to the ethico-political character of 
some forms of mobility. Developed drawing on agonistic, deliberative and cosmopolitan 
theories it offers criteria for distinguishing civic from non-civic practices.  Strategic use 
of cross-border movement is called for and legitimate when basic freedoms are at stake 
and other remedies are not available or effective. Publicity is usually required if such 
practices are to hold a wider transformative potential but secret acts carried out for 
ethico-political reasons may still qualify as conscientious objection.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
 
I began this thesis with three short vignettes of marriage migration and contentious 
cross-border movement in the European Union. Grace and Jonas, Cecilie, Helene and 
Jasper have all been deeply affected by Denmark’s restrictive family unification laws. 
Engaging in public debate, organized activism and EU-mobility they have taken part in 
the politics of membership. Throughout the chapters the narratives of many other 
transnational couples, singles and families have been re-presented and woven together; 
Derek who had to leave for Sweden with his wife and son when he got fired; Laura who 
lost her civic loyalty to Denmark; Charlotte whose anger made her join Marriage 
without Borders; Jamil and Martha who were so keen to come back and make a 
difference. In this last concluding chapter I take a step back to find out what this 
collection of stories tell us about membership and migration in today’s Europe. How is 
citizenship practiced, lost and reinvented in the dispute? To what extent, if at all, do the 
findings enable us to go beyond the binary of thick nationalism and thin 
postnationalism? What are the strengths and weaknesses of agonistic and deliberative 
democracy for grasping and conceptualizing these acts of border crossing and what 
insights, if any, does the case study hold for the theories themselves?  
 
The chapter begins by summarizing the empirical findings. It then discusses what this 
study contributes to the debate over migration and membership in Europe, before 
assessing what insights it offers for agonistic and deliberative theories of democracy. I 
end by setting out a dynamic agonistic model of citizenship across borders.  
 
Cross-border movement in the Danish family unification dispute 
In the thesis I have examined the significance of novel and inventive as well as classical 
strategies of voice, exit, entry and re-entry in the Danish family unification dispute. By 
crossing an internal border in the European Union Danish citizens and their foreign 
partners mobilize supranational law and enact EU citizenship. For European nationals 
who are capable of supporting themselves and their families this gives access to family 
unification and hence a protection of private and family life within the Union that they 
are denied in Danish national law. Exit, entry and re-entry are thus strategies for 
169 
 
practicing a kind of citizenship beyond the nation-state. But what is the character of this 
citizenship? Is cross-border movement in the European Union merely a way to claim 
rights, reflecting a thin, juridical citizenship status, as republican nationalists and liberal 
postnationalists argue? Or can it also contribute to – or even constitute - practices of 
democratic engagement? This is what I have discussed in the previous chapters. 
 
On the basis of 30 narrative and semi-structured interviews with Danish citizens and/or 
their foreign spouses, supplemented by existing studies, I explored how this cross-
border movement was experienced and articulated. Some described this practice 
primarily as a way of obtaining the right to lead a normal family life. Many expressed 
anger and frustration over their involuntary exile from Denmark. Several informants 
told how they had felt ‘kicked out of Denmark’. This in turn had damaged their sense of 
loyalty and attachment to that country. Some interviewees recounted how they had 
come to identify with Sweden where they had been welcomed. Or they expressed 
gratitude towards the EU for protecting their rights better than their own state had done. 
For these informants exit-entry was a way of creating a new citizenship often in 
opposition to Denmark.  
 
Many informants recounted how border crossing prompted and enabled them to take 
part in public debate and collective action and in that way practice citizenship. The 
prospect of involuntary exit led some to voice their critique in the media. For others, the 
relative stability provided by exile, once the initial challenges of resettling were over, 
facilitated their participation in public debate and/or organized civil society activism. 
For still others, exit followed by re-entry generated and enabled their civic engagement. 
Cross-border movement not merely supported practices of citizenship, however, but 
also transformed their character. Transnational micro-publics and semi-publics emerged 
where Danish citizens and their foreign spouses could help each other, give and receive 
advice and create bonds of solidarity and friendship.   
 
A smaller group of interviewees went further and presented exit and/or re-entry as a 
protest against a law they found unfair and illegitimate. In their narratives cross-border 
movement became a critical practice of transnational democratic dissent. I identified 
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and conceptualized different modalities drawing on liberalism, deliberative and 
agonistic democracy. We thus encountered stories of liberal anti-politics where exit was 
presented as an act of refusal similar to conscientious objection. This response to state 
interventions in private life was a paradoxically politicized practice of withdrawal 
which sought to renegotiate the boundaries between public and private life. This 
contrasted with articulations of re-entry as a deliberative practice of dialogical 
engagement and an agonistic enactment of protest. Here emphasis was on 
transformative and re-constitutive participation in a political community. Similar 
commitments were manifested in narratives conceptualized as cross-border democratic 
taking and civil dis/obedience. Semi-legal re-entry was articulated as a way of claiming 
a right to participate while EU citizenship was mobilized to contest national regulation 
deemed unjust.  
 
The analysis contributes to our understanding of cross-border movement and what it 
means for citizenship. First, the study confirms what a growing body of literature has 
found – that exit, entry and re-entry in some cases spur and facilitate public voice. In 
that way, migratory movement in conjunction with public debate and collective action 
can be ways of enacting citizenship across borders. Second, the case shows how exit 
and re-entry can constitute politicized acts of protest creating new transnational civic 
actors. Finally, the experience of involuntary exile can lead to loss of loyalty but can 
also generate new forms of civic identification and bonds of solidarity.  
 
Citizenship in Europe: beyond the thick and thin binary 
What does this tell us about citizenship and migration in contemporary Europe – how 
can we move the debate beyond the stalemate of the dichotomy of thick national and 
thin postnational membership?  
 
The analysis has shown that Danish citizens and their foreign spouses use EU rules and 
Swedish national law to practice both thick and thin citizenship across borders. This 
finding presents an important contribution to the wider debate over migration and 
membership in contemporary Europe. Where nationally oriented critics often fear that 
immigration and EU integration threatens a strong, democratic community the case 
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demonstrates that practices of active and critical citizenship need not be confined to the 
terrain of the nation-state. Participatory and affective citizenship can be exercised by 
citizens and migrants crossing borders. At the same time, my informants’ stories also 
illustrate just how valuable even a minimal, rights-based EU citizenship can be for those 
whose private and family life have been very closely regulated by the state.  
 
As a heuristic, theory-developing case study this research project helps us identify and 
conceptualize unexpected empirical patterns. Exploring lived experiences of exit-entry 
in the Danish family unification dispute, it opens up new ways of seeing border crossing 
as a civic practice. Its critical purchase derives from the reappraisal and re-signification 
of transnational mobility it enables. The case, however, cannot tell us how widespread 
such cross-border acts of citizenship are within or beyond the European Union. 
Exploring general trends requires a different research design. Still, there are good 
reasons to expect that similar dynamics are at play elsewhere. To begin with, EU 
citizenship is mobilized to bypass and challenge national family unification rules in 
other European countries such as the Netherlands, United Kingdom and Norway where 
marriage migration is also tightly regulated. Although sociological studies of these 
practices have yet to be conducted, there is considerable case-law from the European 
Court of Justice and legal analysis suggesting that important civic contestation could be 
found (ECJ, 2002, 2003, 2007, 2008; Kostakopoulou, 2007). We also know from the 
present inquiry that organizations similar to the Danish NGO Marriage without Borders 
exist in other countries (see also Block, 2012) and that they cooperate transnationally.  
 
EU mobility is also of course about other forms of migration. The most extensive 
internal cross-border movement in recent years is the East-West labour migration that 
has followed the successive expansion of the Union in the past decade. The political and 
economic context for this post-Cold-War emigration is very different from the 
controversies of transnational immigration and the politics of intimacy in North-
Western Europe. Comparisons and conceptual analogies should thus be carried out with 
considerable caution. Existing research suggest that finding civic practices of mobility 
in this area is less likely (Hughes, 2005; Woolfson, 2010). Still, one study of 
prospective Bulgarian elite emigrants shows that ethico-political considerations do play 
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a role alongside instrumental interests (Ådnanes, 2004), while case research on Polish 
labour migration present evidence of some participation in public debate and civil 
society networks across borders (Galasinska, 2010; Meardi, 2007). If we turn to the area 
of irregular migration into Europe and the US there are likewise studies which resonate 
with the empirical findings of the thesis. In the US-Mexican border region, for example, 
organized solidarity work takes place supporting migrants on their dangerous cross-
border journeys (Cabrera, 2010; Doty, 2006). Again, though, it is important to pay heed 
to contextual differences, especially as we move beyond the European Union and its 
complex terrain of national, international and supranational law. While EU citizens have 
a right to move across borders and can claim support from national bureaucracies and 
supranational courts, irregular migrants can only seldom invoke the protection of 
international law and their struggle with state sovereignty is profoundly unequal and 
precarious.  
 
While more research is clearly called for there are thus grounds for believing that the 
empirical findings and conceptual arguments have a wider relevance. Having said this, 
it is important to stress that not all border crossing practices are civic. Even within the 
EU, where mobility is formally an enactment of supranational citizenship, not all such 
acts reflect or manifest a participatory democratic membership. The thesis precisely 
seeks to develop conceptual frames such as civil dis/obedience for distinguishing 
between different kinds of exit, entry and re-entry. Here Honig’s gothic agonism is 
particularly helpful in that it draws attention to the gray areas, multiple motives and 
open-endedness of civic action both within and beyond the nation-state.  
 
Insights for agonistic and deliberative democracy 
What are the theoretical implications of the case study for the two theories? I have 
argued that the civic potential of cross-border movement has been overlooked or given 
insufficient attention in agonistic and deliberative democracy because this kind of action 
often appears silent and private owing to the hold state-centric conceptions of 
membership still have on us. But as we have seen, this classical view of exit, entry and 
re-entry is in need of correction. When we appreciate that acts of border crossing can 
generate, facilitate and transform organized action and public debate and reconstitute 
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civic actors then there is no immediate barrier for incorporating such practices within 
these theories of democracy. The analysis shows that both deliberative and agonistic 
democracy offer analytical resources for reinterpreting cross-border movement. This, 
however, required a critical engagement with the theories where concepts such as 
democratic taking were re-appropriated.  
 
I began the thesis with the assumption that both agonistic and deliberative theories of 
democracy have important insights to contribute to the rethinking of migration and 
membership but that agonism holds greater purchase for a thoroughly dynamic re-
conceptualization. On balance, this contention found support in the case study. 
 
Deliberative democracy drew attention to the exchange of reasons in the public sphere 
and I did find evidence of such practices which were prompted by exit. This theory also 
offered a helpful interpretive lens for understanding narratives that defended cross-
border movement as a strategy for civic dialogue. Finally, deliberative democratic 
theorization of civil disobedience proved helpful for the development of a concept of 
transnational dis/obedience. However, the analysis also identified a very marked gap 
between the normative ideals of deliberation and the actual conditions of debate as 
experienced by my informants. When even resourceful and in many ways privileged 
citizens find it difficult to articulate their views and have their perspectives given due 
considerations by responsible politicians it is difficult to see how those learning 
processes are to take place which deliberative democrats place so great faith in.  
 
Agonism also proved to be a very illuminative interpretive frame. I identified agonistic 
mobilization prompted and enabled by cross-border movement. For key informants, 
passion, anger and identification played an important role for their engagement in 
collective action. Partisan transnational micro-publics and semi-publics were created. 
Furthermore, agonistic democracy provided conceptual resources for capturing the 
enactment of protest and the taking of rights through cross-border movement. It 
highlighted the importance of contestation and imaginative re-appropriation rather than 
reasoned argument in civil disobedience and dis/obedience as illustrated by Martha’s 
story. Finally, emphasis on the open-endedness and gothic character of civic action 
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proved very useful in analyzing my informants’ complex narratives, strategies and 
justifications. This aspect in particular helped challenge the dichotomy between thick 
and thin civic action. It draws out how even heroic civic practices contain elements of 
pragmatism, while seemingly instrumental strategies often also reflected ethical 
principles or existential belonging. 
 
But neither agonism nor deliberative democracy or a combination of the two theories 
could encompass all civic practices reflected in the collection of narratives. The 
articulation of exit as a strategy of conscientious objection was better captured by a 
liberal framework of anti-politics. This limitation serves to remind us of the complexity 
of social and political action which is likely to exceed the confines of any theoretical 
perspective. It also demonstrates that deliberative democracy and agonism continue to 
offer distinct conceptual frameworks directing our attention to some aspects of the 
social world rather than others. Incorporating border crossing have not turned these 
theories into analytically irrelevant catch-all frameworks or undermined their identity 
and integrity as specific lenses of interpretation.  
  
Still, it necessary to consider how radical a rethinking of the theoretical perspectives is 
entailed by the inclusion of cross-border movement. Is it simply a question of adding 
exit-entry as a new form of civic action or should we revisit key conceptual 
assumptions? Deliberative democracy is greatly concerned with the promotion of 
transnational or postnational publics both within Europe and elsewhere (Habermas, 
2001b; Oddvar Eriksen, 2005; Dryzek, 2005). Here it is important to grasp cross-border 
movement as an integral part in their emergence. In her recent work, Benhabib (2011) 
has taken a first step towards doing so, but a deeper understanding of and engagement 
with the dynamics of voice, exit, entry and re-entry is called for. In so far as border 
crossing is merely conceived as an enabling (or constraining) condition for debate this 
leaves the theory’s constitutive commitment to voice intact. If some modalities of cross-
border movement should also be seen as symbolic acts of protest this would require a 
more fundamental reconsideration of the theory. Whether or not this is possible or 
desirable is an interesting question which further deliberative democratic scholarship 
could take up.  
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For agonistic democracy, we can note that border crossing can in fact be an organized 
activity of claiming rights. In this respect it tallies well with existing views of what 
constitutes practices of citizenship within that theory. Likewise, when we explore 
individual narratives of border crossing we see that these contribute in different ways to 
collective acts of solidarity and contestation. But I also analyzed articulations of cross-
border action as civic protest and dis/obedience which, although taking place within a 
context of organized activism were not reducible to these collective acts. One response 
would be to exclude such action, deeming it to fall outside the remit of agonistic 
democracy. Another option is to take this as an invitation to interrogate critically the 
relationship between individual and collective engagement and how best to make sense 
of it from an agonistic perspective.  
 
Although agonistic democracy rests on a strong commitment to concerted action and 
social movements we also find other configurations and undercurrents in this school of 
thought. It comes out, for example, when we note the centrality of a range of iconic 
characters in Honig’s writing. Her work is replete with individual ‘exemplars’ 
populating our public mythologies (Finlayson, 2013; Honig, 2009b). In Democracy and 
the foreigner insightful and detailed analyses are given of the biblical figures of Moses 
and Ruth. Both, albeit in different ways, are what Honig terms ‘foreign founders’. 
Outsiders, immigrants who in spite of - or rather because of - their alienness are credited 
with the founding or re-founding of a political community. Moses, to be sure, is a leader 
of a large-scale movement (in more than one sense) but Ruth is presented to us as a 
rather more solitary figure. Much the same can be said of another of Honig’s exemplars, 
Antigone, the Greek princess who violates the law of the polity in order to bury her 
dead brother in Sophocles’ classical play (Honig, 2009a). Indeed, while Honig does, in 
Emergency politics discuss one social movement – the Slow Food movement – her 
exemplars are otherwise all extraordinary individuals. This suggests that there is 
something about individual subjectivity and agency that animates Honig’s work despite 
her insistence on the collective character of democratic political action. From the 
perspective of citizenship as a lived practice this seems to me to be very valuable and 
worth exploring further.  
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Honig’s use of exemplars, reflecting her indebtedness to Nietzsche and Arendt, holds 
potential for a reinterpretation of civic action. Iconic acts and actors ‘“manifesting 
another way” are always singular, yet in their singularity they facilitate the glimpsing of 
a universal, another way of doing things.’ (Norval 2007, p. 190) That is to say, though 
individual action is situated and particular, it often projects an image of a different way 
of living together which would transform the lives of others as well. Exemplary 
individuals are persons whose unusual, courageous or compassionate actions we admire 
and may seek to follow so as to improve ourselves and the world we inhabit. But if this 
was just a form of hero worship the democratic quality of exemplars would be doubtful. 
We would be conceding our independent judgement to an authoritative figure and 
merely seeking to repeat somebody else’s project. This is not the aim of Honig’s 
narrative reconstructions. It is in the ability to ‘disclose new vistas’ (Ferrera, 2008, p.3) 
and stimulate the cultivation of a critical and self-critical ethos that stories of iconic 
characters have their merit (Norval, 2007, pp.193-194; Finlayson, 2013).  
 
On an agonistic reading exemplars are not simply out there. Rather, ‘the exemplar [has] 
to be constituted as an exemplar’ (Norval, 2007, p.196) in and through political 
struggle. Thus, when Honig appropriates and retells the stories of figures like Ruth and 
Antigone she is making a normatively invested intervention in an interpretive field 
(Finlayson, 2013). She does so in order to nurture our sensibilities and project her vision 
of an ‘agonistic cosmopolitics’ (Honig, 2009b, p.129) which might inspire others to acts 
in new ways. The collection of stories analyzed here offers rich material for exemplary 
thinking. The narratives of Jamil and Martha, for instance, may be interpreted as 
exemplars reflecting a dialect relationship between individual and collective action. 
Individual exemplary action can be promoted by social movements or organizations like 
Marriage without Borders in an attempt to influence the political agenda, appeal to the 
passion and compassion of co-citizens and mobilize support. It can also inspire to 
collective action and the formation of political movements. Whether or not this happens 
is never given in advance. This is re-conceptualization that still holds on to the 
importance of concerted action. Without this the theory would hardly be recognizable 
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and would lose important critical edge. But more space is given to certain kinds of 
individual acts of citizenship within the construction of social movements.  
 
A dynamic conception of citizenship across border 
Throughout this thesis I have sought to develop and defend a dynamic conception of 
citizenship drawing on especially agonistic democracy that can incorporate cross-border 
movement as a civic practice. Building on my empirical findings and theoretical 
arguments I set out such a concept in this last section. In chapter three I presented a 
general analytical model of dynamic citizenship. Figure 4 below depicts the revised 
agonistic conception which I have developed here where exit, entry and re-entry are 
included as practices of citizenship: 
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Figure 4 
An agonistic model of citizenship across borders 
 
Notes: Own rendering 
 
In this model cross-border movement and collective action are modes of practicing 
citizenship. The arrows between the two symbolize their interrelation: border crossing 
can be facilitated and prompted by collective action, but can also reversely inspire to 
organization. Exit, entry and re-entry can be strategies for claiming rights in 
commitment to the always contested ideals of liberty and equality; participating in 
passionate contestation and creating, losing or reimagining civic identification. A 
similar figure can be devised for deliberative democracy. 
 
Citizenship practice 
Collective action 
 
Border crossing 
Rights 
Liberty/equality 
Identification 
Passion 
Participation 
Contestation 
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This revised model illustrates the core of the argument I have presented here, but is still 
too simplified. It does not take account of the complex terrain of nested and overlapping 
transnational membership particularly within the EU (Bauböck, 2003). This is 
especially important to consider when we incorporate border crossing. Figure 5 
therefore presents a final version of this model of citizenship: 
 
Figure 5 
An overlapping agonistic model of citizenship across border 
 
Notes: Own rendering 
 
The shaded circles illustrate how a dynamic citizenship is practiced across borders thus 
connecting different political communities. My informants invoke national, 
Citizenship practice 
Collective action 
 
Border crossing 
Rights 
Liberty/equality 
Identification 
Passion 
Participation 
Contestation 
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international and supranational rights in Sweden and Denmark. They participate in 
cross-border collective action and identify as Danes, Cubans, Europeans and 
cosmopolitans. Their narratives show that democratic citizenship is not confined to the 
nation-state and demonstrates how important it is to open up different ways of 
understanding political membership. The revised dynamic conception outlined here 
contributes to this task. It helps us to map out and make sense of the complex juridico-
political spaces and imagined communities that emerge in and through cross-border 
movement. As an agonistic model it does not provide us with a blueprint for 
institutional reform or tell us what rights to distribute to whom. These are questions that 
are part and parcel of the ongoing and open-ended democratic struggle. Rather, what the 
model offers is a critical interpretative lens that enables us to see cross-border 
movement in a different light grasping its affirmative, transgressive and transformative 
character and central role in the making and remaking of democratic life. It provides a 
grammar of transnational citizenship for debating and critically engaging with political 
mobilization and contestations of liberty and equality across borders.   
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APPENDIX I: ON METHODOLOGY 
 
Fieldwork in a border region 
In July 2000 the Øresund bridge opened connecting Denmark and Sweden. It is a 
beautiful 16 kilometres long suspension bridge with a tunnel. The building of it was part 
of a wider strategy of regional integration. Like many border areas, Øresund and the 
land on both sides have a complex history of political contest, economic and cultural 
exchange.  
 
Figure 6 
The bridge of Øresund 
 
Source: Photo by Stern 2002-07, Wikimedia Common, www.wikimedia.org 
 
From the early middle ages until 1658 the region of Scania in Southern Sweden was 
part of the Danish Kingdom. Denmark later tried to win back the lost territory from 
Sweden but without success. During the Second World War when Denmark was 
occupied by Nazi Germany it was over Øresund’s narrow strait of water that Danish 
Jews were ferried to safety in neutral Sweden. After the war, a passport union was 
established between the Nordic countries enabling citizens to travel freely between 
Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland and eventually Iceland and the Faroe Islands. This 
was followed later by a right to take up work in any of these neighbour countries 
(Norden 2012a-b). In 1972 Denmark had joined the European Common Market and in 
1993, albeit with some reservations, the European Union. When the following year 
Sweden also acceded Øresund became an internal EU-border. The rights to free 
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movement which Danes and Swedes already enjoyed through Nordic cooperation were 
now supplemented with the entitlements attached to their EU-citizenship. As 
commuting was eased by the establishment of the bridge, cross-border integration 
gradually increased. Swedes from Scania went to Copenhagen where, prior to the 
financial crisis, jobs were plenty and the options for studying better. Danes meanwhile 
availed themselves of the lower prices of houses in southern Sweden. Yet there were 
also some who moved for rather different reasons, as this thesis has explored (Rytter 
2010a, p.125-126).  
 
In 2002 Denmark’s newly elected centre-right government introduced a comprehensive 
reform of immigration law. It restricted, in particular, access to family unification. This 
legislation marked yet another chapter in the region’s changing politics of boundaries. 
Unintentionally, it came to give renewed significance to the Danish-Swedish border 
through the exit, entry and re-entry practices by transnational couples analyzed in the 
thesis. 
 
A few remarks on my own positionality in this dispute: I am, as a Danish and EU 
citizen, interested in the politics of migration and family unification that has dominated 
Danish politics most of my lifetime. What particularly intrigues and concerns me are the 
interventions of the state and the novel cross-border strategies of evasion and 
contestation developed. As a well-educated, middle-class ethnic majority citizen I have 
a lot in common with many of my informants, but I am not myself in a transnational 
marriage. During my studies and research I have enjoyed the freedom of movement in 
the European Union and experienced changing and multiple attachments to places and 
political communities. Unlike my informants, however, my border-crossing has been 
entirely voluntary and my lived experience of transnational citizenship thus very 
different. This positioning has influenced the research process in various ways. It has 
helped me to establish easy contact and rapport with many interviewees but also made it 
more difficult to gain access to for example ethnic minority communities. With a 
sensitive and politicized issue like family migration, a long term anthropological field 
research might be necessary to obtain contacts and credibility across intensely contested 
ethnic boundaries (cf. Rytter, 2010a)   
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Figure 7 
Map of the Øresund region 
 
Source: www.openstreetmap.org, © OpenStreetMap contributors 
 
In the summer of 2011 I conducted fieldwork in the Øresund border region (see map 
above) where I interviewed Danish citizens and migrant spouses most of whom had 
used the ‘Swedish model’ (Rytter 2010a, 125). In Sweden, interviews took place in the 
cities of Malmö and Landskrona. With its approximately 280,000 inhabitants Malmö is 
the biggest town in the province of Scania. The train ride from Copenhagen across the 
bridge takes about half an hour. This makes it an attractive location for many who have 
jobs and studies in that city which they do not wish to give up. In recent years demands 
for housing in Malmö has increased greatly leading some to look to nearby towns like 
Lund and Landskrona (Rytter 2010a, p. 126). Still, Malmö is or has been the residence 
of most of my informants. It has a charming old town centre with shops, canals, parks, 
and cafés, a vibrant new harbour area, and many pleasant boroughs where people live, 
work and go to school. The town also has a number of rather run down housing estates 
with a high proportion of poor immigrants, refugees, and ethnic minorities among the 
residents. Malmö and neighbouring Lund are university towns offering a range of 
studies. At present, the town is governed by a centre-left coalition. The new anti-
185 
 
immigration party, the Swedish Democrats, is also represented in the city council 
(Malmö Stad, 2013).   
 
Most of my informants who live or have lived in Malmö report liking it. Many say they 
feel welcome and treated with respect by the immigration authorities. A few stress the 
beauty, cleanliness, and quietness of the town. Or they emphasize the greater toleration 
and respect they find here. Some find their Swedish neighbours difficult to get to know 
but admit that this may be due at least in part to their own commuter life which hinders 
their social integration. A few complain about the town being small and provincial. 
Apart from these minor issues, the only substantial problem which some informants 
recount in their relation to Swedish society concerns the job market. Unemployment 
was considerable in Scania also before the global economic downturn. In addition, some 
argue that the Swedish labour market is more regulated and bureaucratic than the 
Danish. Even in low skilled jobs proof of formal qualifications are required making it 
harder for newly arrived immigrants to gain entry.  
 
About half of the interviews I conducted for the research project took part on the Danish 
side of Øresund. Some of my informants had not yet moved to Sweden. A few were 
prevented from doing so altogether as they were unable to meet the self-sufficiency 
requirement in EU-law. Others had moved back to Denmark after a period in Swedish 
exile. In addition, many still had their jobs and studies in Copenhagen though they 
presently lived outside the country and therefore found it convenient to meet here. As 
the capital and largest Danish city Copenhagen is home to many young adults who work 
in public and private sector jobs, undertake college training, or pursue university 
studies. Copenhagen also has a higher number of immigrants and ethnic minorities than 
other parts of the country. Many younger residents live in the borough of Nørrebro, a 
vibrant, culturally, racially and economically mixed part of town. The city also has its 
more segregated neighbourhoods with parts of Østerbro as traditional havens of the 
white and well-to-do and the North West as an area with larger groups of low income 
residents of both ethnic minority and majority background. Politically, Copenhagen has 
been governed by the social-democrats for more than half a century, often in coalition 
with the social-liberals and the leftist parties. Some of my younger informants describe 
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living in Copenhagen as essential to the kind of lifestyle they desire. Comparing it with 
Malmö they see it as bigger, more dynamic and eventful. It is where they have their 
social network. For others, Copenhagen is simply presented as an easier place to find a 
job. A few interviewees associated the city with exclusion and intolerance. Others 
dream of buying a house in the countryside or have a pragmatic view of where to live.  
 
One interview was carried out in a suburb of Copenhagen and another in a provincial 
town south of the capital. I also interviewed a couple in Århus, the second largest city in 
Denmark situated in the western part of the country. Finally, one interview was 
conducted via Skype with a couple residing in Northern Jutland in a North-Western 
region of Denmark. The ‘Swedish model’ (Rytter, 2010a, p.125) is of course 
particularly attractive to citizens who live in the Copenhagen area. Some families from 
southern Jutland have moved to Germany instead. Crossing the Danish-German border 
is also a way of activating EU-citizenship and thereby obtaining easier access to spousal 
unification. The NGO Marriage without Borders
75
 has also had a sub-section in 
Schleswig, a province in Northern Germany. Yet it closed down again after a few years. 
There are obvious reasons why this route is less popular than the move across the bridge 
of Øresund. For one thing, there is no city or large towns on the Danish side of the 
border. This means fewer students and young adults generally and fewer ethnic 
minorities who practice transnational marriages. I therefore chose to focus my fieldwork 
on the Øresund region.  
 
The pilot study 
Before the fieldwork began in earnest I conducted a small pilot-study to try out my 
preliminary interview guide and get a feel of the field. This was done in the spring of 
2011. I interviewed three couples. A young Danish woman and her Turkish boyfriend 
had lived in Malmö for a few years where they both undertook university studies. An 
Australian man and his Danish wife were about to move there with their six months old 
baby. A Danish woman and her Cuban husband had actually obtained family unification 
in Denmark under national rules. They had, however, become worried about the rapidly 
changing legal landscape and were now planning to study a semester in Spain and 
                                                 
75
 Ægteskab uden Grænser, www.aegteskabudengraenser.dk 
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thereby obtain the extended protection available to families of mobile EU-citizens. The 
pilot-interviews were conducted with a topic guide following a narrative style of 
interviewing which will be described further below. This proved to be a useful 
technique. The three couples were all competent story tellers who with a little probing 
narrated their experiences in meaningful sequences around a sort of plot (Riessman 
2008, p.7). In the later stages of the interviews I followed up or introduced themes of 
particular interest for my research. It confirmed my hunch that belonging, citizenship 
and to some extent the EU were topics that resonated with my informants’ experiences 
and which could stimulate interesting reflection. In one interview the narration was 
rather chaotic compared with the orderliness of the others. This did not invalidate the 
interview strategy but illustrated that narratives are constructed in different genres (cf. 
Riessman 2008, p.7). 
 
The pilot-study gave rise to one important adjustment of my research design. Initially, 
the idea had been to interview the Danish part of a transnational couple and not the 
foreign spouse. The partner I presumed to be less interested in the dispute of Danish 
immigration politics and less emotionally involved. It is not, after all, their country that 
prevents them from realizing the family life they desire. Moreover, if you move from 
Australia, Cuba, or Turkey to Scandinavia the socio-political, cultural, and climatic 
changes you experience are bound to be considerable in any case. Consequently, the 
difference between living in Denmark and living Sweden may be of minor import. As it 
turned out, these tacit assumptions had some traction but also notable limitations. In 
general, my Danish informants expressed more frustration and shock, and were also 
often more politically mobilized than their partners. Yet the spouses I interviewed were 
far from unaffected. In fact, two of my three pilot-interviews came about as I was 
contacted by the non-Danish partners who were eager to express their views about the 
Danish rules. In all three interviews, both spouses participated actively in a collaborate 
effort to construct a common account of their experience and the trilateral format 
generated productive conversations. They allowed for in-depth story-telling, as in 
individual interviews, but also prompted joint reflection as in focus groups. As a 
consequence, when subsequently searching for informants I sought to enlist both 
spouses for a joint interview. This was not always possible for practical reasons, for 
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example when the partner had not yet arrived in Scandinavia. Some spouses also did not 
wish to take part. Still, more than half of my interviews are conversations between two 
spouses and me. In a few interviews young children were present, and one conversation 
was carried out with a family rather than a couple. They had moved to Sweden because 
the mother-in-law, who was widow and economically dependent on her son, was unable 
to obtain family unification under Danish law. During the interview she first took care 
of her grandson. Later she was drawn into the conversation by her daughter-in-law and 
contributed her own perspectives and stories. Finally, one interview was carried out 
with two friends who had both married foreign spouses.  
 
During the pilot-study I also contacted a young Danish woman who had previously been 
a leading figure in Marriage without Borders. We met and discussed the project. She 
expressed great interest and helped me establish contact with the organisation and 
obtain their support which proved to be very useful in my search for informants. Apart 
from acting as ‘gatekeeper’ she and her husband were also later interviewed and told 
about their experiences with family migration, border crossing and active citizenship. 
 
In search of story-tellers 
As described in chapter three, in searching for research participants I aimed for diversity 
in socio-cultural and economic positioning, encounters with the law and cross-border 
strategies. To find informants I advertised for couples willing to participate in the 
research project at the homepage of Marriage without Borders. The board of the NGO 
subsequently recommended its members to take part in the project. My advertisement 
was also included in their newsletter and in an e-mail to a network of couples living in 
Sweden (‘the Sweden’s Network’, see chapter five). Most of my informants were 
individuals or couples who contacted me either by e-mail or phone in response to these 
requests for volunteers.  
 
In addition, I also posted the same research ad on the site of a facebook group, Love 
without borders (Kærlighed uden grænser) which had by then just been established. One 
informant contacted me this way. Similar advertisements were posted at departments of 
Malmö University, public libraries and language schools around this city. These settings 
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were chosen as sites that might well be frequented by young Danish citizens residing in 
Malmö and their foreign partners. One or two interviewees responded to these ads.  
 
My research contact at Marriage without Borders put me in contact with several friends 
and acquaintances. This was especially to help me find early movers and divorced 
participants. Finally, there were two informants whom I approached directly after 
having read interviews with them or letters to the editors by them in the Danish press.  
 
My interviewees were thus found through self-selection and strategic selection. This has 
advantages. Participation was clearly voluntary and most informants were eager to take 
part. When, as in this project, contributors are asked to share very personal experiences 
it is especially important that their consent is given freely and on an informed basis. Yet 
self-selection also has limitation, as discussed in chapter three. 
 
A narrative research strategy 
The study is informed by narrative research methodologies which explores how 
meaning is constructed in and through story-telling (Riessman, 2008; Chase, 1995). 
This guides both the interviewing and the subsequent data-analysis. I investigate how 
the experience of border crossing is narrated by my informants. 
 
Narrative interviewing 
There are many different understandings of what a narrative is. Riessman (2008, p. 6) 
distinguishes between ‘the practice of storytelling (the narrative impulse – a universal 
way of knowing and communicating ...); narrative data (the empirical materials, or 
objects for scrutiny); and narrative analysis (the systematic study of narrative data). 
While I find this tri-lateral distinction theoretically insightful ‘narrative data’ seems a 
somewhat technical term for the rich accounts woven in the interviews. In the following 
I use the terms stories and narratives synonymously to refer to both the story-lines my 
informants develop in the interviews and the analytical reconstructions I present in the 
thesis. 
 
190 
 
Narrative research, as discussed in the introduction, is often particularly appropriate for 
studies that explore the meaning of dramatic occurrences. Marriage is an obvious 
contender for a major biographical event. Across a range of different cultural scripts and 
practices it functions as a demarcating event which many orient and interpret their lives 
in relation to. In many societies, matrimony provides the frame for legitimate sexual 
relations and reproduction. Post-traditional norms of cohabitation and single life offer 
different ways of organizing intimacy and childrearing. In Denmark, for example, there 
are presently more single adults than wedded couples (Statistics Denmark, 2013). Even 
so, marriage retains considerable symbolic and material import. This is reflected not 
merely in the excess of bridal gowns, wedding cakes, and honeymoon destinations 
displayed in magazines and reality shows, but also in the struggle by many same-sex 
couples across Europe for the right to marry.  
 
In addition, involuntary exile is clearly an important and disruptive event. Most of my 
Danish informants, as we have seen, are shocked when they realize that they cannot 
bring their partner to Denmark but must move to Sweden to establish the family life 
they desire. It interferes greatly with their plans and dreams. It also more profoundly 
disturbs their trust in the Danish state. Many recount how a sense of security and 
belonging which as citizens they had taken for granted is suddenly in jeopardy. To 
explore my informants’ lived experiences of border crossing and transnational marriage 
a narrative interview technique thus seems particularly well-suited.  
 
While narrative research is a broad church (Chase, 2005; Riessman, 2008) I follow a 
constructivist approach (White, 1980-81; Bruner, 1991). Narratives, on this view, are 
selective and interpretative accounts wherein social occurrences are organized and given 
meaning and subjectivity articulated (Riessman, 1993, pp. 2-4; Chase, 2005, p.656). In 
any story-telling, some ‘events which might have been included … [are] left out’ 
(White, 1980-81, p.10, emphasis removed). Likewise, in the effort to create credible 
plots and characters and distribute credit and blame some discourses are mobilized 
while others are not (Holstein and Gubrium, 1997). My informants, by narrating their 
experiences pick out and weave together a set of happenings such as falling in love, 
moving to Sweden, applying for citizenship, getting divorced, acting politically, raising 
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children, struggling with unemployment. They draw on and sometimes re-appropriate 
cultural repertoires of, for example, romance, migration, patriotism, and human rights. 
In doing so, they narrate themselves as individual persons, couples, families, citizens or 
exiles.  
 
A concern might be that research participants tell stories that present themselves to their 
best advantage, downplaying issues that do not tally with dominant norms and codes of 
behaviour. This problem should not be overstated, however. All ‘identity work’ is about 
interactional positioning where we project and negotiate self-identity in conversation 
with present or imaginary interlocutors (Holstein and Gubrium, 1997; Davies and Harré, 
2001). The aim of the analysis is not retrieve an authentic self but rather to explore how 
subjectivity is constructed situationally by drawing on and rearticulating discourses in 
the social realm (Maynes et al., 2008; Holstein and Gubrium, 1997). Of course, 
researchers can encounter interviewees who are very skilled at crafting heroic public 
selves. This is typical for professional politicians and other media trained persons and is 
thus more of a problem for elite interviewing. By contrast, all my informants, even 
those whose civil society activism has given them some experience with public 
communication, construct complex narratives of vulnerability, agency, pragmatism, 
principles and self-interest.  
 
I also use narrative interviews as a source of information about the strategies of cross-
border movement that have been devised in response to the tightening of Danish family 
unification rules. In this a risk is that the informants leave out important parts of their 
actions for example because they fear repercussions. The guarantee of anonymity 
reduces this problem and the fact that several informants tell about semi-legal or illegal 
tactics suggest that it is not a serious issue.  
 
Telling stories is not necessarily something my interviewees do unprompted. From a 
constructivist perspective it is typically stressed that ‘”the researcher does not find 
narratives but instead participates in their creation”’ (Mishler quotes in Riessman 2008, 
p. 21). As interviewer I sought to encourage, facilitate, and actively listen for stories by 
offering themes, cues, and occasions for reflection (see Chase, 1995, 2005; Holstein and 
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Gubrium, 1997). As Susan Chase (1995, p.12) points out this requires particular 
attention to asking questions which ‘invite the other’s story’. Good candidates are often 
concrete queries about how something happened which is of import in a narrator’s life 
(Riessman 2008, pp. 24-25).  
 
I usually began my interviews by briefly recapitulating the overall topics of the research 
project (family unification, moving to Sweden, and what this means for my 
interviewees’ rights and sense of belonging), explaining the format (1-1½ hours of 
informal conversation), thanking my informants for participating, requesting their 
permission to record the conversation (which was always granted), ensuring them of 
anonymity, and asking if they had any clarifying questions before we could begin. I 
then typically asked if they could start by telling me how they met each other and came 
to move to Sweden. Or if they had not already moved, how it came about that they were 
planning to leave? This generally worked well as a way of opening up the conversation 
and directing the interview to the experience of border crossing and transnational 
marriage which was both central to my research interest and pivotal events in my 
informants’ lives. Most interviewees responded by offering temporally ordered 
sequences of events and holding the floor without significant intervention from me for 
5-20 minutes. A few informants – couples and individual narrators – continued for up to 
an hour without interruptions. These opening accounts often ended with statements like 
‘so this is our story’, ‘that’s the story so far’ or ‘so that’s the short version’. Some ended 
their narration with a pause or invited me to ask questions. Other narratives had no 
easily identifiable ending.  
 
When the opening stories were over I would often ask informants to clarify key 
happenings to ensure I had understood them correctly. Or I invited narrators to expand 
on specific issues they had brought up. In this process the sequence of events was often 
retold and a richer account was woven adding more details of events, emotions, and 
often sub-narratives. I would then ask my informants to reflect on their use of EU law 
versus national rules and explore further their views on family migration regulation and 
participation in public debate or civil society activism. If, as was often the case, my 
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informants had already touched upon these topics in their story-telling, I would merely 
return the conversation to those issues. Otherwise, I would introduce the themes myself.  
 
A question which often generated thoughtful and interesting contributions concerned 
my informants’ sense of home (‘so what and where is home to you?’). Though themes 
of belonging or attachment were central to the project from the outset I was initially 
unsure about the best way to invite my informants’ reflections on this. The interview 
guide below puts the question using more theoretical or academic concepts of affiliation 
or community. Yet after a few try-outs I found out that asking about ‘home’ was 
helpful. This term from our ordinary language was easy to understand across cultural 
and linguistic barriers and seemed to make intuitive sense to most of my interviewees 
who responded well to it.  
 
In the interviews I not only sought to prompt my informants to tell their wider story of 
family unification and moving to Sweden with as much detail as possible. I also actively 
listened for such shorter stories which are often woven into the fibre of the larger 
narrative and help to give it meaning. Some interviewees offer many and rich anecdotes 
in response to questions or to illustrate and emphasize a point. According to Chase 
(2005) this is quite typical in the telling of stories. It indicates, she claims, the impact 
the event has made on the narrator who remembers it vividly. As with narratives 
generally these sub-narratives are moral tales with which the story-teller is making a 
claim and seeks to persuade listeners or readers.  
 
In qualitative and narrative interviewing the researcher is thus actively involved in the 
conversational construction of meaning. The positionality of the interviewer and 
specific rapport created in the situation help shape the stories told (Riessman, 2008; 
Holstein and Gubrium, 1997). Another researcher conducting a similar study might thus 
collect and construct a somewhat different interview material. Still, narratives should 
not differ too much. Most research participants came to the interview with a clear sense 
of having a story to tell reflected in the statement ‘so this is our story’. Many, as we 
have seen, had also told versions of this tale before to the media, although the 
anonymous and narrative interview situation allowed them to develop longer, more 
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complex storylines. Other qualitative studies among ethnic minority exiles find similar 
representations. 
 
Language and transcription 
In narrative research it is important not to ‘treat language as transparent’ but pay 
attention to how it conditions meaningful communication (Riessman, 1993, 2008). Even 
within the same language area different dialects and conventions abound reflecting 
geographical and class-based distinctions. These are usually important to how 
individuals are positioned, the cultural references that make sense to them and the 
symbolic capital they can mobilize. This is all the more evident in multi-lingual 
research. Many qualitative studies where speakers of more than one vernacular are 
involved therefore focuses on one or a few specific linguistic groups whose language 
the researcher speaks fluently or with considerable competence. That in turn helps to 
ensure that important connotations are not lost in translation. It also reduces power-
imbalances as informants are able to speak in their native tongue without third-person 
mediation.  
 
Yet because of the linguistic diversity of my informants, with interviewees from almost 
all regions of the world, such a scenario is hardly possible here. Instead, my interviews 
were conducted in either Danish or English. One exception was my conversation with 
Danish Julie and Australian Derek. They had found that it worked well for them when 
they both spoke their own native tongue. Derek explained that though he had learned 
Danish he no longer wished to speak it because of the ill treatment he felt he had been 
subjected to, as discussed in chapter four. This illustrates nicely the importance of 
language and communicative strategies for the narrative construction of identity 
especially in a politically charged terrain. 
 
The linguistic conditions of the interviews thus call for some reflection. In my 
conversation with Danish Anna and Turkish Enes, two young university students, Enes 
talked a lot about the role of language in his experience of cross border movement. He 
explained that though living and studying in Malmö he did not wish to learn Swedish. 
As long as he speaks English he can position himself as an international student – a 
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cosmopolitan identity that both he and Anna embrace. But if he learns Swedish he will 
speak it with an accent which will mark him out as an immigrant – an unwanted 
foreigner. Enes related this argument to the interview situation arguing that if I had been 
British I would have had greater mastery of English which would put me in a position 
of superiority in the conversation. Since, however, we were all speaking a second 
language this made us ‘almost equal’ (Interview with Anna and Enes 2011, p.31). I 
think Enes’ point is well taken as far as it goes. To be sure, any interview situation is 
marked by inequality between the interviewee who provides the material for research 
and the interviewer who has the privilege of interpreting and presenting what is said. 
But at least this inequality is not greatly enhanced by language differences. The medium 
of a common second language can help to level the playing field. Yet access to that 
medium is not evenly distributed and in a few interviews the non-Danish informants 
spoke English with some difficulties or not all. This affected my ability to understand 
what was being said and influenced the transcription and analysis. It also arguably 
affected their participation as these informants seemed less confident talking or 
struggled to express what they wanted to say.  
 
One interview had to be conducted in Danish and Spanish with the Danish informant, 
Martha, interpreting between me and her Guatemalan husband Guillermo. Though the 
couple usually spoke Spanish this mode of translation was normal for them when in 
company with Martha’s friends and family. As far as I could judge, Martha seemed to 
interpret loyally with few comments of her own. Guillermo, for his part, was an 
extraordinarily competent story-teller and with a very distinct voice of his own, albeit 
through translation, in the interview. Still, the process of translation greatly shaped the 
flow of the conversation and the form of their narrative interaction.  
 
All interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed by myself except in three 
cases where I relied on a temporary research assistant for the transcription. The style of 
transcription was simple. I wrote out verbatim what my informants said including false 
starts, laughs and longer pauses. As the object was not a socio-linguistic study I did not 
employ the more elaborate notation systems often used in for example conversation 
analysis (Riessman, 2008). In any case, the multi-lingual setting would not have been 
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conducive to such a close analysis of micro-structures and practices. When presenting 
quotes in the text I removed false starts where they made sentences unduly difficult to 
read and marked this with ‘...’. Where whole sentences are left out for reasons of space 
and readability this is likewise indicated with ‘...’. Words and sentences that I was 
unable to hear or make sense of in the transcription process are marked with [xxx]. 
Quotes from interviews in Danish I have translated into English. I kept my informants’ 
emphasis of particular words, indicated with italics, except where translation made these 
confusing. Especially in the interviews conducted in English most speakers, including 
the interviewer, make occasional grammatical errors. These are also maintained in the 
quotes since tidying up the language would in many cases be a rather invasive 
undertaking changing the rhythm and tone of the conversation. As I am exploring 
transnational lives, usually lived across linguistic boundaries, it is appropriate that this 
is reflected in the interview material.  
 
Narrative analysis 
Narrative analysis, as already pointed out, is distinguished from other qualitative 
strategies by its emphasis on stories. Where for example grounded theory methods often 
organize data according to different empirically generated codes and categories 
narrative analysis seeks to preserve and re-present narrative structures (Riessman, 2008; 
Chase, 2005). In approaching the data I followed this methodology while keeping in 
sight the project’s analytical focus on citizenship and border crossing. The analysis 
looked at each interview separately and then found patterns in the storylines between 
different conversations. Theoretically, my reading was informed by the thin/thick debate 
over citizenship and migration as well as by agonistic and deliberative democracy. At 
the same time I sought to remain empirically sensitive, allowing for unexpected 
storylines like ‘last resort’ and actively sought out contrasting findings (cf. Clarke, 
2005).  
 
I first identified chains of key events - the beginning of a relationship, the decision to go 
to Sweden, life abroad, and, where relevant, the subsequent move to Denmark. Here I 
primarily analyzed the opening stories my informants told in the beginning of the 
interviews. I employed what Riessman (2008, pp.53-54) calls thematic narrative 
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analysis. This is a type of narrative analysis ‘where the primary attention is on “what” is 
said rather than “how”, “to whom” or “for what purposes”.’ I thus organized the 
interviews into different groups according to the content of the stories. This initial 
coding process was largely inductive.   
 
This was followed by careful analysis of how my informants interpret and give meaning 
to their cross-border practices and experiences. I drew out the discourses they mobilize 
to make sense of their situation and justify their actions. How is identification and 
belonging constructed in anecdotes and longer sequences? What relation, if any, is 
articulated between practices of border crossing and public voice? Focus here is still on 
the content of narratives but with more attention to form as well. The analysis shifts 
back and forth between in-depth investigation of selected interviews and the broader 
data corpus. To give an example, examining in detail Martha’s story presented in 
chapter seven helped to orient my interpretive engagement with other narratives 
exploring similarities and differences and opening up new ways of organizing the 
interview corpus.   
 
When re-presenting my informants’ stories I use different textual strategies. In the 
initial content centred analysis I construct short biographies and storylines that are easy 
to convey and compare. Here I often paraphrase rather than reproduce extensive raw-
data. By contrast, when I analyze constructions of identity and stories of participation I 
use quotes, sometimes lengthy ones. This is to show the discourses informants draw on 
and the rhetorical devises they deploy like for example Martha’s term of ‘forced non-
marriage’. These sequences are offered as evidence to support my interpretations and 
allow readers to make their own judgements. To ensure anonymity all names of 
informants have been changed. Where interviewees have participated in public debate 
and especially if they or their partners have carried out illegal or semi-legal activities, 
further anonymization is carried out by changing background factors like country of 
origin or occupation. This is done carefully, with respect for markers of identity such as 
class and religion, in order to change as little as possible in the overall narrative.  
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The analysis seeks to present a nuanced picture of the data reflecting and exploring the 
diversity of the perspectives and articulations. I include stories that are overtly political 
and others that are less so as well as narratives tallying well with agonism and 
deliberative democracy and accounts resonating with liberalism or forum-shopping. I 
have also sought to ensure that the voices of differently situated informants are reflected 
in the analysis. There are vocal and activist interviewees like Charlotte as well as quiet 
and sombre informants like Jonas; citizens such as Ajda and Carsten and migrant 
spouses like Mary Ann and Jamil. I sought to maintain a reasonable balance in the 
amount of analytical attention given to political and less political narratives, although 
the former as the focus of the thesis is given more weight in order to carry out 
conceptual development.  
 
List of interviews 
Peter and Marielle, 2011 
Anja and Miguel, 2011 
Line and Jamil, 2011 
Katrine and Mark, 2011 
Laura, 2011 
Susanne and Lisbeth, 2011 
Aimeé, 2011 
Anna and Enes, 2011 
Helga and Bekim, 2011 
Carsten and Mary Ann, 2011 
Nikolaj and Natasha, 2011 
Eva, 2011 
Julie and Derek, 2011 
Maja and Enrique, 2011 
Helene and Jasper, 2011 
Carmen, 2012 
Charlotte, 2011 
Nina, 2011 
Astrid, 2011 
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Jakob and Daiyu, 2011 
Rebecca and Narayan (and Kayravi), 2011 
Martha and Guillermo, 2011 
Iris, 2011 
Aisha, 2011 
Maria, 2011 
Maiken and Selim, 2011 
Cecilie, 2011 
Ajda, 2011 
Jonas and Grace, 2011 
Nhean, 2011 
 
Table 1 
Interview participants 
Name Gender Age Education/ 
occupation 
Country of 
nationality 
Civil status 
Peter M 47 Engineer 
 
Denmark Married to Marielle 
Marielle F 28 Hairdresser  
 
Cote d’Ivoire Married to Peter  
Miguel M 26 Accountant and 
blacksmith 
Cuba Married to Anja 
Anja F 30 Student 
 
Denmark Married to Miguel 
Line F 32 NGO-worker 
 
Denmark Married to Jamil 
Jamil F 29 Care assistant  
 
Egypt and Sweden Married to Line 
Katrine F 23 Student 
 
Denmark Married to Mark 
Mark M 25 BA in construction 
management 
Canada Married to Katrine 
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Laura F 30 Student 
 
Denmark Married 
Susanne F 33 Insurance agent 
 
Sweden Married 
Lisbeth F About 
40 
Teacher  Denmark Married 
Aimeé F 25 Student (on maternity 
leave) 
Denmark Married 
Anna F 22 Student Denmark In relationship with 
Enes 
Enes M 29 Student Turkey In relationship with 
Anna 
Helga F Above 
60 
Retired Denmark Married to Bekim 
 
Bekim M 46 Self-taught 
construction worker 
Albania Married to Helga 
Carsten M 45 Student  Denmark Married to Mary 
Ann 
Mary Ann F 31 BA in management 
(on maternity leave) 
The Philippines Married to Carsten 
Nikolaj M 36 IT consultant, MSc Denmark Married to Natasha 
 
Natasha F 31 MSc and PhD in 
economics and maths 
Ukraine Married to Nikolaj 
Eva F 36 BA, unemployed 
 
Denmark In relationship 
Julie F 23 Student (on maternity 
leave) 
Denmark Engaged to Derek 
Derek M 24 Self-taught 
entrepreneur 
Australia Engaged to Julie 
Maja F 25 Student  
 
Denmark Married to Enrique 
Enrique F 29 Engineer, student 
 
Cuba Married to Maja 
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Helene F 47 Dentist 
 
Denmark Married to Jasper 
Jasper M 38 Degree in computer 
science, care worker 
Sudan Married to Helene 
Carmen F 42 Secretary 
 
Denmark Divorced, engaged  
Charlotte F 31 Engineer 
 
Denmark Married 
Nina F 27 Student 
 
Denmark In relationship 
Astrid F 31 Social worker 
 
Denmark Divorced 
Jakob M 25 Shipping broker 
 
Denmark Married to Daiyu 
Daiyu F 25 On maternity leave China Married to Jakob 
 
Rebecca F 30s MD, PhD 
 
Denmark Married to Narayan 
Narayan M 30s Self-taught cell phone 
technician 
Tanzania Married to Rebecca 
Kairavi F ? Home maker Kenya Widow (mother of 
Narayan) 
Martha F 22 Student Denmark Married to 
Guillermo 
Guillermo M 28 Self-taught social 
worker 
Guatemala Married to Martha 
Iris F 24 Student 
 
Canadian Married 
Aisha F 36 Hairdresser, 
unemployed 
Denmark Divorced, in 
relationship 
Maria F 31 Student, teacher 
 
Denmark Divorced 
Maiken F 26 Student 
 
Denmark Married to Selim 
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Selim M 32 Student 
 
Turkey Married to Maiken 
Cecilie F 25 Student 
 
Denmark Married 
Ajda F 23 Student 
 
Denmark Married 
Grace F 25 BA 
 
Denmark Married to Jonas 
Jonas M 24 Works for a transport 
company 
Denmark Married to Grace 
Nhean M 29 PhD Candidate Denmark Married 
 
Notes: Age, education/occupation, country of nationality and civil status at the time of the interview (with 
changes due to anonymization). 
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Interview guide 
 
The interview guide is organised around a set of themes and concepts central to the study: EU, 
rights, post-national identity, citizenship status, civic practice. The questions are meant as 
inspiration and are largely but not exclusively open-ended. A few seek explicitly to elicit critical 
reflections and justifications. The idea behind the interview guide is to provide different ways of 
inviting the informants to narrativize their experiences in the interview. Not all questions need 
to be asked in each interview and the order in which they are asked is not decisive. 
 
Disclaimer 
Thank you so much for agreeing to participate in my PhD study of family unification and 
citizenship. With your permission I record the interviews for the purpose of transcribing and 
analyzing them for the research project. The recordings will be treated confidentially and kept 
for the duration of the study after which they will be deleted. You are of course guaranteed 
anonymity. That is to say, when I use the interview material and retell you stories, names and 
features by which you might be recognized will be changed. Do you have any question or 
queries before we begin? 
 
Civic practice, rights, citizenship status 
 Could you tell me about how you came to live in Malmö? 
 Why do people like you move to Malmö? 
 How come you chose Malmö/Sweden? 
 What problems did you face that made you move to Sweden? 
 Some people who were affected by the new family unification regulation chose to 
express their discontent in public for example in the press. Is this something you have 
considered doing? 
 
Marriage and citizenship 
 How did you meet? 
 Describe the situation you found yourself in after you met your partner 
 Describe the situation you found yourself in after your wedding 
 So when you realized that your partner could not come to Denmark how did you react? 
 What were your thoughts? 
 How did it make you feel? 
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EU, rights, civic practice 
 So tell me about moving to Malmö? How did you go about it? 
 Could you tell me about the application process? 
 The rules seem rather complex. How did you figure out what to do? 
 You mentioned the EU-rules. Could you say a bit more how you made use of them? 
 It could be argued that by making use of EU-rules people like you are circumventing 
Danish law. What are your thoughts on this? 
 Is this acceptable do you think? 
 
Sense of belonging/post-national identity, EU 
 Tell me about your life here in Malmö 
 How do you find living here? 
 What about your spouse? 
 So you have lived in Malmö for [time period] – what are your thoughts on the future? 
 How do feel about going back to Denmark? 
 How about the future? 
 In terms of affiliation and community, how would you describe your-self?  
 Has this changed after you have been through this family unification process? 
 
Background information 
 Full names 
 Age 
 Nationality 
 Education/profession 
 Children 
 Time and duration of stay in Sweden/Denmark 
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APPENDIX II: ON NEWSPAPER DEBATE 
 
This appendix contains an analysis of the public debate over family unification in the 
two largest Danish broadsheets, the centre-right paper, Jyllands-Posten, and the centre-
left paper, Politiken. The two are selected because they constitute the ideological 
extremes within mainstream public discourse on migration issues and thus give a very 
broad sample of opinions.
76
 From these sources I collect, via the database Infomedia, all 
editorials, columns and letters to the editor containing the word family unification 
(familiesammenføring) in 2003. This year is chosen because of the intensity of the 
discussion as the effects of the 2002-restrictions of the law started to become visible. 
This public dispute led to significant changes in the regulation towards the end of the 
year as described in chapter three and five. Other years and other papers or media, for 
example television or blogs, could give a somewhat different picture and might be 
interesting to include in a larger study.  
 
It is a qualitative textual analysis. The material has been coded following a strategy of 
grounded theory (Clarke, 2005; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). In an iterative process of 
reading and re-reading the material I developed and adjusted the categories while 
drawing on political theory (Kelly, 2005; Okin, 1999; Miller, 1995) and insights from 
previous studies of Danish public discourse on migration (Hussain, 2000; Hervik, 2004; 
Karpantchof, 2003; Rydgren, 2004; Lægaard, 2005; Siim 2007). The texts are grouped 
according to five codes: ‘Rights-based international liberalism’, ‘State-feminism’, 
‘Ethno-nationalism’, ‘Social-democratic communitarianism’, and ‘Other’. A few 
articles articulate more than one discourse, but have been categorized after the text’s 
main argument. This coding is combined with a close, discourse-theoretically inspired 
analysis (Wetherell, 2001; Howarth, 2000) of how central concepts such as citizenship, 
rights and borders are constructed in the debate.  
 
Debating the right to love 
In the Danish debate a number of different positions are put forth concerning the 
regulation of family unification by citizens, politicians and newspaper editors. Some are 
                                                 
76
 For a critical analysis of the role of Danish media in the public debate over immigration, see Hussain 
2000.  
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in favour of a restrictive policy, while others argue against it. Their articulations and 
negotiations draw on discourses of liberty, feminism, social-democracy, and ethno-
nationalism. Yet across the board, a central theme is the idea of a right to love, which is 
interpreted in competing ways and related to different conceptions of community. This 
is what I examine in the following sections.  
 
Rights-based international liberalism 
The largest group of articles I have categorized under the label ‘rights-based 
internationalist liberalism’. Strongly supported and propagated by the editors of the 
social-liberal newspaper Politiken, it is a discourse found mainly though not exclusively 
in this paper. Apart from the editors themselves, it is expressed by a number of 
politicians from centre-left parties, especially by leading members of the small Social-
Liberal Party (Det Radikale Venstre). It is also put forth by a group of other debaters as 
well as a handful of citizens who are themselves personally affected by the law. 
  
Rights-based internationalist liberalism is a position which stresses the rights of Danish 
citizens and/or residents to live in Denmark with the partner of their choice. The general 
line of argument expressed here is that love knows no borders and the right to live in 
your home state with your closest family is essential to the concept of citizenship. As 
the former Minister of Economic Affairs and then leader of the Social-Liberal Party, 
Marianne Jelved, puts it: ‘A citizen must under all circumstances be able to reside in his 
or her country with his or her family.’ (Jelved, 2003; see also Politiken, 2003a-c; 
Hornsgaard, 2003; Andersen, 2003). 
 
The following quote from a letter to the editor by Anne Marie and Henrik Voldborg 
illustrates the argument: 
 
To fall in love with a foreigner and decide to get married is a big decision. 
To come home to Denmark with one’s partner and children and find out that 
one’s own little family is not welcome in Denmark is a horrible chock. 
Despair, impotence, anger, insecurity, anxiety and risk of depression, no, the 
feelings are indescribable. Most Danes, who were given the choice between 
living in Denmark or giving up their marriage, probably ask themselves 
what a Danish citizenship is worth in reality when one of the most basic 
rights is not respected, that is, the right to marry whom one wishes to 
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without being excluded from one’s own country. (Voldborg and Voldborg, 
2003)
 77
 
 
In this way the right to family unification, qua the right to love, becomes a fundamental 
freedom without which citizenship is an empty category. Though they do not write so 
explicitly Anne Marie and Henrik Voldborg’s letter to the editor gives the impression 
that they have some personal experience with the situation they describe, perhaps via 
friends or relatives.
78
  
 
Philip von Platen belongs to this small group of people who have chosen and been able 
to give voice in public to their personal grievances. He has helped fuel the debate over 
the restrictive regulation, and especially the attachment requirement, by drawing 
attention to its consequences for Danes living abroad. Von Platen tells his story in a 
letter to the editor in Jyllands-Posten 24 April 2003. A Danish citizen, he married an 
American woman. After living together for 18 years in the USA they decided to move 
to Denmark. The couple met the age requirements – both were obviously more than 24 
years old – but the application was denied because of the attachment requirement. Their 
joint connection was not, it was deemed, greater to Denmark than to any other country, 
and hence they could not get family unification (von Platen, 2004). Philip von Platen 
ends his letter to the editor with a very critical comment on the Danish regulation: 
 
Every week Danes are forced into involuntary exile - human beings whose 
only crime is to love a foreigner. It is these ruined lives which are hidden 
behind the government’s happy message that the restrictions are working 
because the number of family unification applications is dropping. … If 
Denmark wishes to be part of the global society then we cannot live with 
that Danes who go abroad must fear that they cannot come home and live a 
full life – unless they have remembered to marry a Dane. (von Platen 2004) 
 
The quote underlines again the importance of love in this discourse and how it is tied to 
mobility and cross-border movement. In a globalized era, it is pointed out, it is 
unreasonable to expect citizens not to fall in love and marry outside of the national 
community (see also Grove, 2003; Politiken, 2003c). As an ethnic majority citizens 
living abroad, von Platen is clearly not a member of the groups whose life the law 
                                                 
77
 I have translated all quotes in the empirical analysis from Danish to English.  
78
 Anne Maria Voldborg has also participated in Marriage without Borders. 
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specifically intended to regulate. This prompts us to examine more closely who has or 
has not a right to love.  
 
This is often slightly unclear. Some debaters refer to Danes (Wilson, 2003b; Gerner 
Nielsen, 2003b; Lemcke, 2003; Hollingbery, 2003a-b; Lind Simonsen, 2003; Grove, 
2003; Nørlem Sørensen, 2003). Others use the phrase Danish citizens (Nielsen, 2003; 
Gerner Nielsen, 2003a; Politiken, 2003a-c; Arestrup, 2003; Andersen, 2003; Jelved, 
2003). On the face of it, there does not seem to be a difference. The terms appear to be 
used, in the rights based discourse, more or less interchangeably. This suggests that a 
Dane is simply anyone holding a Danish passport. However the debate takes place in a 
context where ‘Danishness’ is a heavily loaded concept and often used in a rather more 
restrictive sense capturing only ethnic majority and not minority citizens (Karpantschof, 
2003, pp.35-36; Hussain, 2000). This underlies the preference for the more neutral 
concept of Danish citizenship on the part of some participants. Indeed there is an 
explicit fear of a ‘gradation of Danish citizenship’ (Politiken, 2003c) in the law as well 
as in the debate which would mean that this key status no longer entails the same rights 
and duties for all (see also Arestrup, 2003; Gerner Nielsen, 2003c; Shah, 2003; Sethi, 
2003; Politiken, 2003a). The right to love thus belongs to anyone who is a full member 
of this political community, the Danish state. 
 
Some takes this argument a step further and include denizens such as migrants and 
refugees. Rasmus Nørlem Sørensen (2003) puts it this way: ‘Let us … expand our 
criticism of the affiliation requirement and the marriage paternalism and fight for just 
laws for all in Denmark and not just [for] those who “resemble ourselves” enough for us 
to identify with their problems.’ The right to love and family unity within ones country 
of residence is constructed as a basic human right. While it requires a state to protect it, 
this right is assigned in principle to anyone who belongs to the universal community of 
the human species (see also Clausen, 2003; Kjær, 2003; Clemensen, 2003; Mortensen, 
2003; Svarre, 2003; Wilson, 2003a; Politiken, 2003a).  
 
The articles in this position thus strongly defend a right to love and family unity. They 
also, however, illustrate the classical liberal tension between universality and 
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particularity (cf. Benhabib, 2006, pp.30-33): Individuals have rights qua human beings, 
but these universal human rights are protected and upheld by ‘bounded communities’. 
This leaves vulnerable those whose political membership is uncertain.    
  
State-feminism 
A second group of texts are coded under the heading state-feminism. It is a smaller 
position put forth in both papers, though not by either’s board of editors. It is defended 
especially by the then Minister for Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs and 
Member of Parliament for the Liberal Party, Bertel Haarder. It also articulated by 
leading social-democratic parliamentarians, including the then party chairman, Mogens 
Lykketoft, as well as by a few other debaters. It is thus largely a liberal and social-
democratic discourse.  
 
The feminist position resembles the rights-based liberal internationalism in its focus on 
the right of individuals to make their own choices in life and love. It differs, however, in 
the assessment of how this goal is best achieved. The argument is that young ethnic 
minority men and especially women are pressed to marry partners they hardly know, let 
alone love – with detrimental effects for liberty and gender equality (Jørgensen, 2003; 
Mandel, 2003). It is pointed out that within, for example, the Turkish diaspora in 
Denmark it is customary for parents to arrange their children’s marriage (Haarder, 
2003d). Arranged marriages are in themselves seen as dubious from this perspective. 
They conflict with the ideals of personal autonomy and romantic love. Even when a 
young person consents to the match he or she may simple be giving in to subtle parental 
pressure (Mogensen and Nørgaard, 2003; Mandel, 2003).  
 
This problem, according the state-feminist line of argument, is aggravated by a 
particular practice of cross-border matrimony. Prior to the restrictive regulation of 
family unification parents and relatives often found a spouse for their children from the 
country of origin (Haarder, 2003d). According to two prominent feminist debaters, 
Britta Mogensen and Lone Nørgaard (2003), money, cultural practices and patriarchy 
interplay to produce this situation. ‘The … marriages are both a visa to the West and a 
successful attempt to uphold traditional values associated partly with female 
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suppression and partly with religious submission.' Because so much is at stake for the 
families involved – honour and prosperity - the young men and women often experience 
emotional blackmail, it is argued. Some who resist are subjected to threats, violence or, 
in worst case, murder (Mogensen and Nørgaard; Haarder, 2003a-c).  
 
Moreover, when the marriage is arranged with a spouse from the country of origin, this 
easily leads to a troubling socio-cultural gulf between husband and wife, some debaters 
point out. A former headmaster, Steen Flemming Jørgensen (2003) tells about a young 
Pakistani woman, just graduated from high school, who is now entering into a marriage 
with a cousin from Pakistan she does not know. Having spent only a few years in 
school, the spouse ‘can hardly calculate nor read. Now he is getting married to this 
young intelligent girl, who can look forward to years as a homemaker and mum.’ And 
he asks rhetorically: ‘[H]ow will the communication be between this well-educated and 
partly liberated woman and this man from some distant village, who has learned that 
women should be silent and take care of the home and his children?’ (Jørgensen, 2003; 
see also Haarder, 2003d)    
 
This matrimonial practice, it is stressed, thus prevents a group of youngsters in 
Denmark from exercising their right to love and it upholds grossly unequal gender 
relations (Sundoo, 2003; Haarder, 2003a). A restrictive family unification policy is 
therefore a necessary means to help some young adults ‘resist their parents and 
grandparents tyranny over who they should marry’ (Lykketoft and Meldgaard, 2003; 
see also Haarder, 2003a-b). As Bertel Haarder (2003a) argues: ‘It is the parents and 
family who violate human rights in this case – not the government.’   
 
Several debaters however recognize that the attachment requirement have unfortunate 
consequences for some men and women – mainly well-off ethnic majority citizens like 
my interviewees – who have fallen in love with foreigners. These negative side-effects 
of the law should be avoided, if possible, but not at the cost of letting down the minority 
youths who are in danger (Jensen, 2003; Jensen, 2003a-b; Lykketoft and Meldgaard, 
2003): As headmaster Isabelle Mandel (2003) puts it: 
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They who argue against the new rules for family unification underline 
precisely this, that human beings should be allowed to decide themselves 
who they fall in love with and wish to live with. This is a value we should 
defend. That is what this law is about – that also young persons with other 
homelands than Denmark should be allowed to choose freely. 
 
Seen from this perspective, Bertel Haarder argues, the new law is a success. And he 
quotes Fatih Alev, a Danish-Turkish Imam, for the following optimistic assessment of 
the rules: ‘”There are youngsters who see the restrictions as an advantage. Now the girls 
in particular can argue better in relation to their parents for why they do not wish to get 
married.”’(Alev in Haarder, 2003c; see also Jensen, 2003a).  
 
Hence, according to this state-feminist position, the right to love is protected and upheld 
– also for the vulnerable - by the government’s intervention, even if it means restricting 
to some extent this same right for the privileged. Similar arguments are found in the 
political theory literature on migration and multiculturalism. Some feminist scholars 
also stress the need for state protection of ethnic minority women against patriarchal 
family structures (see especially Okin, 1999, 2004; for nuanced discussion of family 
unification and forced marriages, see Phillips, 2007).
79
 The theoretical debate, however, 
often focuses on the necessity to restrict or abandon special rights for cultural and 
religious minority groups (see for example Barry, 2002). The state-feminist position in 
the family unification debate, by contrast, favours limiting the general, individual rights 
of all citizens to protect young immigrants.   
 
Ethno-nationalism 
A third, somewhat larger section of articles in the debate draws on what I refer to as an 
ethno-nationalist discourse. It is found mainly in Jyllands-Posten and defended by the 
editors of this paper. It is also put forth by a handful of centre-right parliamentarians 
and politicians, especially by Søren Krarup, reverend and prominent former Member of 
                                                 
79
 Susan Okin’s arguments are controversial and have been subjected to extensive criticism in the 
literature (Cohen et al., 1999; Kukathas, 2001; Shachar, 2001). Other political theorists are articulating 
different and more culturally sensitive feminist positions (see for example Shachar, 2001; Deveaux, 2006; 
Phillips, 2007; Mookherjee, 2009). While a similar diversity can be found in European public debates 
over for example headscarves, the predominant feminist discourse is severely critical of Islam and 
minority cultural practices (Sauer, 2009, pp.87-89; Scott, 2007, pp.151-174).    
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Parliament for the Danish People’s party. A few other debaters also support this 
position.  
 
Like the feminist discourse, the ethno-nationalist rhetoric provides support for a 
restrictive family unification policy. The reasons given are different, though. The 
overall argument is that the Danish nation and welfare state is threatened by extensive 
immigration via family unification (Moes, 2003; Jepsen, 2003; Krarup, 2003b). An 
editorial in Jyllands-Posten (2003a), for example, condemns the allegedly irresponsible 
social-democratic and social-liberal politicians whose lenient refugee and family 
unification policy admitted all these newcomers to the country. The problem is 
articulated as follows: 
 
Denmark has through the past 20 years experienced a massive immigration 
of uneducated people, typically Muslims, who… helped by some mad, 
unenlightened imams constitute an increasing burden on the Danish society. 
Not just because we are talking about people without education, who have 
primarily come to be provided for by the Danish welfare-system, but also 
because they have demonstrated a worrying unwillingness to become 
integrated into a society, they clearly view with skepticism and perhaps 
even hostility. (Jyllands-Posten, 2003a) 
 
Immigrants and Muslims in particular are thus portrayed as generally problematic – 
unskilled, lazy, sectarian and a threat to society. The new restrictive family unification 
policy is presented necessary to stop this further immigration (see also Bitsch, 2003; 
Jyllands-Posten, 2003d-e; Kristensen, 2003a-b; Jepsen, 2003)  
 
Some debaters admit that the law has had negative effects on Danes living abroad, as 
they are no longer able to return with their loved ones to their native country (Moes, 
2003; Larsen, 2003; Jyllands-Posten, 2003c). In response to Phillip von Platen’s letter to 
the editor referred earlier, Søren Krarup (2003b) expresses great sympathy, regretting 
the unhappy situation, which was not ‘the law’s intention’:  
 
Under normal circumstances we all would react with indignation to such a 
case. … But the fact of the matter is that because of 20 years of immigration 
policy madness (udlændingepolitisk vanvid) things are not normal. They are 
highly un-normal. We must protect ourselves against this. We must protect 
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Denmark against being overrun by the flood of migrants. This is why one 
cannot just move to Denmark when one feels like it. This is why there are 
requirements about age and attachment which must be met … and 
unfortunately we cannot distinguish between a Dane who has lived in the 
USA and Middle-Eastern immigrants. (Krarup 2003b) 
 
It is the danger of the present extraordinary situation for the country which makes it 
necessary to limit access to Denmark - even for Danes and their spouses (Krarup, 
2003b). The defence of the community overrides the rights of individual citizens in this 
discourse.  
 
Krarup later changes his view after hearing more sad stories from Danes abroad. He 
subsequently favours a revision of the law which does in fact distinguish between 
‘Danes’ and ‘Middle-Eastern immigrants’ (Krarup, 2003a). The former has a strong 
attachment to Denmark while the latter do not and the two should therefore not be 
treated alike. If Krarup means to differentiate between Danish citizens and immigrants 
with permanent residence this is not, perhaps, very remarkable. Citizen-status does 
generally provide a person with a wider set of rights and privileges (cf. Ersbøl, 2004, 
p.86; Joppke, 2009, p.vii). Yet elsewhere in the text there are indications that Krarup 
intends to make a distinction also within the category of citizens. He thus refers to 
‘culture and family ties’ and suggests that when it comes to acquiring Danish 
citizenship religion is a relevant criterion. ‘[I]f we are to evaluate someone’s possibility 
of becoming integrated into Danish society, religion is naturally something quite 
decisive. Christian Europeans have evidently quite different predispositions than 
Muslim Asians. That goes without saying.’ (Krarup 2003a) This suggests an 
ethnocentric or culturalist undertone where only those citizens with the right religion 
and cultural background are proper Danes. Interpreted thus, a right to love and family 
life in Denmark is put forth, but only for a subset of citizens. Only this, it appears, is 
compatible with protecting the Danish Kultur-Nation.  
 
Some support this differential treatment of ethnic majority and minority citizens 
(Larsen, 2003; Kristensen, 2003a). Others advocate distinguishing between foreigners 
from western and non-western countries applying for family unification (Moes, 2003; 
Jyllands-Posten, 2003d). If these strategies conflict with norms about equality and 
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human rights treatises against discrimination then perhaps it is time to revise or drop 
these international conventions, it is argued (Krarup, 2003b-c; Jyllands-Posten, 2003b; 
Moes, 2003). Niels B. Larsen formulates it thus: 
 
There is no doubt that the new rules concerning family unification affect 
persons whom it was not the law’s intention to affect. Let us therefore 
disregard [the] various conventions and decide ourselves. Let ethnic Danes, 
who fall in love abroad, freely bring home (indføre) their spouse. Denmark 
is an independent country - we should decide ourselves whom we want to 
have residing here. (Larsen, 2003)   
 
In this discourse, international human rights are seen as threatening national 
sovereignty. The same goes for the European Union which should not interfere with 
Danish immigration and family unification policy, according to a few debaters 
(Thomsen, 2003; Engel, 2003). If there is a right to reside in this country with a foreign 
spouse - and this is by no means certain - it is not a human right, but a right of 
citizenship or Danishness. Others may have a right to love, but this does not necessarily 
entail a right to family unification in Denmark. The two, according to Johnnie 
Schoelzer, should be disentangled: 
 
If immigrants residing here insist on finding their spouses in the home 
country this is … their own business. They are thereafter free to leave 
Denmark and move together to the chosen one’s home country. It is no 
natural law that family unification must always take place in Denmark. If 
they truly love their spouses there is hardly a problem in settling in the 
home country. Love, as is well known, conquers all. (Schoelzer, 2003) 
 
Taken together, then, this ethno-national discourse does allow for the right of (some) 
citizens to love and family life in Denmark with a foreign partner. But it is a highly 
circumscribed and exclusive right which can be overridden if the guarding of the 
national community requires so.  
 
The distinctions drawn in this discourse both between migrants and citizens and within 
different groups of citizens merit close attention. They build on a nationalism which 
underlines its cultural and not biological foundations. Hence a couple of the debaters 
explicitly stress that they are not racists (Moes, 2003; Krarup, 2003c). Yet the 
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understanding of culture put forth especially by members of the Danish People’s Party 
is highly essentialistic, portraying ‘Danes’ and ‘foreigners’ as inherently different. 
Moreover, the stereotypes of migrants and ethnic minorities sometimes articulated are 
very negative, generalizing and demeaning (Krarup, 2003a-b; Kristensen, 2003a-b). 
Hence at least some articles in this position fall in the category of neo- or cultural 
racism (cf. Hervik, 2004; Rydgren, 2004).  
 
Social-democratic communitarianism 
The last position identified in the debate I refer to as social-democratic communitarian. 
It consists of a small group of articles published mainly in Politiken. The authors are a 
couple of prominent social-democratic members of parliament and a few other debaters. 
It resembles the ethno-national discourse in its focus on the good of society, but also 
draws on elements from the state-feminist position with regards to universal rights and 
protection against forced marriages. Notwithstanding these similarities and overlaps, the 
texts in this position do have a distinct tone and argument with an emphasis on equal 
opportunities, socio-economic challenges, pragmatism and integration (Meldgaard, 
2003a-c; Lykketoft, 2003; Olsen, 2003; Kornø Rasmussen, 2003; Stub Jørgensen, 
2003).  
 
Like in the ethno-national position there is a worry that the arrival of too many 
immigrants with few educational skills and a very different cultural background can 
create big problems. But in contrast to this discourse, the social-democratic line of 
argument also stresses the rights and potentials of these new members and underlines 
the importance of inclusion (Lykketoft, 2003; Meldgaard, 2003a-c). Anne Marie 
Meldgaard, then spokesperson on foreigners for the Social-Democratic party in the 
Danish Parliament, puts it thus: 
 
Today’s integration policy is too poor. It is difficult for those foreigners who 
come to Denmark to get a good start. Rather than becoming team players 
many are being permanently benched. This is neither good for them or for 
the team. The Social-Democrats now believe this should change. 
Consequently, it is necessary to limit immigration in order to manage the 
integration of those we already share Denmark with. (Meldgaard 2003c) 
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Large groups of migrants and ethnic minorities, Meldgaard points out, are marginalized. 
This is problematic in itself, since these persons do not have the same possibilities of 
leading rich and fulfilling lives and becoming good citizens, she claims. Moreover, it 
can lead to sectarianism, religious fanaticism and social fragmentation. Hence, it must 
be prevented through a policy of ‘rights and duties’ (Meldgaard 2003c).  
 
As in the ethno-nationalist discourse a threatening cultural difference again plays a part 
in the construction of migrants which sets them apart from ‘old Danes’ (Meldgaard, 
2003c). But this otherness is not portrayed as an inherent feature. Practices can and 
should change. Foreigners can and should become ‘new Danes’ (Meldgaard, 2003c). 
Moreover, the cultural lens is supplemented with a class-based analysis. The problems 
that immigrants face are partly socio-economic and thus call for solidarity. This move 
makes the challenges appear more familiar and manageable. Scandinavian social-
democrats have a long history of combating social injustice in the nation state: 
 
We have abandoned the old, deep class divides and we will not watch 
passively while new ones emerge! Foreigners shall not make up the lowest 
echelons of society. They shall participate actively like all others. Therefore 
we have to solve the problems creating social in-equality. The Social-
Democrats will by all means hinder the emergence of a new lower class in 
Denmark whose behaviour is far from all we as a society can and should 
tolerate. We will fight against prejudice and discrimination and give new 
Danes, who have arrived here legally, the best possible conditions to join 
and get started. But we shall also clearly and unmistakably communicate 
that we expect and demand active engagement and acceptance of our 
society’s fundamental democratic values. (Meldgaard, 2003c) 
 
The new restrictive family unification regulation is viewed as a necessary element in a 
strategy for improving social integration: It limits the number of immigrants so as to 
better help those already present, and it hinders forced marriages which are 
incompatible with the values of democratic citizenship (Meldgaard, 2003a-c; Lykketoft, 
2003; Olsen, 2003).  
 
It is thus to some extent a utilitarian as well as paternalist discourse. The welfare of 
society is prioritized over the rights of individual citizens and the state intervenes to 
help ethnic minority youngsters. As in the state-feminist discourse, a right to love and 
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choose one’s own partner is defended against interfering relatives. But for pragmatic 
reasons it does not extend to a right to reside in Denmark with a foreign partner. This 
would endanger those very same rights and undermine the good of the social-
democratic community. Anne-Marie Meldgaard (2003b) explains that the Social-
Democrats ‘can accept the 24-years rule’ - reluctantly it seems - because the integration 
process seldom benefits from ‘family unification between a thoroughly Danish 
[pæredansk] girl with Turkish roots and her cousin from Turkey – regardless of whether 
it is a case of force or ordinary [sic] paternal pressure.’ She insists that ‘Social-
Democrats and others with a pragmatic attitude must ask for time-out [arbejdsro] from 
the self-righteous and others too frightened to solve [the problems]. It is those who yell 
“racist” or “bleeding liberal” [pladderhumanist] ... who brutalize the debate ... not us 
who tackle the problems.’ (Meldgaard, 2003b)   
 
For all the class-based rhetoric, the community which needs protecting is the nation. 
The struggle for equality takes place within its never questioned boundaries. The offer 
of equal membership, rights and duties, is only extended to those outsiders who have 
arrived legally. With restrictive policies for labour migration and family unification this 
is presumably few. This line of argument is reflected in contemporary political theory 
where some communitarian social-democrats argue that socio-economic justice is only 
attainable within the nation-state. Where else do we find the kind of inter-generational 
and inter-class trust and fellow-feeling necessary for re-distributive politics (Miller, 
1995; pp.91-92; cf. Walzer, 1983)? This position, however, leaves open the justification 
of borders and the question of international solidarity and equality (cf. Marx & Engels 
[1848] 1948; Pogge, 2002; Mezzadra, 2011; Ypi, 2012)  
 
Redrawing the boundaries of liberal democracy 
To sum up the analysis, we have seen how competing constructions of rights and 
community are put forth by participants in the debate in order to criticize or defend a 
restrictive family unification policy.  
 
A right to love is articulated by adherents of all four positions – liberal-international, 
state-feminist, ethno-nationalist and social-democratic communitarian. According to the 
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first group it is an unrestricted freedom which goes hand in hand with the right to family 
life in one’s home state. It is moreover central to the concept of citizenship or even to 
the protection of basic human dignity which all persons can claim. For the latter three 
positions, however, the right to love does not entail an unlimited right to family 
unification in a particular country; either because the protection of the right to love for 
some citizens against patriarchal family structures necessitates a break with family 
unification; or because the welfare of the nation would be jeopardized by an increase in 
culturally different migrants and/or socio-economic in-equality.  
 
Different conceptions of community are thus also at stake; Firstly, a liberal international 
community. There, rights are all that that binds people together, and borders are at least 
semi-open; secondly, an paternalist feminist state where the borders must be tightly 
regulated to ensure the freedom of the citizens; thirdly a nation that thrives behind 
closed borders and whose members are held together by an imagined common cultural 
heritage; and fourthly, a national community in which participants share rights and 
duties regardless of ethnicity and class, but where borders should be fairly closed.   
 
This public debate led to changes in the legal regulation, as described in chapter three 
and five. The result was a limited extension of citizens’ rights. In response to fierce 
criticism especially from Danes abroad the 28-years-rule was introduced by amending 
the attachment requirement. In strange ways the liberalization reflected a tenuous 
common ground between the extreme poles in the debate. Their fierce disagreement 
notwithstanding liberal-internationalists and ethno-nationalists all worried about the 
constraint on the right to love for at least some Danish citizens. The former got a minor 
concession, but still faced a very restrictive and possibly discriminatory regime – and 
were highly displeased. The latter secured the rights of not-quite-so-young ethnic 
majority Danes. They could not quite prevent large groups of minorities from enjoying 
a similar freedom, but got a new rule against transnational cousin-marriages thus again 
targeting particular groups of unwanted citizens. The boundaries of membership were 
temporarily redrawn and the interpretive struggle continued.   
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